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Editor’s Preface
The Journal of Retracing Africa (JORA) is honored to publish the second 
volume dedicated to some of the issues surrounding Africa’s socio-political 
and economic development. The attitude in the West over the last three 
decades has been to exaggerate and generalize problems in Africa and ignore many 
positive news that typify modern Africa. This unreliable approach has continued to 
becloud proper understanding of the problems African countries face, the domestic 
and external forces that created them, and the efforts Africans have  made 
to address them. The impression that Africa remains a lost continent persists 
in the minds of many in the Weste in spite of the fact that six out of the 
thirteen fastest-growing economies in the world are located in Africa: Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Mozambique, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and 
Ethiopia.1 As the World Bank’s June 2015 Global Economic Prospects reveals, these 
African countries possess the highest projected Compound Annual Growth Rate 
(CAGR) from 2014 through 2017.2  JORA publishes articles that provide a much 
more balanced and comprehensive analysis of the complex and challenging social, 
economic and political transformation in Africa since the precolonial period.
We witnessed a significant increase this year in submissions. This second 
volume of JORA includes three articles and 18 book reviews. In “Leadership and 
African Agency for Development in Post-Fifty Africa,” Chikwendu Christian 
Ukaegbu examines the remarkable progress made in Africa fifty years since 
independence, the obstacles that threatened to hinder the development of African 
economies, and the strategies to facilitate rapid economic development fifty 
years ahead. He argues that Africa’s future promises to be bright if political 
leaders in their various countries place “local human resources or domestic 
agency” at the epicenter of developmental process, abandon their “fixation on 
extractive economies,” and embrace a policy that “sees development as the primary 
responsibility of endogenous agency.”3 Emphasizing the importance of leadership 
as a critical agent of change, the author concludes that “Only countries that have 
transformational leadership embodied in a developmental state can achieve such a 
change in the highly competitive global economy.”4
The role played by the Aro sub-cultural Igbo group in the social, political, 
and economic development of Eastern Nigeria since the precolonial period has not 
1 World Bank Group, June 2015 Global Economic Prospects: The Global Economy in Transition
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, 2015).
2 Ibid.
3 Chikwendu Christian Ukaegbu, “Leadership and African Agency for Development in Post-Fifty 
Africa,” Journal of Retracing Africa 2, no. 1 (Fall 2015): 1.
4 Ibid., 26.
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been fully studied. In “The Dual Image of the Aro in Igbo Development History: 
An Aftermath of their Role in the Slave Trade,” Ndu Life Njoku argues that the 
Aro were at the center of the transformative (though controversial) activities that 
shaped the history of precolonial, colonial, and post-colonial eastern region of 
Nigeria. As Njoku shows, “the negative and positive experiences that neighboring 
Igbo communities had of the Aro since the fifteenth century helped to evoke 
hatred, fear, and horror on the one hand and wonder, awe, and admiration on 
the other.”5 The author concludes t ha t  that the contemporary perception of the 
Aro had roots in the dominant role they played during the era of the Atlantic Slave 
Trade and the assertive manner they confronted British administrators during 
the colonial rule. The British attitude to the Aro people was a mixture of reluctant 
admiration and mild resentment. As one official puts it, “Thirty- five years ago the 
country was opened up and we knew little about the natives, but we did realize 
that the Aro were very different from the other tribes in those parts.”6 Similarly, 
another official wrote that the Aro established “their relatively great intelligence, 
as compared with other native tribes.”7 On the other hand, the people’s use of 
that intelligence to outwit British colonial officials earned them a bad reputation. 
As one colonial official puts it, the Aro “have done a lot of harm as if they 
are sent to bring the mail they levy blackmail.”8 Njoku’s article offers a priceless 
insight into how dominant ethnic groups in Africa such as the Aro engaged with 
colonial rule and sometimes thrived economically despite the dictatorship that 
characterized colonial rule.
One of the major obstacles to the economic development of Africa, 
especially since the 1990s, is the relentless waves of terrorist attacks across the 
continent and the resultant sense of insecurity. Nowhere i n  Africa is this 
threat potentially more consequential than in Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy. 
In “Beyond Political Islam: Nigeria, the Boko Haram Crisis and the Imperative 
of National Consensus,” Simeon H.O. Alozieuwa shows how Nigeria’s social, 
economic, and political order has been increasingly challenged by the Boko 
Haram terrorist organization. Placing political variables at the center of his 
analysis, Alozieuwa argues that the “outburst” of the sect derived from the “sense of 
exclusion by some powerful political forces from the northern part of the country.”9 
5 Ndu Life Njoku, “The Dual Image of the Aro in Igbo Development History: An Aftermath of their 
Role in the Slave Trade,” Journal of Retracing Africa 2, no. 1 (Fall 2015): 29.
6 Rhodes House, Oxford MSS., Afr. S. 375 (3), The Resurrection of the Long Juju, 1908, 2.
7 Cd. 1768-10, Colonial Reports—Annual, no. 405, Southern Nigeria Report for 1902.
8 National Archive Enugu, CSE 1/86/43, 3rd Political Report, Major H. Trenchard, Ababaliki, March 
17, 1908.
9 Simeon H.O. Alozieuwa, “Beyond Political Islam: Nigeria, the Boko Haram Crisis and the 
Imperative of National Consensus,” Journal of Retracing Africa 2, no. 1 (Fall 2015):51.
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The author shows that Boko Haram has reshaped Nigeria’s political and security 
landscape, especially since 2002.10 It reveals that the activities of the sect have 
continued to create havoc across many northern states, threaten southern states, 
and scare foreign and local investors and workers. The sect has become more or less 
a criminal enterprise bent on irrational killings of innocent civilians in Nigeria, 
the highlights of which was the kidnapping of more than 200 young Muslim and 
Christian students at gunpoint while they were sleeping in their dormitories at 
the Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok, Borno state on April 14, 
2014. This article reminds us that the violence and destructiveness of Boko Haram 
poses a formidable threat to Nigeria’s attempts to construct a united, modern, and 
prosperous country.
The eighteen book reviews published in this volume capture the rich and 
complex experience that define modern Africa. They cover a wide range 
of periods, regions, and topics such as Middle Eastern immigrants in French 
colonial West Africa, dance and music in Malawi, war on drugs in modern 
Africa, agriculture and the challenge of food security, Africa’s foreign relations, 
healthcare and survival, imperialism and decolonization, postcolonial migration, 
identity crisis, the Cold War politics, women issues, and economic challenges. 
Our book reviewers brought their expertise to help our readers understand the 
diversity and richness of Africa’s histories, peoples, cultures, and societies. The 
articles together with the book reviews will certainly make for a fascinating read.
Special thanks are due to o u r  a uthors and book reviewers for their 
dedication, and for trusting us with their manuscripts. Many thanks to our readers 
for revising the manuscripts with care and intelligence. Without the dedication of 
members of the editorial team, this volume would not have appeared. Thank 
you. I am especially indebted to Drs. Tiffany F. Jones and Tamba M’bayo for 
accepting more than their fair share of responsibilities to ensure that this volume is 
published. This volume, more importantly, benefited from the unrelenting support 
of Berkeley Electronic Press, Eastern Kentucky University Libraries, University 
Programs at Eastern Kentucky University, the African/African-American Studies 
program and the Department of History at Eastern Kentucky University. I appreciate 
them.
Ogechi E. Anyanwu
         Editor-in-Chief.
10 Ibid.
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Leadership and African Agency for
Development in Post-Fifty Africa
Chikwendu Christian Ukaegbu
University of Wyoming and Dominican University
Abstract: The year 2010 was a model year for the celebration of fifty years of 
political independence among African countries. Assessments of the human 
condition in Africa show that the continent, especially sub-Saharan Africa, 
has lagged behind other regions of the world in terms of development. 
Based on the analysis of the constants of development, this paper argues that 
effective development is fundamentally driven by the maximum deployment 
of organized endogenous human agency defined as the capacity of individuals 
or groups to think, act, and impact their social environments. Because African 
agency was not properly shepherded in the first fifty years of independence, 
transformational leadership through the instrumentality of the developmental 
state is the path to effective development in post- fifty Africa. This requires 
three key development strategies namely, inserting local human resources 
or domestic agency to the center of development activity; exit from fixation 
on extractive economies to a deliberate policy of value-added production 
embodied in industrialization; and a paradigm of development knowledge that 
sees development as the primary responsibility of endogenous agency.
Keywords: Transformational, Leadership, Development, State, Agency, 
African, Infrastructure, Governance, Transactional, Value-added, 
Industrialization, Endogenous
Introduction
Seventeen African countries celebrated fifty years of independence in 2010. Many 
more march towards that milestone each passing year. Fifty years of independence 
from colonialism is worth celebrating. But sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has lagged 
behind other regions in the march to development whether defined as better quality 
of life, provision of basic needs, productive capacity, global competitiveness, or 
degree of technological advancement. At independence, this lag in development 
was attributed to the lack of qualified human resource; an absence of finance and 
technological capital; a postcolonial state that fanned the embers of antagonistic 
parochialidentities; and a peripheral participation in a world economy dominated 
by the great powers. These factors have become enduring aspects of Africa’s 
socioeconomic structure where structure is sociologically defined as enduring 
patterns of roles, positions, power, resources, and relationships that inhibit or 
2 | Leadership  African Agency
Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2015
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/
facilitate human agency.1 Agency refers to the thoughts and actions that individuals 
and/or groups deploy to impact their own lives, the lives of others, and the social 
institutions of their societies.2
The constraining effects of the structural factors mentioned above still 
manifest in one form or another to inhibit development in the region. However, 
continuing to blame them suggests that Africans are passive to structures from 
which they cannot free themselves. Africans are not slaves to structural conditions. 
Rather, domestic agency in each country awaits transformational leadership to 
lead citizens to unleash their hidden and untapped capabilities. The call for 
infusion of endogenous or domestic agency in development recognizes that 
humans are not blind and dull objects that carry out whatever is predetermined by 
structure; rather, they are active beings who individually or collectively use their 
knowledge and resources of their natural and social environments to transform their 
social institutions.3 Africans are hard working. They exert tremendous physical 
and mental energy as they incessantly struggle to keep body and soul together. 
That the investment of human resource in the last fifty years has not resulted in a 
better life for the majority means that African agency has not been channeled in 
an organized way.
In the context of national development, organized human agency, henceforth 
known as organized agency, occurs when the political leaders of a country 
consciously channel the motives, ideas, skills, and capabilities of their citizens 
toward assuming primary responsibility for transforming their societies. Organized 
agency is primarily endogenous or domestic, it exists and is harnessed within each 
country. But potentially useful exogenous or external agency can be borrowed when 
necessary. Organized agency derives from the sense of readiness to act that leaders 
inspire their citizens through development-oriented policies and plans, investment 
in physical and social infrastructure, support of domestic entrepreneurship and a 
conscious effort to place the citizens at the center of the development process.
Martin Meredith’s rigorous and dispassionate chronicle of lostopportunities 
in Africa’s first fifty years of independence corroborates the thrust of this paper 
that African agency was disorganized and wasted in the first five decades following 
1 Richard Munch, Sociological Theory: From the 1850s to the Present (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1994). 
Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1984); Anthony Giddens, “Structuralism, Post-Structuralism and the Production of 
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independence.4 The gross domestic products per capita (GDP/capita) of Ghana, 
Namibia, Gabon, and Cote d’Ivoire were higher than South Korea’s in 1960.5 By 
2008, South Korea’s GDP/capita had skyrocketed; the figures for Gabon and 
Cote d’Ivoire dropped from their 1960 levels while Ghana and Namibia posted 
infinitesimal increases.6 The United Nations Deputy Secretary General, Asha-Rose 
Migiro provided a reflexive perspective on Africa’s development dilemma saying:
as we celebrate Africa’s achievements, opportunities and potential, we 
must also honestly address the realities and challenges that confront the 
continent. Too many babies still die in infancy, too few children find 
places in school, too many farmers cannot get their crops to market, and 
too many factories lie idle for lack of spare parts, skills or investment.7
To effectively mobilize and deploy organized domestic agency, leaders of post-
fifty Africa should in a more direct way conceptualize the popular indicators of 
development as part of drivers of development. Popular indicators of development 
refer to generic factors exemplified by the indicators of human development 
reported in the United Nation’s annual Human Development Reports (HDR). 
The early measures which included life expectancy, literacy, and gross national 
income (GNP, now GNI) per capita8 have expanded to include measures such as 
gender empowerment, poverty, inequality, personal freedom, and so on.9 These 
measures are often interpreted as outcomes rather than causes of development 
because they appear as ends not as the means to development.
By contrast, there are indicators which catch the eye as the real drivers of 
development but are not given the attention they deserve in the discourse, 
policy, and practice of African development. These include the status of a country 
on technological inventions and innovations, the degree of creative destruction in 
the economy, technical competitiveness, investment in research and development, 
rate of value-added production, the degree of backward and forward integration in 
the national economy, the degree of industrial research and development, and the 
volume of value-added exports.
Scholarly attention to Africa’s development often centers on the generic 
4 Meredith Martin, The State of Africa: A History of Fifty years of Independence (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 2011).
5 Angus Maddison, “Historical Statistics of the World Economy GDP and Per Capita GDP: 1-2008 
AD,” accessed November 20, 2014, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm.
6 Ibid.
7 Ernest Harsch, “Weighing a Half Century of Independence: Beyond Hey Days and Sobering Reality 
Lies Untapped Potential,” Africa Renewal, August 2010, accessed November 20, 2014, http://www.
un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2010/weighing-half-century-independence.
8 UNDP, Human Development Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
9 UNDP, Human Development Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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measures. These real drivers of development in modern society are treated as if they 
are not reachable by Africans. Yet the latter were central to the transformation of 
the societies that are now known as developed nations. Indicators such as life 
expectancy, education, and GNI per capita indeed act as promoters of development 
because they help to build efficient human capital, the elements of agency, which 
help to drive the development process. The problem is that development theory 
and practice, including the human development reports, often treats these human 
development measures as dependent variables.
The highly anticipated Millennium Development Goals (MDG) is a case 
in point. Will the status of a developing nation change to that of a developed 
country if it meets all the expectations of MDG by 2015? What if the said country 
remains an extractive economy, possesses little or no value-added production, 
occupies a marginal place in global competitiveness and innovation, and remains 
captive to the vagaries of global commodity prices? As in previous cases of 
national development, whether in the Western nations or in latecomer nations, 
Africans must take primary responsibility for operating and expanding these 
drivers of development for societal transformation if the next fifty years are to 
be significantly better than the first half century of missed opportunities.
Cognizant of the centrality of organized domestic agency to national 
development, the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation emphasized that development 
is an endogenous and a self-reliant endeavor.10 It should stem from the heart of 
each society which in sovereignty defines its values and vision for the future, 
relies primarily on its members’ energies, its natural and cultural environment, 
and encourages participation by all.11 These insightful principles of development 
corroborate the history of ancient civilizations. They are consistent with the 
process of industrial development in Western societies. And they are verifiable 
from the experiences of successful latecomers to development from the first half 
of the 20th century to the present.
Drawing from the precepts of the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, embedded 
in the centrality of endogenous agency, this paper states that given the long history 
of national development in different countries at different epochs, the successful 
paths or what can be called the constants of national development are now 
well known in development theory and practice. It argues that a transformational 
leadership within a developmental state is the appropriate framework through 
which to shepherd citizens for the emergence and deployment of an organized 
10 Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, “What Now: Another Development,” (Uppsala, 1975), accessed 
May 15, 2012, http://www.dhf.uu.se/pdffiler/75_what_now.pdf.
11 Sheila Coronel and Kunda Dixit, “Setting the Context: The Development Debate Thirty Years After 
What Now Development,” Dialogue 47 (June 2006): 13-27.
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domestic agency for national development. National development, here, refers 
to the ability of citizens who under the leadership of a developmental state apply 
their mental and physical energies to transform their natural resources and social 
and economic environments for individual and national self-actualization.
The Centrality of Organized Endogenous Agency
Development has never been a gift from one developed nation to an underdeveloped 
other. There is hardly a case in history where the people of one society developed 
another society and altruistically handed it over to the latter as a gesture of 
goodwill. Foreigners who through colonization transformed the economies of 
other societies either decided to settle in the area and where settlement was 
not possible, they established intensive and extensive extractive mechanisms 
to transfer as much as possible the resources of the colony to the metropole.12 
Leaders and citizens or individual societies, therefore, have always been the 
prime movers of national development. That is why foreign aid is different 
from national development. Leaders of aid receiving countries decide whether to 
put aid to fruitful use or misuse it due to incompetence or corruption or both.13 Or 
still, leaders can become so complacent with or dependent on aid that they lose the 
motivation to aggressively pursue positive institutional change.14
Another endogenous agency-related constant is that development cannot 
be outsourced or offshored. A country where leaders are complacent with hiring 
outsiders to build and maintain their national infrastructure stands on the façade 
of development.15 Many natural-resource-rich countries that use their money 
to buy most of their basic needs and luxuries from other countries still have the 
characteristics of Third World countries. Therefore, heavy dependence on foreign 
skills inhibits development because national development is about what the people 
can do for themselves by themselves rather than what foreigners can do for them.
A country is defined as developed not only because it has high gross national 
income per capitam generated from the luck of having abundant natural resource 
a country is developed because it has the capability, through the skills and 
creativity of its people, to produce its needs of primary and value added products. 
12 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation,” The American Economic Review 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369-
1401.
13 William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Effort to Aid the Rest of the World 
Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. New York: Penguin Press, 2006). Robert Calderisi, The 
Trouble With Africa: Why Foreign Aid is Not Working (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
14 Dambisa Moyo, Why Aid is Not Working and Why There is a Better Way for Africa (New York: 
Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2007).
15 Harold Kerbo, World Poverty: Global Inequality and the Modern World System (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 2006).
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Almost all countries classified as developed nations or core countries exhibit this 
characteristic. They import their needs as a matter of choice based on their 
calculations of the economic gains of importation over domestic production. 
But when import-penetration threatens their economy they apply their human and 
natural resources to produce in order to continue meeting their needs. Here, we 
see development as primarily the national capability and capacity to produce rather 
than as improvement in the quality of life of citizens only. The World Bank 
put it succinctly; resource-rich countries may have substantial foreign exchange 
earnings, but this wealth may not translate into a country’s competitiveness or 
employment creation.16
By contrast, countries classified as developing have limited capability 
to produce value-added goods or to import them by choice. Importation of 
manufactured goods is a major component of their national budgets. The result 
is that high import penetration causes the structural distortionof the economy.17 
That is why Obafemi Awolowo observed that an underdeveloped country is one in 
which natural and human resources are partly unutilized, partly underutilized, and 
partly misutilized, and in which there is a gross deficiency in the quality of three 
production agents namely labor, capital, and organization.18
That development cannot be a gift from one developed country to a less 
developed other, nor can it be outsourced to people of other countries, is consistent 
with the principles prescribed by the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation. 
Development is therefore an endogenous and self-reliant endeavor. But 
supranational agencies undertake many projects designed to provide basic needs 
such as food, water, healthcare, education, and electricity in many sub-Saharan 
African countries. These are factors of foreign assistance for daily survival, 
not national development for self- actualization. The Tap Project launched in 
2007 by the United Nations Children’s Educational Fund (UNICEF) worked 
to provide clean water in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Mauritania, and 
Togo, one among a string of projects in Africa dating back to 1952.19 There are 
also those projects undertaken by international non-governmental organizations 
such as Africare, which has been working on economic development, women 
16 World Bank, World Development Report 2012-13: Jobs (Washington, D.C.: 2013).
17 Harold Kerbo, World Poverty: Global Inequality and the Modern World System (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 2006).
18 Obafemi Awolowo, “The Path to Economic Freedom in Developing Countries,” A Lecture 
Delivered at the University of Lagos, March 15, 1968, accessed May 16, 2012, usaafricadialogue@
googlegroups.com.
19 UNICEF TAP Project, http://www.unicefusa.org/mission/survival/water/tap-project; UNICEF 
History, Milestones, 1946 -1955, accessed November 19, 2014, http://www.unicef.org/about/history/
index_milestones_46_55.html.
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engagement, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene across Africa since 1970.20 
Therefore Africa has been receiving international assistance on basic needs from 
pre-independence to more than half a century after independence, yet the continent 
remains poor and underdeveloped.
The social disruption, human misery, and deaths that occurred in the Horn of 
Africa in 2011, especially Ethiopia and Somalia, due to drought in that year had 
been recurrent phenomena for many previous decades.21 John Dollar’s visual image 
of hunger in Ethiopia due to drought and famine in the time of Emperor Haile 
Selassie is not different from the situation which occurred in the same country in 
2011.22 Imagine that the countries in the Horn of Africa were located in Western 
Europe, Japan, or the region of the miracle economies of East Asia, the effects 
of drought in that region would long have been stably ameliorated using relevant 
technology, and organizational and managerial efficiency, to anticipate and control 
the situation.
Donor countries and supranational agencies continue to intervene across 
Africa to control age-old diseases such as malaria, polio, measles, and cholera. 
Lawrence O’Donnell, MSNBC’s anchor of The Last Word in the United States, in 
collaboration with UNICEF, established the Kids In Need of Desks (K.I.N.D.) 
project in 2010 to solicit funds for desks for Malawian school children.23 It procured 
40, 000 desks for school children in Malawi at the cost of $3 million in its first year.24
The project provided tens of thousands of desks to Malawian school children 
and their teachers for a better learning and teaching experience. The project also 
provided jobs and therefore was a source of livelihood for Malawians who built 
the desks.25 This great humanitarian accomplishment brought invaluable joy and 
enthusiasm to the school children as they enthusiastically offloaded their desks 
as the MSNBC camera beamed on their happy faces. O’Donnell, UNICEF, and 
donors from the United States and other countries deserve appreciation for their 
benevolence.
However, this magnanimous project underscores the marginal status of 
organized domestic agency in the development process in Africa. Was the lack 
20 Africare, accessed November 19, 2014, http://www.africare.org/africares-approach/.
21 Gabe Joselow, “World Bank Drought Plan Focuses on Ethiopia, Kenya,” accessed June 10, 
2012, www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/east/World-Bank-Drough--; IRIN, “Ethiopia: 
Somalis Living from Drought to Drought,” accessed May 15, 2012, www.Irinnews.org/report.
aspx?ReportId=93200.
22 “The Emperor’s Birthday,” DVD, Directed by John Dollar (New York: Filmmakers Library, 1992).
23 L. O. Donnell, “Last Word K.I.N.D. Fund, One Year Later” (December 15, 2011), accessed May 25, 
2012, www.thelastword.msn.com/_news/2011/12/15/9451755-last-word-kind-fund-one-year-later.
24 Ibid.
25 S. Muller. “Last Word K.I.N.D. Fund One Year Later,” accessed November 19, 2014, http://www.
msnbc.com/msnbc/last-word-kind-fund-one-year-later.
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of chairs in schools because of nonchalance on the part of the government, 
leadership deficit, bad management on the part of public bureaucrats, or was it that 
the Malawian nation really lacked $3 million with which to provide 40,000 chairs 
for school children? Desk-deficit schools abound in Sub-Saharan Africa including 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, South Africa, and more, with more deficits in rural 
than urban areas.26 No amount of donations will ensure sustainability of school 
supplies until Africans regularly make or buy the supplies by themselves.
An American physician was perturbed, indeed shocked, when she observed 
Nigerian physicians perform an emergency cesarean section without light due to 
lack of electricity.27 She quickly arranged for solar powered kits to be supplied 
free of charge to hospitals. But the reality of that country is that once the first set 
of supplies are out of order, they may neither be replaced nor be repaired. Hence 
the status quo ante of surgeries in lightless conditions will return. However, 
performing surgery in the dark would not be typical of hospitals in Nigeria 
given that installation of power generators as back up for the unsteady supply 
of electricity from the national grid has become a permanent feature of 
institutions and organizations. But it is also commonplace for power generators 
to breakdown and remain unrepaired for a considerable length of time. In such 
cases, organizations may work without electricity until the equipment is repaired 
or replaced. 
With much reliance on formal and informal foreign aid, leaders of African 
countries are yet to live up to the examples of newly developed countries such 
as those of East Asia and some parts of South Asia. Endogeneity suggests that 
‘development stem from the heart of each society as it defines its values and visions 
of its future while primarily relying on its own strength and resources in terms of 
human and natural resources’.28
It does not mean that countries should reject external assistance especially in 
times of emergency. Rather, leaders of African countries erroneously perceive 
external assistance as a permanent component of national development. Recent 
development successes in Asia occurred without significant foreign aid as a 
26 Abibatu. Kamara, “First Lady Receives 4000 Lap Desk for School Children,” accessed May 21, 
2012, http://awoko.org/2011/05/02/first-lady-receives-4000-lap-desk-for-school- children/; Yanhong 
Zhang, “Urban-Rural Literacy Gaps in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Roles of Socioeconomic Status and 
School Quality”, Comparative Education Review (November 200 Christie O’ Riley, “Solar Suitcase’ 
Saving Moms, Babies During Childbirth,” CNN, February 28, 2013, accessed March 18, 2013, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/28/health/ cnnheroes-stachel-solar-power.6): 581-602.
27 Christie O’ Riley, “Solar Suitcase’ Saving Moms, Babies During Childbirth,” CNN, February 28, 
2013, accessed March 18, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/28/health/ cnnheroes-stachel-solar-
power.
28 Dag Hammarskjold Foundation.
Ukaegbu  | 9
Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2015
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/
proportion of the recipient country’s income.29
William Easterly further noted that the West itself achieved gradual success 
through market and democratic reforms over many centuries, not through top-down 
‘big plans’ offered by outsiders.30
The pursuit and acceptance of foreign assistance, including basic needs, 
as normal and regular aspects of a country’s political economy and development 
strategy sideline endogenous agency from playing a central role in the development 
process. It perpetuates national psychological dependence on outsiders and 
prevents effective development from taking place. Endogenous agency, amongst 
other things, entails that countries deploy their human and natural resources to 
expand and deepen the productive sector especially in agriculture and industry, 
thereby expanding the store of resources and creating more wealth with which to 
provide for the needs of their people.
Another common characteristic of developmentally successful countries is 
that they combine import substitution and export-oriented industrialization. The 
history of development suggests that national wealth is not and should not be 
based on the extraction and marketing of natural resources alone. But African 
leaders have been fixated on extraction of natural resources. A monocultural 
economy is structurally incoherent because it lacks backward and forward linkages 
and the resulting multiplier effects that diversify and strengthen the economy.31 
In Nigeria where oil exploration started in 1958, the country has been unable to 
develop a robust capability for a sustainable backward linkage in the oil sector 
through domestic refining of crude oil for domestic use. Instead, it spends a lot of 
foreign currency on importation of petroleum products and depends on expertise 
from advanced countries to build its new refineries or maintain existing ones. The 
same is true of other African countries that boast of varieties of natural resources 
but whose leaders lack the knowledge of policies, or the courage to enact policies, 
that transform and upgrade those natural resources in the value chain.
Africa’s weak performance in value-added production was well captured in 
a recent conference announcement by the World Institute for Development 
Economics Research of the United Nations University. The conference held in 
June 2013, fifty-three years after the modal year of independence among African 
countries regretfully stated:
New evidence shows that between 1975 and 2005 the diversity and 
29 William. Easterly, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time by Jeffrey D. Sachs 
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sophistication of industrial production and exports declined in most 
African economies. Today, Africa’s industrial sector is in many ways 
less advanced than in the first decade following
independence.32
The industrial infrastructure established by former colonial masters in some 
countries may have sustained Africa’s industrial sector in the first decade 
but that industrial foundation was not sustained by post- independence political 
leadership. The United Nations Industrial Organization (UNIDO) cited by Jomo 
Sundaram, Oliver Schwank and Rodiger von Arnim observed that immediate 
post-independence Africa gained ground in labor intensive manufacturing until 
premature trade liberalization of the 1980s exposed African infant industries 
to global competition for which they were unprepared; the policy preference 
was simply to abandon existing industrial capacity thereby precipitating de- 
industrialization.33 Regardless of what the obstacles are, and no matter how much 
natural resources African countries have, the living conditions of the majority 
will not change for the better without economic diversification through the 
expansion of value-added production. Put another way, Africa must industrialize 
in order to achieve sustainable development. That is the story of the majority of 
developmentally successful countries. The primary sector, agriculture and other 
extractive activities, however, should not be neglected. Rather, and as in the 
case of South East Asia, agriculture and the entire extractive sector should be 
developed to full capacity to provide national food security and raw material to 
support value-added production for economic transactions in the global capitalist 
system.34 That brings up another truism about developmentally successful countries 
namely, countries, past and present, have attained development through active 
participation in the global capitalist system.
Even the former Soviet Union, a world power, with an economic system 
different from the world capitalist system had a partial attachment to the 
latter. Industrial development in Russia benefitted from Western capitalist 
entrepreneurship, technology, and management style before and immediately after 
the October Revolution of 1917 and the resultant establishment of a communist 
32 United Nations University. “Call for Papers, Learning to Compete: Industrial Policy in Africa”, 
(Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. 2013), accessed May 25, 2012, http://unu.edu/news/announcements/
seeking-papers-on-african-indust.
33 UNIDO cited in Jomo Sundaram, Oliver Schwank, Rodiger von Arnim, and Rodiger L.von 
Arnim, “Globalization and Development in SSA”, UN Department of Economic Affairs (DESA) 
Working Papers, No. 102, February 2011, accessed November 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/esa/desa/
papers/2011/wp102_2011.pdf.
34 Jan Kees van Dongee, David Henley, & Peter. Lewis, “Tracking Development in South- East Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa: The Primacy of Policy,” Development Policy Review 30, S1 (2012): S5-S24.
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state.35 Granted that East-West trade was minimal during the Soviet era, Russia 
used any opportunity afforded by trade to acquire valued Western technology.36 
China has enhanced its prosperity by fully participating in the global capitalist 
system. The miracle economies of East Asia and Japan attained their now enviable 
status by operating within the world capitalist system. Emerging economies are 
operating within the same system.
The global capitalist system is not altruistic. There is no Santa Claus in 
international relations. Leaders of developed nations often protect the interests of 
their countries first. Concessions are made, or gifts are given, in exchange for 
present or future material, cultural, or ideological gains. Hence only strong states 
in developing countries succeed in the world capitalist system. A strong state does 
not mean a dictatorship or the classic autocratic regime that obtains and maintains 
citizen compliance through the use of instruments of state terror.
A strong state means a government with sufficient organization, power, and 
freedom to achieve its development goals.37 According to Obafemi Awolowo, 
economic freedom exists where a sovereign country independent of outside control 
or direction organizes the exploitation and deployment of its total resources for the 
benefit of its people. The idea of a strong state, therefore, means that political 
leaders in post-fifty Africa will assert autonomy from domestic and foreign vested 
interests by enacting and implementing policies that are primarily in the best 
interest of their citizenry. In development theory and practice, a strong state is 
equivalent to a developmental state.38
A developmental state is proactive, interventionist, ambitious, autonomous, 
energetic, and courageous. It invokes nationalism and patriotism as it enacts, 
implements, and supervises its policies. It has a vision of where it wants to 
lead the country. It recognizes the dominant ideology of neoliberal globalization, 
operates within it, but is not slave to it. It situates its development policies and 
practices within its unique history and borrows relevant models from outsiders 
rather than depends on them. It uses national revenue to solve the people’s 
problems and invokes integrity and honesty in the allocation and investment of 
public resources. Furthermore, a developmental state believes that with good 
35 Peter Gatrell, “Reconceptualizing Russia’s Industrial Revolution), in Reconceptualizing the 
Industrial Revolution eds. Jeff Horn, Leonard N. Roseband, & Merritt Roe Smith (Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press. 2010) 229-250; Peter Stearns, The Industrial Revolution in World History (Boulder, CO.: 
Westview Press, 2013).
36 Daniel Yergin, “Politics & Soviet-American Trade: The Three Questions,” Foreign Affairs, April 
1977.
37 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the 
European World Economy in the 16th Century (New York: Academic Press, 1976); Kerbo.
38 Kerbo, Ibid.
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leadership and organization, citizens can unleash their capabilities to multiply and 
add value to natural resources to uplift themselves and society on a sustainable 
basis. Hence a developmental state eschews a dependent mentality and promotes 
a sense of national self-efficacy where leaders and followers join to boldly take 
their developmental destiny in their own hands. Therefore, a developmental state 
is a champion of organized indigenous agency and national self-reliance.
A developmental state is similar to a transformational leadership. It has 
bold visions and takes bold steps to implement its visions.39 It makes leaders 
out of followers so that the latter can effectively mobilize the larger society to 
pursue the collective end.40 Subordinates of the apex leader in a developmental 
state have the ability to mobilize those below them. Cabinet officers in the 
executive branch of the central government, administrative heads and their 
aides at the provincial level, and local government functionaries have leadership 
capacity and enthusiasm for development as should the president of the country. 
The legislature at national and provincial levels of government in a developmental 
state is focused, courageous, imaginative, and makes transformational rather than 
mundane and self-serving laws.
Governors or administrative heads of provinces see the economic development 
of their provinces, states, regions, or districts as their primary responsibility, not the 
responsibility of the national government. Just as there are strong states, so 
should there be strong provinces, regions, or districts. The administrative head 
and elected and appointed officials of the Ashanti Region of Ghana, for example, 
should see the development of the region as their primary responsibility. That is 
why Arthur Stinchcombe defines a strong province or region as one that keeps the 
local part of a commercial flow of goods and services going, integrates that flow 
within a cosmopolitan system of flows governed by a central government, other 
provinces, or other sovereign states and builds institutions that arrange such things 
as residences, churches, education, retail trade, and other activities that make 
up life.41 Therefore, the distributionist governance practiced by provincial, state 
regional and local government officials in some African countries does not 
facilitate development. By distributionist governance I mean the habit of political 
officials at regional and local levels to be complacent with monthly or periodic 
allocations of revenues from the national government without making imaginative 
39 James Burns, Transforming Leadership (London: Atlantic Books, 2003).
40 Iain Hay, “Transformational Leadership,” accessed April 29, 2012, http://www. leadingtoday.
org/weleadinglearning/transformationalleaders; Mathew Kelly, (2003). Academic Advisers as 
Transformational Leaders. The Mentor: An Academic Journal, January 1, 2003, accessed June 2010 
http://.psu.edu/dus/mentor/03010mk.htm; Gary Yukl, Leadership in Organizations (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989).
41 Arthur Stinchcombe, “How Can Provinces Govern?” Unpublished Work in Progress.
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policies that can multiply those subventions by creating an environment that 
enables citizens to expand productive activity. All state and local governments 
in Nigeria depend on allocations from the national government for financing 
most of their programs and this creates a disincentive to maximize collection of 
internally generated revenue.42 The situation in Kenya and Ghana with respect 
to allocations to counties and district assemblies respectively is similar to that of 
Nigeria.43 Leaders of strong regions engage in regenerative governance by creating 
an environment for economic expansion, increased employment opportunities, 
and infrastructural modernization.
Consequently, the rule of thumb definition of development as improvement in 
the quality of life of citizens’ is no longer a helpful model for steering development 
in post-fifty Africa or anywhere for that matter. Resources with which to 
improve quality of life do not fall from the sky. National development is driven 
by the promotion of drivers of development through the deployment of organized 
individual and collective domestic agency embodied in the efforts and activities 
of the citizens themselves. Consistent with centrality of domestic agency 
on which this paper is anchored, achieving development in post-fifty Africa 
entails that African leaders of developmental states create appropriate conditions 
under which the creative and physical energies of their citizens will be optimally 
harnessed. Leaders of a developmental state or developmental regions can, 
for example, challenge and provide incentives to its universities to construct 
mini refineries as part of building domestic capability for a steady flow of 
petroleum products.44 Or national, regional and local governments of a country 
can strengthen, broaden and deepen national and regional entrepreneurship and 
the industrial sector by procuring all their operational needs from local firms.45
The Federal Executive Council of Nigeria, in 2010, approved the importation 
of one thousand plastic bins for the collection of garbage in the Federal Capital 
Territory, Abuja on the premise that products made by Nigerian firms were 
42 Michael Oseni, “Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) in Nigeria: A Panacea of Development,” 
European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 21, no. 1 (2013): 1052-1066, accessed 
November 24, 2014, http://www.journalsbank.com/ejhss_21_1.pdf.
43 Mwangi Kimenyi, “Kenyan Devolution and Resource Sharing Calculator,” Brookings, (October 
2013), Accessed November 24, 2014.; Daily Guide, Ghana, “District Assemblies’ Common Funds 
at 10%” (May 2013).
44 Chikwendu C Ukaegbu, “Leadership Fatalism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria: Imaginative 
Policymaking for Human Development,” Philosophia Africana 10, no 2 (2007): 161-182).
45 Chikwendu C. Ukaegbu, “Imaginative Policymaking for National Development,” The Guardian, 
(Lagos, Nigeria, October 28, 2010).
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inferior.46 A political elite that takes development seriously will see the purchase of 
local manufactures as a means to strengthen the manufacturing sector. In another 
instance, the government of Senegal accepted a paltry $13 million from a foreign 
firm to fish on its waters for four years. The superior technology of the foreign 
company quickly depleted the fish population, displaced indigenous fishermen and 
women, and increased unemployment and economic insecurity in the area.47 
Tanzania’s gold mine is a hotbed of conflict between foreign firms and local 
residents because the latter perceive themselves as marginal to a lucrative resource 
in their native land.48
Harold Kerbo noted that developmental states do not enter into international 
agreements that put their citizens in precarious positions.49 Other commentators 
note that the liberalization of trade occasioned by the IMF/World Bank structural 
adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s coupled with the influx of Chinese 
textiles in the 2000s have caused a significant decline of the textile sector in 
Lesotho, South Africa, Namibia, Swaziland, and Nigeria.50 The latter scenario 
is not conducive to Africa’s quest for development given the importance of the 
textile industry in the industrial development of nations.
A developmental state knows that globalization creates winners and losers, 
and that guided free trade rather than unbridled free trade has been the norm i n 
m a n y  of international economic transactions in the global system. For centuries, 
national governments have enacted laws, charted colonial and imperialistic paths, 
made policies, waged wars, negotiated and signed treaties, led business delegations, 
funded research and development, and designed strategies in search of positive 
outcomes for their national economies. These are elements of state intervention 
too. The British government played an active role in the 19th century Industrial 
Revolution previously attributed solely to the magic of the invisible hand.51 
Richard Lehne observed that government influence over business in America 
46  “EC Approves N927m for FCT Waste Bins,” Nigerian Tribune (September 23, 2010), accessed 
March 16, 2012, http://tribune.com.ng/index.php/ news/11458-fec-approves-n927m-for-fct-waste-
bins.
47 “Globalization: Winners and Losers,” DVD, Directed by Keely Purdue, Films for the Humanities 
and Sciences (Princeton, NJ: 2004).
48 Nicholas Bariyo, “Deadly Clashes at Tanzania Mine,” Wall Street Journal ( November 14, 2012), 
accessed http://www.online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324556304578119.
49 Kerbo.
50 Deborah. Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa ( London: Oxford 
University Press, 2009; Asianews, “Chinese Textile Tsunami Hits Africa” (April 26, 2005), accessed 
May 4, 2012, http://www.Asianews.it-en,Chinese-textile-tsunami-hitsAfrica. 
51 Jeff Horn, The Industrial Revolution: Milestones in Business History (Westport CT.: Greenwood 
Press, 2007); Patrick O’Brien, “Deconstructing The British Industrial Revolution As A Conjuncture 
and Paradigm for Global Economic History,” in Jeff Horn, 21-46.
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has even become more pervasive in recent decades.52 The British government 
played the role of a developmental state during the Industrial Revolution; so did 
German, Belgian, French, Portuguese, Spanish and Scandinavian governments in 
the industrial development of their respective countries.53
The UN’s Economic Report on Africa 2011, was premised on the thesis 
that Africa needed a developmental state even though it was a well-known fact 
that strong activist states enabled development in Southeast Asia, Japan, and other 
places where development had occurred in world history.54 Even Walt Whitman 
Rostow, a foremost protagonist of neoliberal, modernist developmentalism, 
assigns a central role to the state in his outline of stages of economic growth. 
According to Rostow, the takeoff of economic growth is characterized by the 
emergence to political power of a group prepared to regard the modernization 
of the economy as a serious high-order political business.55 We now know, from 
the East Asian experience, that a developmental state can emerge and operate 
successfully anywhere and at any time there emerges a political group that takes 
development seriously.
A developmental state is not an abstract entity. It is people, human beings, 
elected officials, plus bureaucrats and technocrats in leadership positions who 
are responsible for policy and action that empower their citizens to transform 
their socioeconomic environments. Aware of the circumstances of their own 
societies, leaders of a developmental state find ways to shepherd their citizens to 
prudently create, manage, and expand national or local financial, physical, social, 
and production infrastructure on the path to development. China currently earns the 
attention and respect of the world as its political elite successfully shepherds the 
national economy and human resources on the path to national development through 
prudent policies and management.
On the Importance of Prudent Management of Financial, Physical, 
and Social Infrastructure
Countries that make it in the development process seek ways to avoid the burdens 
52 Richard Lehne, Government and Business: American Political Economy in Comparative 
Perspective (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006).
53 Jeff Horn, et al., The Industrial Revolution: Milestones in History (Westport CT.: Greenwood Press, 
2007); Ian Inkster, “Cultural Engineering and the Industrialization of Japan” in Reconceptualizing 
the Industrial Revolution, Jeff Horn, Leonard. N. Roseband, and Merritt Roe Smith, eds. (Cambridge, 
Mass: MIT Press, 2010): 291-398.; Kristine Bruland, “Reconceptualizing Industrialization in 
Scandinavia in Horn,” 125-150.
54 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, “Economic Report on Africa, 2011: Governing 
Development in Africa, The Role of the State in Economic Transformation,” accessed November 
2012, http://www.uneca.org/era2011/ERA2011_ENG-fin-pdf.
55 Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960.
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of foreign debt. Avoidance of debt, especially external debt, is part of prudent 
financial management. For example, the cancellation of a sizeable chunk of 
Nigeria’s foreign debt by core countries in 2005 lifted it out of the debt burden. 
Nigeria paid the final installment of its foreign debt in April 2006. But in August 
2014, the head of the Debt Management Office put that country’s foreign debt at 
$9.38 billion.56 The latter is a conservative estimate because the World Bank and 
the World Fact Book noted that Nigeria’s external debt had reached $13 billion 
by 2011.57 At the present pace, Nigeria steadily marches towards re-incurring as 
much as the $18 billion debt forgiveness it received from international lenders less 
than a decade after.
Of the thirty-nine countries listed under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) initiative, thirty-three were in Sub-Saharan Africa and the majority of them 
had attained completion status, the point at which debt relief was irrevocable.58 If a 
primary objective of debt relief is to free up resources for social spending including 
more spending on health and education, that purpose stands defeated if, as in the 
case of Nigeria, these thirty-three SSA countries soon after debt forgiveness 
incur new debts, become re-saddled with the burden of debt servicing, and use 
the latter as an excuse for not spending on sectors such as education, health, 
poverty reduction, infrastructure, technology acquisition, and capital formation 
for economic modernization. Consistent with the central argument of this paper, 
avoiding the debt burden is the responsibility of state actors who themselves 
should be part of organized domestic agency. Countries that have made it on the 
journey to development have placed a premium on high quality education while at 
the same strengthening their economies.
Indicators of educational progress often cite quantity or enrollment trends but 
de-emphasize quality or how well education prepared its recipients to effectively 
function in their positions and roles in society. Flagship compendium of human 
development indicators, “Human Development Report” is a good example of the 
emphasis of quantity or rate of enrollment over quality or how much and how 
well students learn. The education component of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MGDs) is also premised on enrollment rather than on quality. But does 
progressive increase in enrollment in all levels of education mean the production 
56 O. Abioye and I. Onuba, “Nigeria’s External Debt Rises to $9.38 billion: DMO,”Punch Nigeria, 
August 20, 2014.
57 World Bank, International Debt Statistics (Washington, D.C. 2013); Central Intelligence Agency. 
Debt-External, The World fact Book, 2013, accessed November 19, 2015, www.gov.library/
publications/ theworl-factbook/rank.order/2079rank.html.
58 World Bank & International Monetary Fund, “Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative,” January 10, 2013.
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of human agents competent enough to lead and manage national development? A 
study of quality assurance in higher education in Sub-Saharan Africa conducted 
by Peter Materu (2007) further illustrates this problem. In that study, a university 
student in Ethiopia responded thus:
Most donors define African education success in terms of how many 
students are being graduated and how many students are in school. 
The quantity issue is of course one thing that should be addressed, but 
it shouldn’t be the whole mark of any education intervention in Africa. 
How an African resource could be better utilized by an African child 
for an African development should be the issue.59
That African education should produce an African child capable of utilizing 
an African resource for African development is consistent with the infusion of 
organized domestic agency in the development process. Studies of education in 
Africa leave doubts on the capacity of the educational institutions to effectively 
play this role. David Johnson laments that the children who complete primary 
schooling in Africa leave with unacceptably low levels of knowledge and skills.”60 
A study by Justin van Fleet cautioned that the prognosis for the economic future 
and social development of Africa was gloomy because over half of the children 
complete primary school without learning basic skills.61 Peter Materu notes that 
poor governance and insufficient qualified academic staff contribute to decline in 
the quality of higher education in Africa.62 Otherwise why would international 
agencies, including the World Bank, and national governments spend tremendous 
amounts of financial and human resources on an alternative concept known as 
capacity building in Africa?63
Capacity building entails the enhancement of skills and capabilities of 
individuals and groups to enable them to be effective participants in their social 
and economic environment. Educational institutions around the world play this 
role. One can surmise that the proliferation of capacity- building programs in Africa 
by national, international, and supranational agencies in the last three decades 
means that national education systems have lost their ability to continue to play 
59 Peter Materu, “Higher Education Quality Assurance in sub-Saharan Africa: Status, Challenges, 
Opportunities, and Promising Practices,” The World Bank Working Paper, No.124. 2007.
60 David Johnson, The Changing Landscape of Education in Africa: Quality, Equality and Democracy 
(Oxford: Symposium Books, 2008).
61 Justin van Fleet, “Africa’s Education Crisis: In School But Not Learning,” Brookings, (September 
17, 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2012/09/17-africa- education-crisis-van-
Fleet.
62 Materu.
63 World Bank, Capacity Building in Africa: An OECD Evaluation of World Bank Support’ 
(Washington, D.C. 2005).
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the role of producing human capital for effective leadership and management of 
the development process.
Worthy of emulation is Lee Kuan Yew and his People’s Action Party who 
as leaders of a developmental state were determined to promote the principle 
of an organized domestic agency for national development. They implemented a 
policy of massive economic restructuring with emphasis on technology, computer 
education, and human capital development, which led Singapore to develop as a 
leader in electronics, petrochemicals, and international trade.64
Granted that education is very important as a driver of development, higher 
education is not a sufficient condition. Studies show that most people in developed 
countries do not have university education.65 But the majority lives at middle class 
level. Studies in the United States have found a rise in the rate of unemployment.66 
The apparent oversubscription to higher education in some African countries is a 
function of weak economies dominated by preponderant numbers of ultra-micro 
and non-gainful economic activities in the ubiquitous informal sector. Strengthen 
the economy in such a way that secondary school graduates with or without 
additional short term vocational education can find gainful employment, and 
you will see a drop in the number of applicants to universities. Strengthen the 
economy in such a way that the majority of first degree graduates secure gainful 
employment, and you will see a drop in the number of students rushing to pursue 
higher degrees. In the ideal scenario, however, liberalization of and greater access 
to higher education in Africa continues. But those who pursue higher education 
will do so not because they see time in tertiary institutions or graduate education as 
a temporary diversion from the anxieties of joblessness, but because they actually 
want to and are capable of achieving educational success. This is the story of 
many developed countries.
Because the majority of the economic activity in Africa takes place in the 
unorganized informal sector where people are in an unending struggle to scrape 
by, the economy is unable to play the role of a receptacle for educated people. 
A developmental state shepherds citizens to bring organization, direction, and 
dynamism to the economy through imaginative laws, public policies and actions. In 
the end, additional investments greatly needed to improve the quality and quantity 
of education will achieve intended goals of producing citizens who can effectively 
64 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First:The Singapore Story, 1965-2000 (New York: Harper 
Collins, 2000).
65 OECD, “Education Policy Analysis: Focus on Higher Education 2005-2006,”accessed May 21, 
2012, http://www.oecd.org/education/skills-beyond-school/38140461.pdf.
66 Kelly Bedard and Douglas Herman, “Who Goes to Graduate/Professional School: The Importance 
of Economic Fluctuation, Undergraduate Field and Ability “accessed November 25, 2014, econ.ucsb.
edu/-kelly/grad_june06.pdf.
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conceptualize and implement national development goals.
That the development process entails conceptualization of visions and 
implementation of policies by the people of a given society is another constant. 
There have been lots of think tanks, blue prints, conferences and summits 
about everything in the purview of development in Africa. Everything said at 
conferences on the state of infrastructure in any African country can be summarized 
in one sentence, namely, something must be done about the poor state of physical 
infrastructure in that country. The U.S. - Africa Business Forum which took place 
in Washington D.C. on August 5, 2014 was no different. One of its sessions, 
“Powering Africa: Leading Developments in Infrastructure,” focused on the 
problems of physical infrastructure on the continent, especially the intractable 
deficiencies in the power sector.67
Therefore there is more than enough information which a developmental 
state can use to steer a country to the path of sustainable development. It is 
time to stop talking and start doing something. It is common knowledge that 
investment in physical infrastructure (roads, bridges, electricity, water works, 
rail, air, and sea ports) has several advantages in all societies.68 It is a sure source 
of creating jobs in a country. A developmental state can use it as an avenue to 
broaden, deepen, and strengthen the skill capacities of indigenous technical skills 
and the scale and scope of production in firms that supply construction inputs. 
The modernized items of infrastructure facilitate the movement of people, goods, 
and services. Good infrastructure is a powerful pull of domestic and foreign 
investments because capital responds positively to where conditions for doing 
business are most cost-effective.
The World Bank’s Regional Program for Enterprise Development (RPED) 
verified this proposition in a series of studies of African economies from the 1980s 
to the early 2000s. World Bank researchers lucidly defined the infrastructural 
problems of many African countries including Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Cameroon 
Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and others. Those studies observed 
the infrastrastructural deficiencies of many African countries and projected their 
costs to business activity.69 The Center for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) 
and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) jointly 
conducted similar studies and corroborated the findings of the RPED on the 
67 U.S.-Africa Business Forum, Mandarin Oriental Hotel: Washington, D.C. , August 5, 2014, accessed 
November, 26, 2014 http://usafricabusinessforum.bloomberg.org/#/agenda.
68 A. Ghani & C. Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding A Fractured World 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
69 World Bank, Pilot Investment Climate Assessment: An Assessment of the Private Sector 
in Nigeria. RPED (Washington, D.C. September 2002); See http://search.worldbank.org 
all?qterm+RPED&title=&filetype= for studies of various African countries.
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poor state of infrastructure in Africa.70
Similarly, a  s t u d y  o f  t h e  transport situation in Africa showed that 
only 14.2 percent of the roads in SSA were tarred and rail and air services 
deteriorated due to poor maintenance of railways and runways.71 Vivian Foster and 
Cecilia Briceño Garmendia report that forty-eight SSA countries generate the 
same amount of power as does only Spain; thirty countries experience power 
shortages and regular interruptions in service; and serious gaps exist in the 
various aspects of transport infrastructure and water supply.72 SSA started with 
stocks, similar to South or East Asia, of roads, telephone, and power but these 
regions had left Africa behind by the year 2000.73 Foster and Briceño-Garmenda 
attribute this slow pace of infrastructural development in SSA to constraints posed 
by geography, high costs of services, funding gaps, oil price shocks, political 
conflicts, and the high number of atomized or small nation-states, among others.74 
These are not good excuses for poor performance among African countries because 
the developmental state is all about surmounting constraints. There is no country 
that attained development without obstacles on its way.
Declare a national emergency in an African country on revolutionizing the 
national infrastructure through investments in public works. The result will be jobs, 
jobs, jobs; and more jobs if the inputs for the construction and maintenance of 
public works are sourced locally. It does not require special summits, white papers, 
or conferences, to know that a government that wants to inject domestic agency 
at the center o f  the development process can tie job creation to the contracts 
it awards indigenously and foreign-owned firms operating in agriculture, 
manufacturing, construction, or services in its country. Establish mechanisms 
to ensure that firms that win such contracts strictly adhere to the job creation 
requirements of contracts and insist that indigenous professionals have decision-
making positions, challenging roles, and avenues of learning by holding such jobs. 
The role of a developmental state, therefore, is to make and implement policies 
that enable private firms to make profit.75 Private firms, in the process, expand 
70 Mans Soderbom and Francis Teal, The Performance of Nigerian Manufacturing Firms: Report of 
the Nigerian Enterprise Survey, 2001 (Oxford: Center for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) & 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2002).
71 UNECA, “The Transport Situation in Africa”. United Nations Economic And Social Council: 
Economic Commission For Africa, Fifth Session of the Committee on Trade, Regional Cooperation 
and Integration (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 8-10, 2007), accessed September 15, 2013, http://
www1.uneca.org/Portals/ctrci/5th/The-transport- situation-Africa.pdf.
72 Vivian. Foster and Cecilia Briceno-Garmendia, “Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time For Transformation” 
(Washington, D.C.: Agence Francoise de Development & World Bank, 2010).
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Atul Kohli, State-Directed Industrialization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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production, and thereby create many employment opportunities that enhance 
the effective participation of domestic agency in development while eschewing 
corruption.
That unbridled corruption cripples the ability of a developing country’s 
governments to steer development is another constant. Corruption, the use of 
political power for private gain, is a familiar characteristic of human societies. 
While no society is exempt from it, it is more blatant and destructive in some 
than in others. Toke Aidt found a strong negative relationship between growth in 
wealth per capita–a measure of sustainable development–and corruption.76 Global 
Financial Integrity reports that Africa lost more than $854 billion through illicit 
financial outflows between
1970 and 2008 perpetrated by domestic and foreign actors; sub-Saharan 
Africa experienced the bulk of the illicit outflow.77 From what we know about 
development, countries that have been successful in the journey to development 
in the last fifty years have done so on the strength of high national savings as the 
experiences of the Tiger economies and China show. Loss of a significant bulk of 
national revenue to private bank accounts through corruption, high internal and 
external debts, the high costs of government in some countries, and the absence of 
strong national, regional, and local tax collection regimes constrain overall national 
savings in African countries. Hence prudent management of national revenue is a 
stock of positive domestic agency that leaders of countries need to exhibit in post-
fifty Africa.
Leadership and Domestic Agency for Post-Fifty Africa
What we know about development, or the constants of development, summarized 
above means that the governing elite of respective countries in post-fifty Africa at all 
levels of government must tow a path different from the previous fifty years. They 
should exert ownership of the development process and apply the developmental 
state as the tool with which to achieve development goals.
Jan Kees van Dongee, David Henley, and Peter Lewis observed that South 
East Asians were much poorer than Africans at the time of independence in the
1960s but by 2005, South East Asians were two and half times richer.78 When 
Lee Kuan Yew became Prime Minister in 1959, Singapore’s GNI per capita was 
76 Toke Aidt, “Corruption, Institutions, and Economic Development,” Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, 25(2) (2009): 271-291.
77 Dev Kar and Devon. Cartwright-Smith. “Illicit Financial Flows from Africa: Hidden Resource for 
Development,” Global Financial Integrity, March, 2010, accessed October 5, 2011, www.gfip.org/
index.php?option=content&task=view&id=299.
78 Jan Kees van Dongee, David Henley and Peter Lewis, “Tracking Development in South- East Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa: The Primacy of Policy,” Development Policy Review 30, (S1, 2012), S5-S24.
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$400,79 but it astronomically grew to $43,000 by 2011.80 This is a history-making 
performance and national development is about a nation making history. By 
contrast, the average GNI per capita in SSA in 2011 was only $1,257 the lowest 
among world regions with many countries in the region below $1000.81
Some may quibble that Singapore is a small city-state and therefore not 
comparable to most African countries in landmass, population, ethnic diversity 
and its attendant sociopolitical problems. The success of Lee Kuan Yew was not 
because of the small size of his country but because of his development-oriented 
mindset premised on an acute sense of personal independence (which he translated 
into state autonomy), plus his courage, a sense of self-efficacy and love for the 
progress of his people, traits which are not easily apparent in African leaders. 
African leaders may wish their countries to look like the United States of America 
or France, or for their cities to look like Paris, Shanghai, or Dubai but will not 
ask how those countries and cities got there. One of the strengths of Lee Kuan 
Yew is his ability to look at societies which have succeeded, identify what he 
could borrow from their experiences (external agency), and combine those with 
the strengths of his own society (endogenous agency).82
As the saying goes, “opportunity knocks but once.” Lost years and lost 
resources, natural resources especially, will never return. That 51 percent of SSA 
population live under $1.25 a day fifty years after independence is not a cheery 
situation.83 Nor should we cheer that 70-80 percent of Africans struggle to eke 
out a living in the unorganized, unpredictable, rough, and some tines, ungainful 
informal sector. That African leaders allow other societies to continue to dump 
their value-added goods on a continent with a weak industrial base does not elicit 
hope for industrial development in the near future. Reports about low standards 
of education as highlighted above also pose a handicap to national development.
That the development process in SSA has not been steered towards the 
infusion of an organized self-reliant agency is contrary to the history of pioneer 
developed countries of the West, the experience of recently developed countries 
of East Asia, and the ongoing high speed of national development in China. A 
former governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi laments 
79 Calestous Juma, “Development: Learning from Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew,” Belfer Center: Harvard 
University, January 30, 2013), accessed February 10, 2013, http:// belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
publication/22709/development.
80 World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, D.C: December 21, 2012), accessed 
March 21, 2013, http://databank.worldbank.org/databank/download/GNIPC.pdf.
81 Ibid.
82 Graham, Allison & Robert Blackwill, Lee Kuan Yew: The Grandmaster’s Insights on China, the 
United States, and the World (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2012).
83 United Nations, “The Millennium Development Goals Report 2011,” New York Times, June, 2011.
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that dependence on imports of manufactured goods coupled with a superficial 
manufacturing sector portends a continuously weak economic future for his 
country.84 The rest of SSA, except South Africa, falls within the scope of high 
dependence on imported manufactures.
High dependence on imports does not indicate a development process 
propelled by the society’s reliance on its own strength and resources, its members’ 
energies and its natural and cultural environment as rightly prescribed by The Dag 
Hammarskjold Foundation.85 High dependence on imports also corroborates the 
concern expressed by the World Institute for Development Economics Research 
that Africa’s industrial sector was less advanced fifty years after independence.86 
Mo Ibrahim noted that Africa’s lag in economic development rests squarely on the 
way Africans have governed themselves and no amount of aid, he says, can move the 
continent forward; hence Africans should get up and take on the responsibility of 
development.87 In the same vein, President Obama said to the Ghanaian parliament, 
“The future of Africa is up to Africans.”88
Ibrahim and Obama underscore the importance of endogenous and self-
reliant development. The future of Africa will not belong to Africans if they cannot 
establish sustainable backward and forward linkages in their economies through 
value-added production and if they continue to allow countries more hungry and 
aggressive to continue to exploit and use the continent’s natural resources to 
secure their own national development. Achieving endogeneity and self-reliance 
will therefore depend on how state actors in post-fifty Africa define their role. 
One way is to define the African development dilemma as a governance problem; 
the other is to see it as primarily a leadership question.
Governance Versus Leadership: Complementary Yet Distinct 
Governance means making and managing public or organizational policy, 
organizing people and material resources, controlling and encouraging 
subordinates to exercise skill and commitment to achieve excellence in a given 
set of assignments. In the realm of public affairs, governance refers to the range 
of policies public officials enact and actions they take to manage the affairs of 
84 “Central bank of Nigeria Governor Sanusi Lamido Sanusi (SLS) Responds to Some Internet 
Inquiries on Fuel Subsidy,” accessed March 10, 2013, Usaafricadialogue@googlegroups.com on 
behalf of Mobolaji Aluko, January 5, 2012.
85 Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, Ibid.
86 United Nations University.
87 Mo. Ibrahim, “How and Why Africa Should Solve its Problems,” This is Africa: A Global Perspective, 
July 25, 2013, accessed November 25, 2014. http://www.thisisafricaonline.com/ Perspectives/How-
and-why-Africa-should-solve-its-problems?ct=true.
88 Barack Obama, “Text of Obama’s Speech in Ghana. July 11, 2009,” accessed July 12, 2009, http://
www.washingpost.com/wp-content/article/2009/07/11.
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society.89
Good governance is highly necessary and very much needed in Africa 
because it can yield positive incremental change. Similar to transactional leadership 
the rate of change from good governance alone is slow and circumscribed.90 
Stepping into the path towards another half century, Africa needs more than 
ordinary managers of national affairs. The continent should aspire for leaders 
that move their people to achieve profound institutional change. The latter is the 
role of transformational leadership. In which case, leadership is different from 
governance. While good governance aspires to perfect the status quo, good 
leadership is determined to transform the status quo to a higher order. Truly, 
Africa’s development is both a leadership and governance problem. But leadership 
supersedes governance because a good or strong leader can inspire his/her followers 
to practice and sustain good governance practices. 
Leadership is a bundle of attributes and actions including knowledge, vision, 
courage, drive, imagination, determination, transparency, decisiveness, motivation, 
patriotism and nationalism deployed by occupants of strategic positions to move 
their citizens towards profound and positive societal transformations. According 
to Lee Kuan Yew,
All said and done, it is the creativity of the leadership, its willingness 
to learn from experience elsewhere, to implement good ideas quickly 
and decisively through an efficient public service, and to convince the 
majority of people that tough reforms are worth taking, that decide a 
country’s development and progress.91
This means that leadership creativity, a critical attribute of transformational 
leadership, will spread to citizens who then apply and expand their creative 
potentials to the highest possible levels.
In real terms, transformational leaders in post-fifty Africa will assert 
independence and exercise courage in making choices in the best interest of their 
countries within the global system of economic, political and cultural interaction. 
They will lead their people to return quality and excellence to education, 
revolutionize infrastructure and modernize productive activity in agriculture and 
industry; make a determined effort to shepherd the industrialization of their 
countries; insert indigenous professionals and labor at the center stage of building 
national infrastructure; and deploy imagination to make policies that generate 
89 Chikwendu C. Ukaegbu, “Development Lag and the Imperative of Transformational Leadership in 
Sub-Saharan Africa,” in Perspectives on Leadership in Africa, eds. Egodi Uchendu, et al. (Nsukka, 
Nigeria: Afro-Orbis Publishing, 2010).
90 Hay.
91 R. Velloor, cited in G. Allison & R. Blackwill.
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employment in public and private sectors of society.
Transformational leadership is inward looking but does not isolate 
its society from the global system. It assumes ownership of the national or 
local development problem depending on the layer of leadership. It enables 
followers to unleash hidden and untapped capabilities and brings transparency 
and accountability to the fore of national affairs. The motto of transformational 
leaders in post-fifty Africa should be, use the people’s money to solve the people’s 
problems.
The World Bank projects that the economies of sub-Saharan Africa would 
grow from 4.9 percent in 2013 to 5.2 percent in 2015 because of an increase 
in export volumes from several countries that discovered mineral deposits in 
recent years, namely Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, 
and Uganda.92 Oliver August added his voice to the list of optimists of Africa’s 
economic future.93 But some skeptics such as Richard Dowden see this optimism 
as greatly exaggerated because optimists talk about rise in GDP due to income 
from extractive sectors without mention of Africa’s place in manufacturing value 
added exports and the lack luster performance of African leaders in governance.94
Furthermore, the 2013 Human Development Report projects that 60 million 
people in Sub-Saharan Africa will still live in extreme poverty by 2050.95 That 
will be close to 100 years after the modal year of independence. One may say that 
60 million is substantially lower than the 371 million in extreme poverty in 2010.96 
By contrast, however, zero population and only 2 million people will be in extreme 
poverty in China and India respectively by 2050.97 The optimistic projections 
on China and India may derive from the speed, breadth, and depth of economic 
modernization especially in the export of manufactures ongoing in both countries.
In their analysis of the role of manufacturing in the future of global growth 
and innovation, James Manyika et al. identified leading countries on indicators 
such as value-added, production of energy and resource- intensive commodities, 
92 World Bank & International Bank for Reconstruction & Development, Global Economic Prospects: 
Sub-Saharan Africa Region, 2013 (Washington, D.C.: January 2013).
93 Oliver August, “Africa Rising: A Hopeful Continent,” The Economist, March 2, 2013, accessed April 
8, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21572377-african-lives-have-already-
greatly-improved-over-past-decade-says-oliver-august.
94 Richard Dowden “Africa: The Myth of Africa’s Rise,” Foreign Policy (January 4, 2013), accessed 
February 8, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/04/the_myth_ of_africa_s_rise; 
Richard Dowden, “Little evidence of ‘Africa Rising’ in Ibrahim Index of African Governance” 
October 1, 2014), accessed November 26, 2014 http://www. royalafricansociety.org/blog/little-
evidence-%E2%80%98africa-rising%E2%80%99- ibrahim-index-african-governance.
95 UNDP, Human Development Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
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technology innovators, and installed capacity of industrial robots.98 No African 
country was mentioned on any indicator of manufacturing. Further, a study of 
technology transfer conducted by the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (UNECA) found that Africa was the smallest importer of capital goods 
and the least favored destination of R&D projects.99 The findings of James 
Manyika et al. and UNECA are similar to the drivers of development listed at the 
beginning of the present paper. They are also consistent with the proposition 
that African political and economic leaders should treat both the indicators of 
industrial innovation and productivity and indicators of basic needs as drivers 
of development rather than treat the latter as ends in themselves.
Conclusion
The success of African countries in development in the next fifty years depends 
on a paradigm of development that accords unequivocal and dedicated primacy 
to domestic human power/agency. As the United Nations rightly observed, if 
African countries are to achieve substantial reduction in poverty, they need to go 
through a process of structural transformation involving a decrease in the share 
of agriculture and an increase in the share of industry and modern services.100 
African countries should not expect other countries to do this for them because 
it is a historical incontrovertibility that development is neither a gift nor can it be 
outsourced. More than fifty years of foreign aid or development assistance has 
not brought Africa close to achieving development as we know it in history. Only 
countries that have transformational leadership embodied in a developmental 
state can achieve such a change in the highly competitive global economy. The 
goal of transformational leadership is both to shepherd and empower citizens to 
define, own and surmount national development challenges by infusing organized 
indigenous agency into development vision and action. That is the history of 
development left by transformational leaders in both advanced countries and the 
newly developed ones.
Africa’s development, especially post-fifty Africa, will not be different. 
Inserting domestic agency at the center of national development requires 
government policies that challenge Africans to independently initiate and 
98 James Manyika et al., “Manufacturing the Future: The Next Era of Global Growth & Innovation”. 
McKinsey & Company, November 12, 2012, accessed April 21, 2013, http:// www.mckinsey.com/
insights/manufacturing/the_future_of_manufacturing.
99 UNECA, “A Technological Resurgence? Africa in the Global Flows of Technology,” UNECA Series 
on Technology Transfer for Africa’s Development, United Nations Publication, 2010.
100 UNDP, 2011.
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consummate development programs. It will also require a conscious policy and 
an unflinching determination by leaders to shepherd their countries to develop. 
Development studies started in advanced countries on the premise that poor 
countries needed help. The unintended effect of that premise is that it created 
a mentality of dependence on advanced countries by Africans including well-
educated African leaders. Effective infusion of domestic agency in national 
development will require a fundamental change in the content and substance of 
development knowledge from the present model that fetishizes external agency, 
especially the agency of foreign countries, to a paradigm that conceptualizes 
development as the sole responsibility of endogenous agency. The education 
sector will be at the forefront of the effort to redirect development theory and 
practice that emphasize an endogenous perspective.
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The Dual Image of the Aro in Igbo Development 
History: An Aftermath of their Role in the Slave 
Trade
Ndu Life Njoku
Imo State University, Owerri, Nigeria
Abstract: The Arochukwu people, popularly known as the Aro, are the most 
debated sub-cultural group in Igboland. The Aro, whose ancestral home is 
near the Cross River, and their co-Igbo neighbors were an integral part of 
the early history of the hinterland of the southeastern region of Nigeria. 
The Aro dominated commerce, politics, and religion in the region in pre- 
colonial times. With the introduction of the Atlantic slave trade in the fifteenth 
century, they emerged as significant players. The Aro’s role in the region in 
both precolonial and colonial times has shaped the way they are perceived in 
contemporary Igbo society. This article examines two sides of the image of 
the Aro people in contemporary Igbo society and argues that the negative and 
positive experiences that neighboring Igbo communities had of the Aro since 
the fifteenth century helped to evoke hatred, fear, and horror on the one hand, 
and wonder, awe, and admiration on the other. The article traces the origins of 
this dual perception of the Aro and analyzes the reasons why it persists.
Keywords: Southeastern Nigeria, Igboland, Aro, Slavery, Inter- group 
Relations, Trade, Precolonial era, the Atlantic Slave Trade, Migration, Diaspora
Introduction
The literature on inter-group relations in pre-colonial southeastern Nigeria 
acknowledges the influence of the Aro in the region.1 The Aro dominated their 
neighbors in the hinterland, especially during the era of the Atlantic slave trade. 
The leading role the Aro played in the slave trade led to their dominance and 
resulted in what came to be “the fear of the Aro” by neighboring communities, 
villages, and towns. This fear has in turn led to the generally held view that the 
overall Aro’s positive influence “also had a dark side.”2 The fear of the Aro was so 
strong that in the early years of colonial rule, a British official observed that Igbo 
and non-Igbo groups in the hinterland still dreaded their Aro neighbors.3 That fear 
1 K. O. Dike and F. Ekejiuba, The Aro of Southeastern Nigeria, 1650-1980: A Study of Socio-economic 
Formation and Transformation in Nigeria (Ibadan: University Press Ltd., 1990), 223-226. 
2 Kate Meagher, Identity Economics: Social Networks and the Informal Economy in Nigeria (Ibadan: 
Heinemann, 2010), 34.
3 G. Ugo Nwokeji, “The Atlantic Slave Trade and Population Density: A Historical Demography of 
the Biafran Hinterland,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 34, no. 3 (2000): 633.
30 | The Dual Image of the Aro
Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2015
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/
derived from the slave trade, which, as Inya Eteng argues, “left enduring hatred 
between the Aro and their war mercenaries, on one hand, and community-casualties 
of their slave raids, on the other.”4 Apollos Nwauwa insists that the Aro owe 
“their notoriety” not only to what they did with their famous religious deity, Ibini 
Ukpabi, but also to their skill in the formation and operation of a network of trading 
oligarchy, mainly in human cargoes, especially in the 18th and 19th centuries.5
From the era of the slave trade in Igboland there remains “an ambivalent 
social attitude of most people of various Igbo sub-groups toward their Aro 
neighbors.”6 This article discusses some of the factors that shaped this attitude 
toward the Aro within Igboland, and how in modern times a “dual image” of 
the Aro exists.7 It attempts to establish the veracity and nature of this dual image, 
as well as its ethno-historical underpinnings. Aro participation in the Atlantic slave 
trade is an especially important point of reference particularly because the scale of 
their activities and involvement in the trade constituted a critical turning point in 
their relations with their neighbors.
Aro Relations with their Neighbors
Decades before and after the fifteenth century, the southeastern region of Nigeria was 
characterized by great population movements, human settlements, and demographic 
changes resulting from migrations, raids, intra/ inter-ethnic squabbles, and various 
socio-economic tensions and challenges. Aro relations with the rest of their Igbo 
neighbors within this region can be interrogated in five important historical 
stages. The first was the pre-Atlantic stage. This stage, which began before 
1400, was the period when the forces which led to the basic formation of the 
Aro demographic composition, their fascinating state or kingdom, and their 
economy were systematically coming into fruition through an elaborate network 
based on a combination of the various institutions of trans-local connections.8 As K.O 
Dike and F. Ekejiuba note, early Aro demographic configuration and development 
4 Inya Eteng, Onye Ajuru Aju Anaghi Aju Onwe Ya: Ndi Igbo in Post-Civil War Crisis of Disunity, 
2004 Ahiajoku Lecture (Owerri: Ministry of Information, 2004), 46.
5 Apollos Nwauwa, “State Formation and Evolution of Kingship Revisited: A Case Study of the 
Origin of the Aro Kingdom,” in Between Tradition and Change: Sociopolitical and Economic 
Transformation among the Igbo of Nigeria, ed. Apollos Nwauwa and Ebere Onwudiwe (Glassboro: 
Goldline & Jacobs Publishing, 2012), 41.
6 Ndu Life Njoku, “The Atlantic Slave Trade, Environmental Changes, and Human Migrations in 
West Africa: the Case of the Aro of Southeastern Nigeria,” Igbo Studies Review 1 (2013): 32.
7 This is similar to the dual image of the Jews in English and American literature. See Jay L. Halio, 
ed., The Merchant of Venice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 4-5.
8 Njoku, “The Atlantic,” 20-23; Nigerian National Archives, Enugu (hereafter, NNAE.) H. F. Mathews, 
ARODIV 20/1/15: Being the various accounts of Intelligence Reports on the Aro Clan, Arochukwu 
District, Calabar, 1927; A. Harneit-Sievers, Constructions of Belonging: Igbo Communities and the 
Nigerian State in the Twentieth Century (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2006), 18-20.
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economy derived, on the one hand, from an internal source, that is, from a series of small-
scale migrations from the savanna fringes of the central plateau of the region, only to 
converge in the rainforests of the Cross River basin.9 No doubt, this laid the foundation 
for the transformation of the Aro economy through the intensification of agriculture, 
competition for productive resources, and the growth of commerce. On the other hand, 
an external source of change derived mainly from the Atlantic slave trade, which also 
increased the momentum of internal migrations.
The second stage, which dates from about 1500, was that of the Atlantic slave 
trade. The Aro economy had developed before the Atlantic slave trade began, but the 
Atlantic trade was an important agent of change that contributed in developing the 
perceptions of the Aro by their neighbors. The slave trade era witnessed the emergence 
of the three-legged Aro trading oligarchy: the commercial, the diplomatic, and 
the cosmological/oracular. Positioned as the middleman in the Euro-African trade, 
and eager to meet the demand for captives by rising up to the challenge of tapping 
the thickly populated Igbo hinterland, the Aro entered into various alliances with 
neighboring communities, availing them to the sought-after European trade goods 
and procuring slaves in exchange. They not only used their dreaded oracle, the Ibini 
Ukpabi, to achieve their commercial goals, but also hired people of neighboring 
Igbo war-like clans of Abam, Ohafia, Edda, and Nike to assist them with captive-
catching, expeditions, or raids, and to generally protect Aro interests and enforce 
their will whenever it was necessary to do so. The United States of America’s 
domination of the modern world is similar to the Aro influence in the area. R. C. 
Njoku succinctly captures this:
As the US today controls the world with superior technology and 
military muscle, the Aro employed the use of their all-powerful oracle, 
known as the Ibinukpabia (Long Juju), and their military alliance with 
the Ohafia, Abam and Eda as instruments of fear and domination. 
The Aro-Ohafia-Abam-Edda military alliance, like the US-led North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), accorded the Aro the military 
muscle to threaten and often raid other communities who were opposed 
to their commercial and religious interests.10
Thus, the Aro emerged as the leading captive-recruiting merchant class of the 
region.11 With the clear advantage they had over their neighbors, Aro traders seized 
and enslaved populations, grew wealthy by selling many slaves, while retaining 
9 For details, see Dike and Ekejiuba, 31.
10 R. C. Njoku, “Neoliberal Globalism in Microcosm: A Study of the Precolonial Igbo of Eastern 
Nigeria,” Mbari: The International Journal of Igbo Studies 1, no. 1 (2008): 59.
11 Martin Klein, “The Atlantic Slave Trade and Decentralized societies in West Africa,” Public 
Lecture, Imo State University, Owerri, Nigeria, January 22, 2000, 11.
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some for domestic use. By so doing, they were able to maintain and sustain a 
complex network of client-patron relationships across Igboland and beyond, with 
their Arochukwu homeland as the metropolis.
For the majority of people in the Igbo hinterland, the rise of the Atlantic slave 
trade led to high-level feelings of insecurity.12 As a result of Aro- instigated 
raids, many villages either had their community life disrupted or simply ceased 
to exist. That European officers in latter-day colonial Nigeria filed reports about 
villages that had been “exterminated” or “almost exterminated”13 suggests the 
prevalence of high incidences of raids to meet the demands of the trade, especially 
from the eighteenth century onward when the increasing demand in the Americas 
for African captives provoked changes in the interior of the Bight of Biafra.14 At the 
end of such raids, “the practice then was for majority of survivors to seek refuge, 
for instance, in nearby hilly or forested locations, where, in some cases, they might 
try to set up brand new communities; it was also not unusual for some survivors 
to escape to their maternal home, that is, the land of birth of their mothers.”15 
Available evidence indicates that during this period when the business of slaving 
was the most lucrative business available, households across Igboland became 
prepared to migrate at a moment’s notice, to change occupation, residences, 
and social networks with little apparent hesitation.16 The incessant sense of 
helpless preparedness and readiness to switch gears, in some cases, made the 
capacity to maintain recognizable and usable forms of collective solidarity and 
collaboration difficult. In the economic realm, the crisis which came in the wake 
of the Atlantic slave trade created major challenges related to maintaining the 
level of well-being for people of the non-exploiting classes at the lower ends of the 
slave market economy. Socially, the arrival of immigrants, European goods, and 
images that were perceived as “strange” created feelings of anxiety. Along 
with these were stories about cannibalism associated with the export trade, which 
created an atmosphere of fear and hatred for stranger elements, including the 
12 For details, see Njoku, “The Atlantic Slave Trade,” 26-28.
13 NNAE., F. A. Goodlife, “Intelligence Report on the Otanzu, Okigwe Division, Owerri Province, 
28935 CSE 1/1/5, 1933 & 1952; NNAE., I.R.P. Heslop, “Intelligence Report on the Nkalu Clan, Orlu 
District, Okigwe Division, Owerri Province, CSE 1/85/6197A, 1936.
14 Njoku, “The Atlantic Slave Trade,” 27-29; see, also, Ndu Life Njoku, “Women’s Resistance against 
the Slave Trade in Igboland, Southeastern Nigeria,” Ofo: Journal of Trans-Atlantic Studies 2, no. 1 
(June, 2012): 34.
15 Udochukwu E. Akukwe, (retired teacher, now trader, age 81), interview with author, Umuejechi, 
Nekede, Owerri, Imo State, December 15, 2013.
16 Chief Anthony Ogu, (trader, age 80), interview with author, Afor-Eziama Market, Eziama, Ikeduru, 
Imo State, November 28, 2014.
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Aro.17 In the face of the challenges that these developments posed, however, the 
Aro still triumphed. Over time they established settlements in parts of non-Aro 
Igboland and beyond, with invitation in some cases, along with large quantities of 
assorted gifts, from those desirous of their presence.18
The third stage is that of legitimate trade which began about the 
last decade of the eighteenth century. For the generality of the people of 
southeastern Nigeria, this stage was a critical period of commercial transition 
from trade in “human cargo” to trade mainly in oil palm products. Particularly for 
the Aro, the picture and challenge this new stage presented, as Chima Korieh points 
out, were such that “they were unable to monopolize the palm oil trade in the same 
way they had monopolized the slave trade. Unlike the slave trade, the production 
and marketing of palm oil were readily open to local competition since the oil 
could be produced by anyone who had access to the trees.”19
During this period of legitimate commence the Aro struggled to smoothly 
transition to agricultural production, thus threatening their control of the better 
part of the southeastern regional market. The difficulties the Aro faced in making 
this shift, coupled with the threat to their regional dominance, underscores the 
viewpoint that in the period before the legitimate trade, the Aro economy was 
indeed driven by the slave trade.
It also gives credence to the crisis of adaptation view expressed by A. G. 
Hopkins and others in reference to the Aro in the context of the legitimate trade 
that opened up a new market economy.20 However, that the transition diminished 
Aro control of trade did not mean a total collapse of their trading system. On the 
contrary, Aro hegemony did not end as they became active to some extent in 
the new palm produce trade in parts of the region by using old trading contacts, 
organizational skills, and capital accumulated during the slave trade. The stage 
of colonial rule saw a change in Aro regional position of dominance, with the 
proclamation by the British of a Protectorate over the whole of southern Nigeria 
in 1900. This political action automatically brought the Arochukwu district within 
the Old Calabar Administrative Province. The British understood clearly that to 
consolidate power in the conquered areas, they had to undermine the Aro influence. 
17 The initial story then was that those enslaved were taken to the coast for sale to ndi Potokiri, 
that is, people of Portugal, who would eat them up. Pa Nduka Clifford Opara (village elder, age: 
85+), interview with author, Umuokoro, Achi Mbieri, Mbaitoli, Imo State, December 18, 2013; and 
Udochukwu E. Akukwe. 
18 Uche Ohia, Patriotism and Community Development: A History of Arondizuogu Patriotic Union 
(Aba: Silverduck, 2007), 6-7.
19 Chima Korieh, “The Nineteenth Century Commercial Transition in West Africa: The Case of the 
Biafran Hinterland,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 34, no. 3 (2000): 597.
20 See, for example, the arguments of A. G. Hopkins as captured in Korieh, 597-598.
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As the British colonial officer, Colonel Moorhouse, put it: It was inevitable, in my 
opinion, that in the extension of the [British] Administration, there should be a 
conflict between the Government and the Aros in the conditions that existed at 
the time.” He insisted that “It was in order to break down the trade monopoly of 
the Aros far more than any missionary influence that the decision to open up the 
country was made.21
With colonial rule in place, the British embarked on an anti-Aro 
expedition between 1901 and 1902 during which they defeated the Aro. This 
defeat culminated in the destruction of their major source of influence - the Ibini 
Ukpabi oracle.22 The defeat of the Aro and the destruction of their oracle paved 
the way for the gradual introduction of Christianity and Western culture into 
Arochukwu and the rest of the Igbo territory.23 Although Western influence 
undermined Aro power in the region, the pre- conquest Aro-inspired migrations 
and intermingling yielded various forms of inter-group relationships between the 
Aro and their neighbors in the Igbo and even non-Igbo areas. Although Aro 
migrations and settlements had various long-lasting effects, the most prominent 
result is the permanent geographical dispersal of the Aro in various parts of Igboland 
and beyond, encapsulated in what is popularly referred to as the “Aro Diaspora.”24 
In spite of the many challenges which the Aro in the homeland and those “in 
Diaspora” had to face especially during the colonial era, quite a good number of 
them still distinguished themselves in the different areas they found themselves, 
often taking advantage of Western education to enhance their prestige. Such Aro 
sons as Mbonu Ojike, Alvan Ikoku, K. O. Mbadiwe, S. G. Ikoku, Reverend Inyama, 
to mention just a few, had the impact of their achievements felt in the post-colonial 
period in the fields of politics, education, and religion, among others.25 However, 
to what can the Aro be said to owe their ascendancy in Igboland? Moreover, what 
generally were their capabilities? To these questions, we now turn.
Domains of Aro Influence and Capabilities in Igboland
Aro traders were unarguably the driving-force behind Aro success and ascendancy 
in Igboland. The traders owed their reputation, influence, and dominance more 
to an accident of geographical location than to anything else. Arochukwu was 
21 Nigerian National Archives, Kaduna (NNAK), Minute dated 28/9/1920 attached to letter No. 2532 
of 17/12/21 in the file Conf. NO.80/1920.
22 The oracle, associated with immense religious and judicial powers, was the instrument of Aro 
commercial dominance in the Igbo country (and beyond): NNAE, ABADIST 20/1/3– Long Juju of 
Aro Report on, 1909-1923.
23 NNAE, ARODIV, 20/1/15, 13; NNAE., ARODIV, 31/1/55, 15.
24 Njoku, “The Atlantic,” 31-32; see Ohia, 6-8.
25 Dike and Ekejiuba, 325-329.
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strategically located around the Enyong Creek, which links it to the main artery 
of the Cross River system – “the highway by which ‘light and civilization’ would 
penetrate the remotest recesses of the terra incognita inhabited by the Ibo, the 
Ibibio and the Ogoja peoples.”26 Therefore, it had the advantage of commanding 
the gateway into the densely peopled Igbo hinterland, apart from being within easy 
reach of the main southeastern Nigerian coastal ports. Thus, with a location that 
was favorable, the Aro naturally manipulated their geographical advantage to gain 
high economic status.
Aside from a favorable geographical location, the Aro had the advantageous 
influence of the authority of the widely famed Ibini Ukpabi oracle. The oracle 
conferred on the Aro the appellation “Umu Chukwu” (“Children of the high 
God”), making them almost untouchable as they traversed the length and breadth 
of the Igbo territory.27 In addition, there was the Aro military alliance system which 
they relied on to protect their interests. They made use of the services of war-like 
neighboring Igbo clans who, even on short notice, served to ensure the protection 
of Aro interests in the region. Any analysis of the factors and strategies behind Aro 
success and dominant influence in Igboland is incomplete without recognizing the 
remarkable Aro spirit of enterprise and adventure, and their flexible social system 
embodied in the trinity of the trader, the diplomat, and the oracular agent. With their 
array of exotic wares, wherever the itinerant Aro trader paused, prominent men 
literally fell over each other to host him, and even tried to lure him to establish a 
resting place of sorts. Then, the readily available agent of the Aro oracle would 
act as a guide for consulting the oracle, and also serve as a guarantee for security 
along hazardous routes. Finally, the presence of the Aro diplomat was necessary 
for ending those inter-community feuds, which were adjudged unprofitable to Aro 
interest because of the challenges of insecurity they posed to travelers. Additionally, 
the presence of the diplomat was a known deterrent to attack from potential invaders 
because of both the fear of real or imaginary repercussion from the dreaded Aro 
oracle and the fear of the inevitable military reprisal that would certainly follow 
such action.28
The image of the Aro in Igbo development history hinged essentially on what 
constituted Aro sources of influence and capabilities, especially in the slave trade 
era. It is possible to present these in five distinct domains. The first is “the domain 
of human social capabilities.” This embodies Aro ability to apply common-sense 
26 A. E. Afigbo, “Trade and Politics on the Cross River Basin, 1895-1905,” Journal of the Historical 
Society of Ghana xiii, no. 1 (1972): 21.
27 Pa Michael Abiakam, (retired trader/village council elder, age 90+), interview with author, 
Ogonaluma, Umuoziri, Inyishi, Ikeduru, December 23, 2013; and Udochukwu E. Akukwe.
28 Ohia, 6.
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psychology in controlling the land and peoples of their homeland region. After 
mastering the regional land and river transportation network systems, Aro traders 
and diplomats divided the environment into two parts: the abode of “bush people,” 
whom they called ndu mba ohia, and the abode of “littoral people,” or ndu mba 
mmiri. While the “littoral people” consisted of all those who lived close to the 
coast, such as the Efiks and the Ijaws, “bush people” referred to those who lived in 
the hinterlands.29
Being in direct contact with the coast-based Europeans, the littoral 
communities were better armed and they were also largely organized under 
centralized political structures. Additionally, their men of authority occupied a 
strategic middleman position in the slave trade. By virtue of the geographic location 
of such communities, the Aro avoided raiding them for captives. Rather, exchange 
of trade goods, which included human cargo, and diplomatic cooperation with the 
leaders of these communities, mainly through the instrumentality of the Ibini Ukpabi, 
were the defining characteristics of the relationship between these communities and 
the Aro. On the other hand, seeing the “bush people” of the decentralized Igbo 
hinterland largely as people of “primitive tribes” that were very much uninformed 
about the goings-on in the coast-based Euro-African relations at the time, the Aro 
designated their abode as the main source of captive extraction. The abode of the 
littoral people was the main destination point of captives before shipment across 
the Atlantic. Little wonder then that the catchphrase for punishing a recalcitrant 
fellow in the Igbo hinterland during that period of insecurity was simply: iresi 
ya ndi mba mmiri;30 that is, “to sell the fellow off to the littoral people” or people 
of the coast. Furthermore, the Aro, not insensitive to local cultural forms, were 
thoughtful and smart to appropriate and put to use the important element of trust, 
building it into their unequal social relations with their neighbors. To facilitate this, 
they dutifully adopted the dialect of their host. Moreover, in recruiting professional 
load carriers from host communities, the Aro relied on the advice of local men of 
authority, whose trust and confidence they earned and to whom they gave material 
presents, but also a promise to provide for the load carriers’ security/protection. In 
addition, they re- invented the institution of Igbandu (“blood pact”) to service their 
trade relations. Whereas Igbandu was originally used, for instance, to re-establish 
confidence between disputants, especially in kinship relationships, the itinerant 
Aro trader used it in forming friendships and alliances with alien groups.31 In other 
words, they adapted the institution to establish strong links with non-Aro Igbo 
29 Pa Abiakam and Pa Opara.
30 Udochukwu E. Akukwe and Pa Opara.
31 For details, see, F. I. Ekejiuba, “Igba-Ndu: An Igbo Mechanism of Social Control and Adjustment,” 
African Notes VIII, no. 2 (1972): 9-24.
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sub-groups, thereby making it possible for them to gain entry into areas where 
a forcible entry would disrupt trade by generating hostility or resistance. Thus, 
Igbandu removed the element of mutual suspicion, established confidence in the 
contracting parties, and made it obligatory for local chiefs and men of authority 
to keep trade routes open and secure for Aro traders to ply their business without 
hindrance.
Next is “the domain of economic capabilities” under which the Aro 
became the major purveyors of European trade goods, including the exotic/ luxury 
ones, such as gun and gunpowder, obtained from within the abode of the littoral 
people. With such goods, they endeared themselves to the elites in the abode 
of “bush people,” and stimulated differences in wealth and social status in these 
communities. For instance, the possession of a gun by an individual, and the firing 
of gunshots during ceremonies, such as funerals, soon became indicators of a 
high-level social status.32 Thus, the Aro depended on the coast-bound export trade 
to generate luxury goods with which they increased their power and prestige 
vis-à-vis their neighbors. As a result of exposure to what was perceived by the 
standards of the time as “better things of life,” expectations were raised, and 
this “created in these areas a new class of men anxious to acquire wealth and titles 
– a class with whom the Aro also allied to extract captives through kidnapping and 
occasional raids.”33 Therefore, Aro dominance was based on wealth accumulation 
through trade and military power, as is evident in the politico-legal domain
With the influence and authority conferred on them by their oracle, the Aro 
became key negotiators in local socio-political disputes, enthroning the justice 
system of their oracle in the abode of the so-called “bush people.” With time, 
the Aro justice system became fundamental to the social organization of people 
in various parts of the Igbo hinterland.34 For instance, as an integral part of 
the traditional Igbo judicial system, consulting with the Ibini Ukpabi oracle at 
Arochukwu became an effective means of achieving genuine reconciliation and 
of re-establishing confidence between disputants whose relationship was so 
strained that normalcy was impaired. With their justice system installed, even 
without having to push ultimately for the acceptance of their political lordship, 
the Aro used the services of fighting allies to assert some quasi-political supremacy 
whenever the need arose. By the same token, however, the allies were also used to 
32 Chief Joseph Ndubuisi, (retired teacher, aged 75 years), interview with author, Obinkita, Arochukwu, 
Abia State, December 18, 2013; and Mazi Sunday Okoro, (retired teacher, aged 65 years), interview 
with author, Obinkita, Arochukwu, Abia State, December 18, 2014.
33 Udochukwu E. Akukwe.
34 See, for instance, NNAE, J.G.G. Allen, Intelligence Report on the Ngwa Clan, Vol. 1, 1933, 41; 
see, also Elizabeth Isichei, A History of Igbo People (London: Macmillan, 1976), 105; Pa Opara and 
Udochukwu E. Akukwe.
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raid for captives in the abode of the “bush people.”
The importance of the Ibini Ukpabi in Aro ascendancy should not be 
overstressed. As much as the oracle was paramount in the imposition of Aro 
hegemony, it operated in perfect symbiosis with the great Aro commercial acumen: 
the utilization of contacts made in the course of promoting it to advance Aro 
commercial interests, and vice versa. As pointed out earlier, the ability of the 
Aro to impose their authority in Igboland also rested on their military prowess. 
The exercise of the ability to implement this policy was, however, guided by 
tact because, as Alan Burns explains, the Aro were not a military people but 
owed their power to their relatively great intelligence when compared with the 
neighboring groups.35
Under the “domain of culture and cosmology,” the Aro advertised their 
oracular power and propagated the Ekpe/Okonko society in many parts of Igboland,36 
using the cult members to further expand their commercial interests. Remarkably 
with time, the use to which the Aro put their oracle contributed in influencing or 
changing Igbo cosmology, having impacted the Igbo worldview, as Aro agents 
were often invited to different parts of Igboland to help to establish local shrines, 
or Ihu Chukwu, of the great Chukwu, the high God of the Igbo pantheon. For the 
Aro, the spirito- psychic field involving occultism and the use of charms was very 
useful in the very dangerous business of slaving. Though risky, under the effective 
protection of their dreaded oracle, and distinguished as “children of the high 
God,” the Aro confidently strutted from one community to the other, directing the 
procurement and movement of captives.
Finally, there was “the domain of the physical environment.” With no 
encumbrances, the Aro travelled and traded extensively in the course of which 
they built up a sequence of resting places stretched out as a trade diaspora 
along the trade routes. The subsequent proliferation of Aro settlements in pre-
colonial Igboland was a corollary of these resting- places. According to David 
Northrup, the more important resting places gradually became trading centers, 
and finally Aro settlements.37 From these trading centers, new settlements were, 
in turn, founded owing either to Aro initiative or the initiative of a local man 
of authority. This was the genesis of “Aro imperialism,” which became the 
35 Sir Alan Burns, A History of Nigeria (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 215.
36 For information about the power of the Ekpe society, see NNAE File No. B 1680/15 J. N. Cheetam, 
“Report on Secret Societies,” 1915; see, also, John N. Oriji, “Transformations in Igbo Cosmology 
during the Slave Trade: A Study of the Genesis of Place-Names, Totems and Taboos,” in Nwauwa 
and Onwudiwe, eds., 106; and, F. Ekejiuba, “Aro Worldview: An Analysis of the Cosmological Ideas 
of Arochukwu People of Eastern Nigeria,” West African Religion, 8 (1970): 1-11.
37 David Northrup, Trade without Rulers: Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South-Eastern 
Nigeria (London: Oxford University Press, 1978): 126.
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foundation of effective Aro hegemony. Once a settlement was formed, as Uche 
Ohia notes, the Aro acquired landed property and took wives from among their 
host communities. Such affinities served both to ensure peaceful co-existence and 
to increase the size of Aro groups since, while freely marrying non- Aro women, 
the Aro men at the time never permitted their daughters to marry a non-Aro.38
Thus, the Aro migrated and settled permanently in choice or strategic parts of 
Igboland either to enable them advertise and promote the powers of their oracle, or 
simply to be better able, among other things, to tap captives from even the most 
isolated but well-populated hinterland communities. This strategy produced two 
types of Aro: “the Aro-uno,” the home-based Aro or those Aro who remained at 
home in Arochukwu, and “the Aro-mba” or “Aro- Uzo,” the Aro abroad or the Aro 
living outside the homeland.39 In other words, the strategy led to the formation of 
Arochukwu confederacies, which maintained direct links with the Atlantic market 
even though they were not under any central authority.40
With the inception of colonial rule in Nigeria, most non-Aro Igbo, for 
fear of domination, became determined to halt Aro expansion into neighboring 
territories, an expansion that had been going on for hundreds of years. In many 
cases, the Diaspora Aro soon began to be treated as “aliens,” especially under the 
Native Lands Acquisition ordinances of the British colonial state, notwithstanding 
the number of generations for which they had been settled in non-Aro areas, or the 
means through which they acquired titles to land. In some cases, they were made 
not to acquire land, or alienate it, without the permission of their indigenous 
landlords.41 In the final analysis, commercial reasons connected to the Atlantic 
trade were certainly not the exclusive motive for Aro migrations/settlement 
outside their immediate homeland, but they were, indeed, a powerful incentive 
for temporary or permanent movement of the Aro across the Arochukwu borders. 
They moved across their home borders in order to bridge different contexts in the 
commerce of the time, or, they just left Arochukwu as fortune-hunters in search 
of greener pastures elsewhere. Accordingly, Aro migrants can best be described as 
entrepreneurial pioneers, as bricoleurs making the best out of the changes associated 
with the trade of the Atlantic community. So, even though it is valid to say that 
the Atlantic trade did not shape or initiate Aro responses to changes in the region, 
it did set the parameters for the forms of change that took place in the area. For 
the Igbo hinterland area of southeastern Nigeria, migrations by a predatory group 
38 Ohia, 7.
39 Ibid.
40 G. Ugo Nwokeji’s The Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra: An African Society in the 
Atlantic World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
41 Njoku, “The Atlantic,” 31-32.
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like the Aro were undertaken to cope with environmental and demographic changes 
and demands occasioned by the slave trade and resistance to it. Thus, trade and 
environmentally instigated migrations resulted in the permanent geographical 
dispersal of the Aro in various parts of the Igbo territory and even beyond; but, 
for the same reason, they also form the background factors of what later led to 
their dual image.
Aro Dual Image
In the context of ethno-history, the dual image of a people rests upon their 
achievements, exploits, and performance recognized as impacting favorably or 
profitably and otherwise on some other people or groups. The dual image of the 
Aro is a function of the level of their overall attainment rooted at all levels of 
their material, psychic, and spiritual being. At the exoteric level, it derives from a 
people’s ethno-history and culture; that is, from the level of their material and non-
material achievements, modes and methods of living, and the story which is told, 
or history which is written, about them.42 Each group of people is a product of 
history. Their past has brought them to where they are today.
A dual image can be the attribute of an individual person or a group. An 
individual can have this image either as a result of what he has achieved as a person 
or by belonging to a group that has made a particular mark in human history 
because of its placement on the ladder of culture and civilization. Thus, a Mazi 
Nwachukwu Okoroafor of Arochukwu, even if he is a lily-livered fellow will 
attract, at least outside his Arochukwu homeland, the same dual image associated 
with an average Aro man because of the Aro exploits in the past. An individual 
achievement can be a freak occurrence, but a group’s achievement can, and 
usually does, gel into a system or what we may call “culture and civilization.”43 
Thus, for emphasis, the achievements and exploits of an individual cannot confer 
a dual image on a group, though a group’s achievement/exploits can confer a dual 
image on a person who belongs to it, even if he was an outright failure. That an 
individual’s exploits or achievements cannot give a group a dual image is like the 
old story or adage that a tree cannot make a forest, or one swallow makes a summer.
The exploits or achievements from which a dual image derives can fall into 
any of the following three fields of activity: i) mentifacts by which we mean mental 
constructs; ii) socio-facts or social institutions and usages; and iii) artifacts or 
tools for doing work. In the field of mentifacts are areas such as philosophy 
and ethics; in socio-facts things like religious, political, economic and legal 
42 A. I. Nwabughuogu, “Ugwu Ndi Igbo in the Nigerian Nation State,” Ugwu Abia (Umuahia: Ministry 
of Information, 2000): 33-34.
43 A. E. Afigbo, “Ugwu Isi Oji or the Blackman in the Context of Global Civilization,” Ugwu Abia, 
(Umuahia: Ministry of Information, 2000): 59.
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systems, social life and values, language, etc., count; and artifacts are such 
things as material tools for getting things done. Put in simpler terms, human social 
achievements and exploits can be compartmentalized into two large fields, the 
spirito-psychic and the mental-material fields. For pre-colonial Igboland, especially 
in the heydays of the Atlantic slave trade, the spirito-psychic field, which includes 
occult and oracular powers, was, in a sense, almost the exclusive playing turf of 
the Aro through the instrumentality of their Ibini Ukpabi oracle. With this oracle, 
Aro cosmological influence in the context of their relations with communities 
in the Igbo hinterland, for example, spread out to take Igboland (nay, the south-
eastern region) by storm.
Even though the mental-material field, in this case, Western science and 
technology, was the private domain of the West, the Aro were at least among 
the first of the hinterland southeastern Nigerian peoples to have a toehold claim 
in this field through their middleman position in the trans- Atlantic trade. Aro 
acquisition, through trade with Europeans at the coast of items such as gun and 
gun powder, umbrella, narrow, etc., at a fairly early historical age paid off for 
them as it constituted part of the secret of the dazzling successes they recorded in 
their many-sided relations with the rest of the Igbo. This trade, indeed, set the 
foundation for their early superior positive and popular image in Igboland, which 
became an important basis of their domination of the region. It is possible, now, to 
highlight some crucial aspects of this domination, which are germane to the issue 
of an Aro dual image in the area.
Igboland was predominantly a decentralized society whose growth and 
development, given the overall impact of the slave trade, was not in any way 
promoted by internal Aro exploitation for captives. Decentralized societies were 
victims rather than predators within the Atlantic slave system. There were two 
kinds of decentralized societies in the context of the slave trade: those raided by 
outsiders and those internally exploited for captives. Igboland fell into the second 
category. At no time did any neighboring non-Igbo group directly raid the Igbo 
for captives.44 Together with their allies, the Aro did. They masterminded the 
raiding of communities and sub-groups, especially in the Igbo hinterland, but 
were themselves never raided. To fall into the hands of an internal group of 
predators was, for all intents and purposes, worse than to be raided by outsiders. 
Aro-led internal exploitation of their own ethnic group proved quite disastrous for 
Igboland. Thus, by the middle of the 18th century the area had become one of the 
most important sources of slaves for the Euro-African trade.45
Further, it may well be that the internal Aro predatory role was mainly 
44 Njoku, “Women’s Resistance,” 33.
45 Northrup, chapters 1-3.
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responsible for the existence of the village-type political structure in most parts 
of Igboland, such as outside Oguta, Onitsha, and parts of western Igboland. The 
Aro strategy of internally exploiting and tapping Igboland inch by inch weakened 
societal solidarity and undermined any successful anti-slave resistance. With the 
Aro strategy of instigating inter- and intra-group squabbles, resistance could not 
be possible in the absence of a centralized authority.46 The strategy may have 
exposed the Aro to the generally advantageous small-scale political organization 
of non-Aro Igbo communities, which, at the time, they may have found suitable, 
at least in the short run, for their captive extraction business. But, in the long run, 
such a strategy also discouraged the game-changing move towards political 
centralization. As Kate Meagher rightly avers, Aro “predatory relationship 
with the Igbo hinterland, which involved the encouragement of slave raiding and 
other institutions of slave procurement, may have contributed to their inability 
to consolidate their extensive coordinating role into the formation of a centralized 
state.”47 In any case, the fact remains that, tapping one village after another was, 
par excellence, the Aro “divide and rule” policy, or a “divide and enslave” tactic, 
suitable to their slaving business since it kept local units fragmented and therefore 
vulnerable. 
The Aro, whose own in-built and self-perpetuating rationale for acquiring 
wealth through slaving activities was to see it more as a means of exchange than 
as means of production, contributed in building the foundations of a spineless 
feudalism in pre-colonial Igboland. They first led the way in inoculating the 
Igbo with the virus of a nouveau appetite for European trade goods, leading, in 
the end, to the “de-industrialization” of the indigenous economy.48 Next, they 
stimulated differences in wealth among the Igbo in a manner that paved way for 
a rabid acquisitive propensity and instigated the commoditization of “everything 
around them and the commercialization of life” leading to “the rise of mercenary 
instinct in a good number of the people.”49
46 It is obvious that the Aro preferred that the fragmented polities of Igboland remained decentralized 
and bound together by social and economic institutions, which Elizabeth Isichei in A History of the 
Igbo People (London: Macmillan, 1976) describes as “a dense network of tiny capillary veins,” 67.
47 Meagher, 32.
48 For details on some local industries that were affected, see NNAE, ABADIST 9/1/1303– Akwete 
Cloth Weaving, Aba Division, D.O. Aba to the Resident, Owerri Province, Umuahia, 18 June, 1947; 
NNAE OP. 1760 Vol. 1, Local Industries Ondist 12/1/1224; and NNAE Memo No. NS. 810/16 of 
May 31, 1938, from D.O. Nsukka to Senior Resident, Onitsha Province; according to P. A. Talbot, 
the “export trade in (local) cloth flourished until the third quarter of the nineteenth century, whence 
it gradually declined owing to great expansion in the import of Manchester goods.” P. A. Talbot, The 
Peoples of Southern Nigeria: A Sketch of their History, Ethnology and Languages with an Abstract 
of the 1921 Census Vol. 3 (London: Frank Cass, 1969), 941.
49 Victor Ukaogo, “Clapping with One Hand, Sleeping with One Eye: Repositioning the Igbo Agenda 
in a Competitive and Globalizing World,” Igbo Studies Review, 1 (2013): 111.
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Under the influence of the Aro, accumulating captives and selling them off 
into slavery became the much sought-after occupation in order to “get-rich quick” 
and as a means to provide revenue to purchase European goods. Domestically, it 
even became a class status symbol to acquire captives and use them as slaves. In 
fact, the growth of the local Aro-driven slave trade created sinister opportunities 
for capital accumulation by the elite, but also imposed burdens on the agricultural 
economy because of the undue emphasis on the enslavement process, the 
institutionalization of slavery, and the neglect of the subsistence sector due to the 
heightened commoditization of human beings.50 Thus, the Aro may be the precursors 
of “the negative entrepreneurial spirit that is today legendary and proverbial in 
Igboland.”51
In the area of cosmology, the proliferation of oracular deities in pre- colonial 
Igboland is traceable to the Aro. Monday Noah’s research shows that “the Long 
Juju,” as visiting Europeans nicknamed the Aro oracle, was specifically designed 
or re-designed for the commoditization of human beings, and might have been 
the largest single vault in the region “where human beings were held awaiting 
shipment.”52 Dike also considers the Aro oracle as the medium through which the 
captives exported from the ports of the Niger Delta were largely recruited, and 
estimates that half or more of the slaves exported from this region had passed 
through its mysterious portals.53 As we noted earlier, the influence of the Ibini 
Ukpabi contributed in changing Igbo cosmology, with deities and shrines 
mushrooming in different parts of Igboland as if in emulation of the Aro. Yet, the 
influence of the Aro oracle continued to dwarf other oracles such as the Igwekala 
of Umunoha, the Ogbunorie of Ifakala, the Amadioha of Eziama, the Agbala of 
Awka, the Kamalu of Ozuzu, etc.54 Given the foregoing, it may be difficult to rule out 
that, considering the extent of their cosmological impact on the rest of Igboland, 
the Aro may also have laid the institutional foundations of ritual slavery, or the Osu 
caste system, in parts of the Igbo hinterland.55
50 Njoku, “The Atlantic,” 28-29; this was in spite of the fact that the Aro brought new crops, such as 
Ede Aru – a special type of cocoyam allegedly introduced in Igboland by them (the Aro), as its name 
suggests. Pa Opara.
51 Ukaogo, 111.
52 Monday Noah, Old Calabar: The City-States and the Europeans (Uyo: Scholars Press, 1980), 75.
53 K. O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1956), 40-41.
54 For the role of the oracles in integrating Igboland, see Simon Ottenberg, “Ibo Oracles and Inter-
group Relations,” South-western Journal of Anthropology, xiv (1958): 295-317; Interview with Mr. 
Harrison Nwachukwu, aged 78 years, retired civil servant, Umunah, Orlu Local Government Area, 
Imo State, 21/12/2013.
55 The evidence on the institution of Osu “suggests that it is of relatively recent origin, and adopted its 
present form in the era of the trans-Atlantic slave trade;” see, Isichei, 6.
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The Aro art of long distance trading, as well as their habit of migrating, settling, 
and integrating into host societies have had a demographical impact on the 
greater part of non-Aro Igboland, resulting in high population densities, population 
re-configuration, the fear of domination on the part of host communities, and land 
disputes. The ripples of some of these may have worsened the negative image 
of the Aro. But, the Aro spirit of enterprise and adventure which manifested in 
their art of long distance trading also manifested in the Diaspora Aro’s habit to 
contribute meaningfully to the development of host society, while not forgetting 
their homeland. On another front, the Igbo, now well-known for their presence in 
virtually all parts of the civilized world, would appear to have emulated or copied 
the Aro spirit of enterprise and adventure. Shrewd and resourceful, the pre-colonial 
Aro had led the way in introducing local institutional mechanisms, such as 
armed convoys, organized rest houses, marital alliances, fictive kinship, and 
indigenous credit system, for overcoming the risks and lightening the burden of 
long distance trade in the then fragmented and insecure pre-European political 
environment of Igboland and environs. It has therefore been rightly argued that 
the rapid expansion of the Igbo diasporas was a product not only of population 
pressure at home, but of the prior development of social “blueprints for 
migration” in pre-colonial Igbo social organization.56 The organization of traders 
and fortune hunters into itinerant groups created a framework for migration that 
did not rupture linkages between migrants and their home areas. Pre-colonial 
institutions requiring the annual return of migrants to their home town for festivals 
were well established among the Aro, and spread to other Igbo groups with the 
passage of time.57 According to a study on entrepreneurs in Nnewi, which was 
a commercial Igbo town, “systems of apprenticeship also followed a diasporic 
pattern, in which masters settled apprentices in other parts of Nigeria in order to 
widen their networks and avoid problems of oversupply in a given area.”58
Thus, what is now the Igbo diaspora began, in a very real sense, in the pre-
colonial era as the Aro trade diaspora in order to benefit maximally from the slave 
trade. The Aro successfully colonized strategic trade routes and places in non-
Aro Igboland and beyond in their own form of Aro lebensraum, if you will.59 
Clearly, the Aro were successful, in part, because their trade diaspora was not tied 
to the apron strings of the political agenda of an expansionist state. To some extent, 
therefore, they were the precursors of what one may now refer to as the modern 




59 Njoku, “The Atlantic,” 28-32; Ohia, 4-8.
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the abolition of the slave trade.
Finally, the character of Anglo-Aro relations during the period of colonial 
conquest, and the nature of Aro resistance influenced Anglo-Igbo relations for the 
better part of the colonial period. Unlike the majority of the rest of the Igbo sub-
groups, the Aro perceived rather quickly that the presence of the British posed 
a great threat to their economic interests.60 Although they realized the military 
superiority of the British, the Aro believed that they were clever enough to outwit 
them:
They decided therefore to engage in endless negotiations while, at the 
same time, determined not to yield an inch of territory to the British. 
Employing to the fullest that Aro capacity for sweet but tortuous double-
talk, they got the British bogged down in fruitless negotiations for five 
years. It was not until 1899 that the British were able to see through 
the Aro game and decided on military conquest. The experience left a 
decided impression on the British about the Igbo.61
Because of the nature of Anglo-Aro relations, the British and the 
Igbo never really came to love each other, even if there existed until the end of 
colonial rule a certain uneasy type of admiration between them. Aro predatory 
relationships with the rest of the Igbo, which involved the encouragement of 
raiding and other institutions of captive procurement, impacted Igboland. However 
adventurous, enterprising, and materially successful the Aro were through their key 
role in the slave trade in Igboland, the flipside is that their ascendancy and influence 
are irrevocably tied to the unpleasant memory of a remarkable aspect of brutal 
Igbo history.
Conclusion
This article has shown that the dual image of the Aro is traceable to the central 
role they played in the slave trade in Igboland, the memory of which lingers in the 
60 A British colonial officer captured an important part of the Aro economic interest during this 
period as the phenomenon of “clandestine slave dealing, especially in small children,” being an 
internal trade which the British needed to get “automatically and completely suppressed.” For details 
see NNAE., CSE 1/85/2924, EP 5279, vol. 1 Williams, acting Secretary, Southern Provinces, to 
Governor, December 13, 1939; and, NNAE., CSE 1/85/2924, EP 5279, Vol. 1 Chief Secretary for the 
government, February 5, 1924.
61 G. N. Uzoigwe, “Ndi-Igbo in Modern Nigerian History,” unpublished manuscript. The slave trade 
and the Aro oracular practices persisted for more than a decade after their formal elimination, leading 
to a second destruction in 1912. In fact, it took several decades of repression and punitive sanctions to 
dismantle the economic systems and sanctioning powers of Aro-centered commercial organization. 
See A. E. Afigbo, Ropes of Sand: Studies in Igbo History and Culture (Ibadan: Ibadan University 
Press, 1981). On the doggedness with which the British colonial administration hunted down the 
agents of the Aro see, also, A. E. Afigbo, “The Eclipse of the Aro Slaving Oligarchy 1901-1927,” 
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 6, no. 1 (Dec. 1971): 3-24.
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consciousness of many Igbo people in southeastern Nigeria. The Aro dominance of 
pre-colonial Igboland was notoriously based on the cold logic of their built-in and 
self-perpetuating rationale for acquiring wealth through infamous slaving activities. 
That the slave trade could and did develop in the context of the southeastern 
Nigerian hinterland despite the absence of a strong centralized power was largely 
because of the Aro factor. Within the context of the Atlantic economy, it is to their 
credit that the lack of a central government in Igboland during this period did not 
prevent the formation of a complex commercial network, one that remarkably 
was, in part, supported by private enterprise dominated by the Aro people. Aro 
trade merchants were successful as cultural brokers who connected small Igbo 
communities to the wider world. With great wealth amassed in the process, the 
Aro were emboldened by their achievements and came to refer to themselves as 
“Aro oke-Igbo” (“Aro – the great Igbo” or “Aro – the male Igbo”); and they were 
reverentially regarded throughout precolonial period as “the government” of that 
period.62 The respect accorded to the Igbo by their neighbors was due in part to 
Aro economic, religious, and military power. The Aro oracle commanded respect 
that extended to Isoko, Urhobo, Idah, and Idoma.63 A German Doctor, Hermann 
Koler, reported in
1840 that the dominance of the Igbo language in the southeastern region and 
the respect neighboring societies had for the Igbo had to do with the Aro-driven 
trade of the Igbo and their warlike nature.64
Yet, one cannot account for the many-sided setback of Igboland as a result 
of the slave trade without the unsavory realization that it has much to do with the 
predatory role of one of its very own sub-groups. The Aro remain a critical aspect 
of the unpleasant memories of inter-group relations in pre-colonial Igboland. The 
place of the Aro in the pre-colonial history of Igboland can be better explained in 
the context of a successful creation of a network of an exploited people connected 
to the Atlantic economy. This is so because the Atlantic Ocean, and with it the 
Atlantic economy, redefined Igboland, and on this ocean a trauma is inscribed.
One aspect of the aftermath of pre-colonial Aro activities in Igboland is 
that many Igbo sub-cultural groups tend to loathe the Aro presence to the extent of 
abhorring relating closely with them and even forbidding marital ties with them. 
As one oral informant cynically put it, “Even if we now have started trusting the 
62 Ohia, 5 and 7.
63 Nwabughuogu, 35.
64 Hermann Koler, “Bonny and Igboland in 1840,” reproduced in Elizabeth Isichei, Igbo Worlds 
(London: Macmillan, 1977), 14-17.
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Aro, the demon in them we do not trust!” 65 Those who refuse to trust the Aro have 
continued to harbor anti-Aro sentiments; they continue to view their presence with 
suspicion, easily justifying their attitude by evoking memories of “what they 
regard as the treacherous Aro activities in the age of the Atlantic trade of the 
not-too distant past.”66 Nonetheless, there are still people across Igboland that are 
convinced that Aro socio-economic ascendancy in the area, far from constituting a 
disaster, was an unmitigated blessing. To this group, the Diaspora Aro have been 
whole-heartedly accepted in their midst as their kith and kin, having lived in their 
host communities for decades, if not centuries. This has often been portrayed by 
statements such as: “Ndi Aru bu Bekee mbu anyi ma; ha weteere anyi ihie,”67 which 
translates to “The Aro were the first Europeans/white men we knew; they brought 
us civilization.”
The introduction of the slave trade marked a great turning point in the history 
of Igboland. The Aro participation in the trade had some positive, though mainly 
negative, repercussions for the Igbo people, who still evoke memor i e s  o f 
its impact. Studying the Aro-Igbo aspect of the long history of the trade 
and its repercussions advances a better understanding of the interplay of 
international and local socio-economic dynamics in intra/inter-group relations. 
For in Igboland, inter-group relations over these centuries were not overtly guided 
by the alliance of coercion and capital.68 On the whole, the study analyzes the role 
of the Aro in the slave trade in Igboland and the reason for the kind of memory it 
evokes in contemporary social relations among groups in the area. Additionally, 
it reveals how a particular understanding of the tensions and complexities of a 
critical aspect of the Igbo present is embedded in the past.
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Abstract: The escalation of the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria that peaked in 
2010 has led to the emergence of many theories to explain its causes. 
These theories focus on the socio-economic/ human needs, vengeance, the 
Islamic theocratic state, and political dimensions. Beside the socio-economic 
perspective, which harps on the pervasive poverty in the North, the theocratic 
state analysis seems compelling not only because it fits into the sect’s mission 
to Islamize Northern Nigeria and carve it out as a distinct political entity, 
but it also resonates with political Islam, the driving ideology behind such 
Jihadi groups as Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) with which the sect has been linked. While this 
paper identifies with the political causes perspective in offering more cogent 
explanation of the crisis, it goes beyond theory to underline empirical facts 
that have shaped the group’s violence. It argues that in its current dimension, 
the Boko Haram crisis is squarely an outburst of a sense of exclusion by 
some powerful political forces from the northern part of the country. To save the 
country from similar crises in the future, Nigerian leaders should devise clearly-
defined periodic power-sharing formulae that can enable its component parts 
to have a voice.
Key Words: Boko Haram, Political Islam, Global Islamic Crescent, Political 
Militia, National Consensus.
Introduction
This paper analyzes the nature of the current terrorism in Nigeria by situating it 
within the context of the country’s extant democratic milieu and political experience 
rather than lumping it together, in Ankie Hoogvelt’s terms, with the broader 
theme of the “current Islamist crescent.”1 It adopts the popular name Boko 
Haram to identity the terror group that has waged an unrelenting campaign 
of violence against Nigerians since 2009. Otherwise the official name of the 
group is Jamatu’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’wati wal-Jihad (People Committed to 
the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teaching and Jihad). This clarification removes 
1 Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Postcolonial World: the New Political Economy of
Development (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001).
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certain ambiguities which have beclouded the sect and its activities and obviated a 
clearer understanding of the objective of the current violence. Such ambiguity 
invariably hindered to some extent the state’s ability to properly diagnose the 
problem at the initial stage and respond appropriately. That failure on the part of 
the state enabled the group to metamorphose into the lethal monster it has now 
become.
Boko in Hausa language means book (education). Haram on the other hand 
means sin. Since the education common to the people of Nigeria is the western 
model, boko has come to generally mean, western education. Boko Haram therefore 
means western education is a sin. This name was given to the Jamatu’atu Ahlis 
Sunna Lidda’wati wal-Jihad by the Nigerian media because of the general 
assumption that the group’s philosophy seems to resist western education. The 
group has however contested the misrepresentation. According to one of the sect’s 
members, Mallam Sanni Umaru,
Boko Haram actually means “Western Civilization” is forbidden.
The difference is that while the first (Boko) gives the impression
that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West…
which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy
of Islamic culture (not education), for culture is broader. It
includes education but not determined by Western Education.2
Mallam Umaru’s exposition on the group has no doubt inspired the attempt 
to explain the group’s emergence and philosophy within the clash of civilization 
theoretical framework. Advanced by Samuel Huntington, the theory argues that in 
the post-Cold War era, people’s cultural and religious identities will constitute the 
primary source of conflicts in many countries of the world.3 Based on that theory, 
Ezeani E. Onyebuchi and Chilaka F. Chigozie argue that the violent extremism 
going on in Nigeria amidst the transformation of the country’s politics could be 
understood as a clash of civilizations.4 Hence the driving force of Boko Haram is 
religion, with Islam violently questioning Western values. This foundation resonates 
with the global political Islam from which Islamist groups generally draw their 
inspiration.
This paper goes beyond the general theory of Boko Haram’s religious origin. 
2 Cited in Ezeani Emmanuel Onyebuchi and Chilaka Francis Chigozie, “Islamic Fundamentalism and 
Problem of Insecurity in Nigeria,” in Internal Security Management in Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism 
and Counter-Terrorism, eds. Ozoemenam Mbachu and Usman Bature (Kaduna: Medusa Academic 
Publishers Limited, 2013), 204.
3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilization and the Remarking of the World Order (New York: 
Simon & Schuter, 1996).
4 Onyebuchi and Chigozie, 205.
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While it acknowledges its religious posturing, the paper critically interrogates 
the sect’s assumed religious background and contextualizes it within the general 
political milieu in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria from where its violence 
began and spread. In doing this, the paper attempts to draw attention to how 
this phenomenon actually first arose and how it has grown to acquire the life it has 
today. The paper emphasizes the sect’s violence, which has constituted a major 
security challenge confronting contemporary Nigerian society. In this regard, it 
considers the critical junctures, first, when the sect originally known in its 
immediate environment as non-violent in its propagation of its Islamic messages 
began to acquire arms; and second, the intersection at which it jettisoned its non-
violent posturing, even prior to the death of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, before 
finally turning its rage against the larger Nigerian society.
Boko Haram’s Early History
According to Nnaemeka C. Okereke, initially, the Boko Haram sect had no 
specific name as its members attracted several descriptions where they operated 
based on the perception of the local population.5 Therefore, either as Yusufuya 
sect, Nigerian Taliban, Jamaatul Takfur Wal Hyra Ahlus Sunna, Khawaarji, Shabaab 
Muslim Youth Movement, Boko Haram, or Jamaatu Alhlissunnah Lidda’awatiwal 
Jihad, a name of which the sect approves, the exact date which the sect manifested 
on the Nigerian landscape remains largely a subject of speculation. While some 
tendencies trace the origin to 1995, others argue that the group was founded 
around 2001 or 2002. Similarly, the founder of the group is also contested. It 
is either ascribed to one Lawan Abubakar, who left for further studies at the 
University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, or to an evangelical group formed by 
Muslim students at the University of Maiduguri, Borno state, who reportedly felt 
dissatisfied with Western values.6
Relevant to this analysis, however, is that Mustapha Modu Jon, known as 
Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, was the leader of the group in 2009 when the Boko 
Haram stand-off with security forces gained wider national attention. Under Yusuf, 
the sect was said to have recruited its membership of mostly women and children, 
school drop-outs and unemployed university and polytechnic graduates most of 
who tore up their certificates.7 Like the origin, the sect’s propensity for violence 
5 Nnaemeka C. Okereke, “Implementing the Nigerian Defence Policy: Reflections on the Boko 
Haram Crisis,” in Nigerian Defence and Security: Policies and Strategies, eds. Ozoemenam Mbachu 
and Ahmed A. Sokoto (Kaduna: Medusa Academic Publishers Ltd, 2011).
6 Simeon H.O. Alozieuwa, “Contending Theories on Nigeria’s Security Challenges in the Era of Boko 
Haram Insurgency,” The Peace and Conflict Review 7, no.1 (2012), accessed December 26, 2013, 
http://review. upeace.org/.
7 Okereke, 450.
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has also been a subject of controversy. Certain accounts cast Yusuf as someone 
whose preaching tilted towards violence. This was premised on the fact that 
he derived his inspiration from the works of a fourteenth century legal scholar, 
Ibn Taymiyya, who preached Islamic fundamentalism, and was also considered a 
“major theorist” for radical groups in the Middle East.8
There was also an account that Yusuf, a native of Girgir in the Jalasko local 
government area of Yobe state, received Quranic education in the Chad and 
Niger Republics and was imbued with radical instincts, which generated friction 
between him and other moderate Islamic scholars such as the late Jafa Adam, 
Sheik Abba Aji, and Yahaya Jingir.9 Remarkably, Yusuf was the son of Mallam 
Yusuf, a clerk at the Maiduguri office of the Kaduna State Transport Authority, 
who later abandoned his secular job to found an Islamiyya school where he taught 
the recitation of the Qur’an to Almajiris (street children). Yusuf Jr., a secondary 
school drop-out soon joined his father in his Quranic School, where his 
profound oratorical skills were honed. According to Simon M. Reef, it was here 
that Yusuf Jr. developed the effortless ability to convince people about the sincerity 
of his cause; his charisma also began to manifest.10 He became so popular, grew in 
influence, and effortlessly succeeded his father. Going by this version of Yusuf’s 
background, that projects him as one imbued with radical instincts, and which 
forced his relocation from Borno, where he grew up to Yobe his home state, he 
could be perceived as one with trouble-making potentials. Indeed, although he was 
said to have initially gone about his preaching peacefully, his views nonetheless 
drew attention from other Islamic preachers who saw both his preaching and 
interpretation of the Quran as a recipe for violence and an affront to authority.11
On the other hand, despite the inspiration Yusuf drew from Ibn Taymiyya, 
other accounts had him as someone who was opposed to any form of violence 
and who insisted that it was against the teaching of Islam. He resisted some 
of his followers’ relentless beliefs that “an Islamic state was realizable through 
preaching and mobilization of the people to reject secularism, by way of taking up 
arms and fighting to conquer the unbelievers.”12 Such a personality trait contrasts 
significantly with that of Yusuf’s successor, Abubakar Shekau, the Kanuri 
psychopath who “enjoys of killing anyone that God commands me to kill, the way 
8 Mohammed Aly Sergie and Toni Johnson, “Boko Haram,” accessed December 26, 2013 www.cfr.
org/nigeria/boko- haram/p25739.
9 Freedom C. Onuoha, “Countering the Financing of Boko Haram Extremism in Nigeria,” African 
Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Extremism 2, no. 1 (December 2011), 94
10 Simon M. Reef, “Foi’s Neighbours Open Up on Sheriff,” People’s Daily, August 10-16, 2009, 6.
11 Okereke, 457.
12 T. Suleiman, “The Plot to Islamize Nigeria,” Tell, November 30, 2009, 12.
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I enjoy killing chicken and rams.”13 The emphasis on the personality difference 
between Yusuf and Shekau becomes useful for the purpose of ascertaining, as I 
have noted elsewhere, whether the sect’s current level of radicalization is a function 
of the deaths of its initial leadership and subsequent clampdown by the state, or 
due to the accession of its leadership of Shekau.14 It is noteworthy that before the 
death of Yusuf, the sect had already acquired arms and had also violently protested 
the killing of seventeen of its members who were on a funeral procession.
Boko Haram, Political Islam and Militant Islamic Violence
The concept of “political Islam” has generally been adopted by many scholars 
to identify the seemingly unprecedented irruption of Islamic religion into the 
secular domain of politics - an illegitimate extension of the Islamic tradition outside 
of the properly religious domain it has historically occupied.15 Hence, for Ibrahim 
Muazzam, in its contemporary forceful form, political Islam “is a modern 
ideological construction and not the product of a historical continuity with an 
essentialist Islam preserved in the hearts and minds of people. It is the result of a 
protracted societal crisis of multi-dimensional proportions revealing an ongoing 
dialectic between Muslims and their socio-economic political environment.”16
The rise of Islamist movements, Muazzam further notes, is thus, a result 
and a symptom of a society in crisis - the outcome of a process of development 
that has taken place in these countries, which includes rapid urbanization and 
social mobilization that has exceeded the capacity of the system. He also perceives 
that the activism of some of the Muslim groups as a function of the social, economic, 
and political context found in the various societies.17 Hoogvelt blames the crisis 
on colonialism and globalization, and argues that the contemporary Islamic revolt 
is the consequence of millions of people who do not have any prospect of being 
incorporated into the new global system. As she notes, “It is the failure of the 
national evelopment strategies in the neocolonial period, coupled with the 
recent episode of globalization that drives the contemporary Islamic crescent.”18 
Hoogvelt further makes the point that Islamic resurgence is best understood 
as a politics of identity in response to exclusion. In an attempt to remove the 
13 “Nigeria’s Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in profile,” May 9, 2014, accessed November 16, 
2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18020349.
14 Alozieuwa, “Contending Theories.”
15 Charles Hirschkind, “What is Political Islam,” Middle East Research and Information Project, 
accessed December 23, 2013, http://merip.org/mer/mer205/what-political-islam.
16 Ibrahim Muazzam, “Security Challenges in North Africa and the Maghreb,” African Strategic 
Review 2, no. 2 (April/May, 2011):39.
17 Ibid.
18 Hoogvelt, 199.
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pejorative edge from “political Islam,” however, Charles Hirschkind argues that 
despite the militant violence that has given practical meaning to the concept, it 
is not all forms of contemporary Islamic activism that revolve around trying to 
“capture the state.”19 He contends forcefully that
The vast majority of these movements involve preaching and 
other da‘wa (missionary) activities, alms giving, providing medical 
care, mosque building, publishing and generally promoting what is 
considered in the society to be public virtue through community action.20
The early history of the Boko Haram in Nigeria casts the group both in 
Hirschkind’s idea of the political Islamic groups which try to promote public virtue 
through community action and Hoogvelt’s Islamists who have raised the spectra 
of the jihad.21 For instance, Yusuf’s refusal to yield to the pressure by some of his 
followers to take up arms as a way of realizing an Islamic state aligns the Boko 
Haram sect with Hirschkind’s characterization. Similarly, Sanusi Mohammed, a 
journalist who had studied and had interacted with some leaders of the sect prior 
to the outset of the crisis, insists the sect was “not founded as terrorist group as 
erroneously believed in some quarters.”22 Even after Yusuf’s death, given its anti-
government posturing, it would have been uncharacteristic of the group to agree to 
mediation by former President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was seen as an unofficial 
envoy of the government. That meeting held on September 15, 2011 and aimed at 
opening a channel of dialogue between the government and the terror group, and 
had in attendance Yusuf’s father in-law, Babakura Fugu, a known gun dealer who 
made his property at the Railway Quarters in Maiduguri available to his son in-law 
for his religious activities.23
Certain tendencies about the sect, however, project it as a jihadist group. 
At its earliest periods, Yusuf leveled charges of corruption and failure to preach 
pure Islam on the sheiks that appointed him leader after Lawan Abubakar’s 
departure.24 Under Abubakar Shakau, the sect later declared its intention to 




22 “Boko Haram out to end 1914 amalgamation, install Islamic govt —Sanusi” Saturday Sun, January 
21, 2012, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.gbooza.com/group/nigeriapolitics/forum/topics/
boko- haram-out-to-end-1914-amalgamation-install-islamic-govt-sanu.
23 Andrew Walker, “What is Boko Haram?” Special Report (USIP ), accessed 17 November, 2015, 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf.
24 Emma Ujah, et al “Yar’Adua orders probe of Boko Haram leaders’ killing,” Vanguard, August 4, 
2009, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/yaradua-orders-probe-
of- boko-haram-leaders-killing/.
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of the sect was the Taliban; the leadership of the group also trained in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, which are well-known as the Taliban’s abode; and after the attack on 
a police station in Kanamma, Yobe state, the sect briefly flew the Taliban black 
flag as a gesture symbolizing commonality of cause.25 Some members claim to 
have trained in Afghanistan. Very germane here is that the Soviet resistance, 
from which the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria seemed to draw its inspiration, occurred 
against the backdrop of the Soviet replacement of the traditional Islamic practices 
and social conventions in Afghanistan. The call for a jihad in Afghanistan and its 
day-to-day implementation were not initiated by Muslim states as such, but by 
transnational Islamic religious networks. Thus, to the Boko Haram sect, which is 
part of this network, a “defensive jihad,” according to the Sharia, obliged every 
individual Muslim to participate.26
The sect leader, “Yusuf …embraced technology, [and] believed Western 
education should be ‘mediated through Islamic scholarship’, such as rejecting 
the theory of evolution and Western-style banking. He preached a doctrine of 
withdrawal.”27 And in spite of the unheeded complaints of a group of fifty 
Maiduguri-based Islamic clerics, who claimed to have warned and complained 
to “the government and security agencies about the activities of Yusuf,” not until 
the murder of Yusuf, his father in-law, Fungu, alleged, financier Foi, and members 
of the sect at a funeral procession in Maiduguri, did the Boko Haram violence scale 
up in the North-East.28
Noteworthy is that the government had made available the sum of a N100 
million blood money to the sect for the loss of some of its leadership. While the 
acceptance of the blood money from the government by the sect does not 
conform to a true jihadist movement, Boko Haram’s current level of radicalization 
could well be a function of the ascension of Shekau. Indeed not until late August, 
2011, after it had expanded the scope of its violence outside of the North-East, 
vis-à-vis the bombing of the United Nations House in Abuja, were there any 
credible links between the sect and some al-Qaeda regional affiliate groups such as 
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Somali’s al- Shabaab.29 Furthermore, 
the fractioning of the sect into two groups, with one focusing on local grievances, 
namely, the ascendency of a Muslim to Nigeria’s presidency, and the other seeking 
25 Joseph Lengmang, “The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism: A Critical Reflection in the Light of 
the ‘Boko Haram’ Phenomenon in Northern Nigeria,” in Religion and Post Conflict Peacebuilding in 
Northern Nigeria, ed. Shedrach G. Best (Ibadan: John Archers Publishers Ltd, 2011), 98.
26 Cited in R. Shackleford, “Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Rise of the Taliban,” accessed 
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alliance with external jihadi groups dedicated to imposing Islamist rule across 
the world, raises doubt about the group’s genuine commitment to the global 
Islamist agenda from the outset. Despite reference to the establishment of an 
Islamic government, the revelation that the Boko Haram was out to end the 1914 
amalgamation that brought together the Northern and Southern Protectorates to 
form the country called Nigeria30 fits into the political feud theory that the Boko 
Haram violence revolves around Northern angst against President Jonathan for 
ignoring an informal power-rotation agreement that should have kept a Muslim 
Northerner as president this time around.31
The Political Origin of Boko Haram Violence
A common notion about the Boko Haram sect is that it is a fundamentalist jihadist 
movement bent on imposing the Sharia law on Nigeria. This perception is fostered 
both by its perceived philosophical and perverse spiritual underpinnings, namely, 
total abhorrence for Westernization and secularization. According to Joseph 
Lengmang, this foundation drives the group’s activities, including its violence.32 
The abhorrence of westernization and secularity is also perceived to have been 
boosted by the reintroduction of Sharia in 1999 by the then governor of Zamfara 
state, Ahmed Yerima Although the re-introduction of the Sharia in Zamfara turned 
the abhorrenc of westernization and secularity ideology into a grassroots movement 
in the North, despite the subsequent adoption of the Sharia by 12 northern states 
widespread “disillusionment” accompanied the manner in which the Sharia was 
implemented. That faulty implementation provided profound dissatisfaction, 
which the Boko Haram sect tapped into to promote the idea that an Islamic state 
would eliminate the inconsistencies.33
But while the sect’s emergence has generally also been attribute to the 
ideology of hatred for westernization and secularity, the Boko Haram phenomenon 
actually arose from a prevalent culture of political thuggery in Nigeria. By 
this culture, political gladiators establish political militias which they use in the 
fierce struggle for the capture and control of political power. These militia groups 
exist across the regions and states of the country where they assume different 
forms and perpetuate criminal political activities on behalf of their benefactors. 
In the North, Borno and Yobe states had the Ecomog, Bauchi, Sara-Suka, 
Gombe, Yan- Kallare, Taraba state, Banu-Isra’il, Adamawa, Yan-Shinko, Kano, 
30 “Boko Haram out to end 1914 amalgamation, install Islamic govt —Sanusi” Saturday Sun, January 
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Yan Gumurzu or Yan daba. In the South, the defunct “Bakasi Boys” operated in the 
East and were particularly notorious during the administration of former governor 
Chinwoke Mbadinuju in Anambra state.
There is also the Odua Youth Movement in the South-West, and the “Niger-
Delta Defense Force” in the Niger-Delta/South-South region. They are usually 
drawn from jobless university graduates and street wanderers, criminals, common 
thugs and in the North as abandoned Almajiri’s (street children). In most of the old 
Eastern part of the country, most of the youths who constitute the army of militants 
and kidnappers graduated from being political militia gangs who were recruited 
for criminal political activities during elections and dumped by their benefactors 
afterwards.
The culture of nurturing political militia gangs is however not a new 
phenomenon in Nigeria. It dates back to the pre-independence era. From the 
1950s, instances of political violence including the formation of political militias 
in the course of the contest for political power had become increasingly evident.34 
In the North, there were the Jammiyar Maukhatar, and the Positive Action as the 
armed political gangs of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), and Northern 
Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), political parties respectively. In the East 
the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) had the Zikist Movement, 
whereas the Action Group (AG) political party had the Awoists.35
However, an important distinction needs to be made among these political 
militia groups both in terms of the eras and political geographies in which they 
operated and in some instances still subsist. In the pre- independence era, 
whereas both in the North and South, political militias were unknown to have 
emerged from any religious origin, those currently in the North do. Currently 
also whereas in the South those which drift into sundry criminal activities like 
kidnapping and armed robbery do not link their cause to any known religious 
ideology, their counterparts in the North do.
Although the Boko Haram insurgents currently espouses religious 
ideological orientation, most of its foundation membership were essentially made 
up of elements drawn from the army of political militias in some parts of the 
North. The point of departure however is that hitherto, political militant gangs were 
raised by political parties rather than individual politicians. The Boko Haram, as a 
violent group specifically started off as Ecomog, a band of political thugs linked 
34 A.O. Banwo, “Political Violence and Democratization in Nigeria: An Overview,” in Electoral 
Violence in Nigeria: Issues and Perspectives, ed. B. A. Olasupo (Lagos: Frankad Publishers, 2003), 
111.
35 See Simeon H.O. Alozieuwa, “Nigeria’s Social Groups, Power Struggle and the Political Economy 
of Violence” Igbo Studies Review 3 no. 3 (May 2014): 196.
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to the former governor of Bornu State, Ali Modu Sheriff, and some other politicians 
in the state in the struggle for the control of Government House in Maiduguri, 
aimed specifically at dislodging the then incumbent governor of the state, Mala 
Kachallah. The conditions that bred the army of recruits for both the politicians 
and the Boko Haram sect also clearly predate both Yusuf and Boko Haram. These 
conditions include general adverse socio-economic conditions, which equally bred 
an army of disillusioned citizenry and youths who questioned the existing socio-
economic and political system in Nigeria, and the Sharia fervor in the North, which 
favors the imposition of the Islamic legal system as an alternative to the Western 
system.
In Borno state, the former governor, Ali Modu Sheriff, was said to be 
instrumental to the prominence of the sect. It was alleged that he was one of 
their financiers and supporters until the alliance broke down.36 Despite Sheriff’s 
persistent denial of any link with Boko Haram, Ali Konduga, an arrested member 
of the sect, confessed to the agents of the Nigerian State during interrogation 
that a certain politician from Borno State stepped in to sponsor Ecomog when the 
relationship went sour with Ali Modu Sheriff.37 Then acting Minister of Defense, 
Labaran Maku, was therefore right when he blames politicians from the North 
East for the “insecurity [which] is not religious but the after-effect of violent local 
politics.”38 Thus, the killing of government functionaries in Borno and Bauchi 
States in the early stages of violence clearly links “the rise of Boko Haram in 
Maiduguri and Bauchi … to politics.”39 Sheriff also views the Boko Haram 
violence as political and not religious.40
Ustaz Buji Foi, the alleged financier of Yusuf, deserves further mention at this 
juncture. Foi’s days as chairman of Kaga Local Government Council under the 
Kachallah administration was ‘“unprecedented in the history of the area council”’ 
in terms of “transforming Benisheikh, the headquarters of the (Kaga) council 
into a paradise of administrative transparency.” He was “noted for his sense of 
36 Boko Haram out to end 1914 amalgamation, install Islamic govt —Sanusi” Saturday Sun, January 
21, 2012, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.gbooza.com/group/nigeriapolitics/forum/topics/
boko-haram-out-to-end-1914-amalgamation-install-islamic-govt-sanu.
37 “Suspected Boko Haram Suspect Fingers Ex-Gov Sheriff, Senator Ndume, Ex-Envoy As Sect 
Sponsors,” accessed November 17, 2015, http://ireports-ng.com/2011/11/21/suspected-boko-haram-
suspect-fingers-ex-gov-sheriff-senator-ndume-ex-envoy-as-sect-sponsors/.
38 “Maku Accuses North East Politicians of Creating Boko Haram,” Newsdairy, December 31, 2013, 
accessed November 17, 2015, http://newsdiaryonline.com/maku-accuses-north-east-politicians-
creating-boko-haram/.
39 A. Agbo, “A Game of Vultures,” Tell, January 17, 2011, 23.
40 E. Bello, and L. Sabo, “Boko Haram Crisis Wasn’t Religious,” Leadership Weekend, August 8, 
2009, 10.
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fairness.”41 At the expiration of his tenure as the
Kaga Area Council chairman, Foi was appointed the caretaker committee 
chairman of the same area council. Described as a man of impeccable honesty, 
and “one of the few voices in the wilderness crying against corruption by 
politicians selected into public offices,”42 Sheriff appointed Foi as commissioner 
for local government affairs. He was later redeployed to the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and his house according to his neighbors was always visited by politicians 
including Governor Sheriff.43
Foi and his Boko Haram group had worked as part of the political militia 
that helped Sheriff win his election. In addition to a commissionership slot in the 
government, Sheriff was also effecting the full implementation of the Sharia as part 
of the pre-election deal with the group. Sheriff’s reluctance to effect this latter 
part of the deal obviously angered the Boko Haram sect and strained the group’s 
relationship with him. Thus, at the beginning of the Sheriff’s second term in office, 
Foi approached him with a proposal to resign his office, because according to Foi, 
it was the only way he could make paradise.44
Sheriff preemptively dissolved his cabinet to forestall Foi going to town with 
the news that he left the cabinet.45 The adoption of the Sharia in twelve northern 
states,46 and Sheriff’s failure to adopt the Islamic legal system in Borno where 
it was hoped could eliminate the inconsistencies observed in the implementation 
of the Islamic legal system in other northern states, could have inspired Foi’s call for 
Sheriff’s resignation after he walked away from Sheriff’s government. Situating 
Foi’s grouse within another context is also necessary. Besides the issue of 
corruption, as commissioner for religious affairs, Sheriff’s administration had 
banned motorcyclists’ movement in Maiduguri after 7 p.m. His administration 
also imposed a law that required motorcyclists to provide helmets for themselves 
and their passengers as a way of protecting them against head injuries in the event of 
accidents. This piece of legislation affected mostly the down-trodden and Almajiris, 
most of whom were used as political militia during elections, thereafter abandoned, 
flocking around the Islamic preachers who fed them daily with religious fantasies. 
Ustaz Foi was known for his “sense of fairness.” On the surface, the motorcyclists’ 
reluctance to obey the helmet legislation may appear a protestation of their poor 
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abandonment in the post-polls period by the Boko Haram group whose members 
worked as political militias as it was also against Sheriff’s refusal to adopt the 
Sharia. The helmet legislation provided an ample opportunity for the Boko Haram 
leadership to mobilize its members against the government.
Governor Sheriff later relished how he set up a security outfit, “Operation 
Flush,” to deal with Yusuf and his crowd, which included Foi:
As a governor, I had to take charge and restore some measure of order 
to my domain. I started creating laws. I first started by making a law 
regulating motorcycles, because at night, you find over one thousand 
motorcycles in the city. They would move from one end of the town 
to the other with different kinds of weapons: cutlasses, swords, etc…. 
And because they don’t wear helmets, I insisted that they begin to do 
so. I asked that their members be arrested and tried.47
Foi was killed in the aftermath of the crackdown on Yusuf’s followers. Before 
his death however, the former commissioner had demanded to meet with governor 
Sheriff, a request that was reportedly turned downed by the then governor. According 
to Okereke, “there exist [sic] a school of thought that contend [sic] that the killing 
of Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf and Ustaz Buji Foi was orchestrated to deny Nigerians 
true knowledge of the major sponsors and profiteers from the incident.”48 It was not 
ascertained whether Yusuf’s father’s low-level education and a corresponding 
poor material condition influenced his resignation of his secular job, as well 
his son’s dropping out of school. But Yusuf, who had taken over from his father, 
whose Quranic school was receiving wards from people within and outside of the 
Maiduguri, became someone whose “popularity was phenomenal, making friends 
easily, and some politicians who sought the truth identified with his movement 
discreetly and assisted him tremendously.”49
Perhaps amidst his preaching which resonated anti-corruption messages and 
disappointment with the western system of governance, past administrations 
before Sheriff’s had become uncomfortable with Yusuf as his influence grew in the 
state. Attempts to restrict him to certain sections of the state prompted his father in-
law, a known arms dealer who was also quite influential, to offer Yusuf the refuge 
of his large compound in the Railways Quarters in Borno State. It was at this 
location that Yusuf built “a movement that would ultimately unleash a phenomenal 
crisis which has not been seen in the history of Borno state since the Maitatsine 
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violence of 1983.”50 Why authorities refused to revoke Yusuf’s abode despite 
security reports of the unwholesome activities going on there, is suggestive that 
either Yusuf and his father in-law had become too powerful and untouchable by the 
authorities, or that in certain critical quarters, the movement Yusuf had built was 
of immense importance to the political actors holding the reins of government. 
Noteworthy, however, about the man who would later lead a group that declared 
Western civilization as forbidden, were some of the activities that went on in 
his large Railways Quarters abode. It was reported that, “despite claims that Boko 
Haram was against western education and its leader averse to western civilization, 
a trip to one of Yusuf’s compounds outside of the Railways Quarters shows that he 
ran a nursery school that was involved in teaching English and Maths…. Yusuf 
had computers with internet services for communication.”51
When the security forces stormed Yusuf’s abodes, they also found a Toyota 
Sienna SUV, among seven cars and many motorcycles, which belonged to sect 
members who used them for commercial operations otherwise known as okada.52 
The discovery therefore contradicts the sect’s posturing:
Available information indicates that the group emanated from
an orthodox teaching slightly resembling that of the Taliban in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their school of thought considers
anything western as an aberration or completely unislamic. 
The group viewed the western influence on Islamic society as
the basis of the religion’s weakness. Hence their declaration that
western education and indeed all western institution is infidel
and as such must be avoided by Muslims…. It was gathered that
most people sold their belongings to contribute to the coffers
of fighting the cause of Allah to save Islam from the clutches of
western influences and domination.53
Prior to his death, Yusuf’s abode usually gave the impression of big party 
as the whole area of the Railway Quarters would be lined with exotic cars 
owned by very powerful individuals who would arrive with tinted glasses that 
shielded them from easy identification when visiting Yusuf.54 It is also not known 
at what stage Yusuf began to use his large compound at the Railways Quarters as a 
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the shooting of his members by the men of the Operation Flush boasted that “his 
group would be prepared to confront all the security agencies in the State as well 
as government,”55 was also the same man who earlier had been cast as resisting 
Islamizing Nigeria by means of violence. It is therefore safe to speculate that 
while Yusuf did not believe in using violence to propagate Islam, turning his 
abode into a training ground for militant activities as well as the weapons found 
with his followers, were all part of the instrumentality used in supporting 
Sheriff in edging out Mala Kachallah, then the Governor of the Bornu State 
Government House, with the understanding that Sheriff would introduce Sharia 
in the state. Sheriff’s failure to implement that pre-electoral understanding thus set 
his administration on a collision path with the sect. When Nigerian soldiers stormed 
their Bama camp in Borno in 2013, they found items such as used condoms which 
contrasted a Moslem preaching of a return to the Islam’s glorious days of great 
piety56 – thus exposing the contradiction between what the sect preached and 
what they practiced.
Undoubtedly, this questions their pious religious posturing. Each socio-
economic and political environment has its peculiar character that can easily be 
exploited by criminal elements. In the Southern part of Nigeria, a predominantly 
Christian area, religion is treated as a distinct sphere of life, and separated from 
socio-economic and political issues. Hence in the old Eastern states, abandoned 
disgruntled political militia men drift into militancy, oil pipeline vandalism, 
and kidnapping to make a living. In the South-West, street extortion and money 
hustling, otherwise known as Area Boyism hold sway.
However in the predominantly Moslem North, where the Boko Haram violence 
occurs, criminal elements exploit the tradition of the Islamic religion ordering of 
social relations among people, including legal, contractual institutions, social 
and political institutions, and issues of economic propriety and practice57 to blame 
western values for the mismanagement of the country’s resources. In addition, the 
lack of Western education and high unemployment rate in the Northern region offer 
such group “a seemingly bottomless reservoir from which to draw disgruntled 
youth recruits.”58 With the thin line between Islamic religion and other spheres 
of life, extremist groups like Boko Haram that appear fed up with failed promises 
of politicians, would easily resort to seeking spiritual solutions to what is viewed as 
55 Ibid.
56 M. Mozayyan, “Glory in Defeat and Other Islamist Ideologies,” in Pirates, Terrorists, and Warlords: 
The History, Influence, and Future of Armed Groups Around the World, ed. H.J. Norwitz (New York: 
Skyhorse Publishing, 2009).
57 Hoogvelt, 200.
58 Onyebuchi and Chigozie, 212.
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an insoluble problem.59 Furthermore, coupled with some segments of the Northern 
Muslim population, allegedly unhappy with the compromise of state-level Sharia 
co-existing side by side with a secular system, these groups increasingly become 
radicalized and are more willing to periodically express themselves through 
violence. Within these groups also are elements who share the view that Western 
education is incapable of stimulating any meaningful development and prosperity 
in the region; hence their quest for the imposition of the Sharia on the country. 60
Understanding the Boko Haram Violence
In the synopsis to an essay on the security challenge posed by the Boko Haram 
violence, I have postulated that analyses that consider the political context of 
the insurgency deserve particular attention, especially in relation to President 
Jonathan’s contestation of the 2011 presidential election and the recently 
concluded 2015 elections.61 Similarly, in another work, which focused on the 
tendency by Nigerian ethnic groups to employ violence in the struggle to capture 
central power, I stressed how forced co-habitation of the disparate pre-Nigerian 
groups in a single political economy by British imperialism engendered a socio-
political environment which predisposes these social forces to intense struggle for 
power whose utility value is its guarantee of unfettered access to the public till. 
The utility of violence in the struggle for political ascendency, was “evident in 
the Hausa-Fulani hegemony of the 1960s through the late 1990s via the control of 
the country’s military, the Yoruba presidency from 1999-2007 via the violence 
that trailed the annulled June 12 1993 presidential election and the Ijaw presidency 
via the Niger Delta militancy.”62
Jean Herskovits has rightly argued that while the original core of the group 
remains active, Boko Haram has become a franchise for many criminal gangs who 
have adopted the name to claim responsibility for attacks when it suits them.63 
Although the Boko Haram sect had formed prior to the emergence of the Jonathan 
administration, the intensity which its violence assumed in the post-2011 general 
elections period, led to the inevitable conclusion that the insurgency is not only 
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ungovernable should Jonathan contest and win the election, but also geared towards 
the North’s quest to reclaim power by 2015. In the period leading up to that 
election, some political forces from the North bitterly challenged Jonathan’s moral 
authority to vie for the country’s presidency on the premise that the North was yet 
to do an eight-year term in the context of North-South zoning and power rotation 
principles said to have been instituted by the then ruling People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP).
Amidst the rancor surrounding his ascension to power in 2010 following 
his predecessor Umaru Musa Yar’Adua’s death, as well as the opposition that 
mounted against his vying for the 2011 presidential polls, Jonathan had come up 
with an appeasement gesture towards the North- West region of Nigeria from 
where Yar’Adua hailed, namely, the choice of Namadi Sambo, the governor of 
North-West state of Kaduna, first as his deputy, and second as his running mate 
in the 2011 elections. Ishiaka Mohammed Bawa, the Chief Whip of the House 
of Representatives of the Nigerian National Assembly and leader of the North-
East caucus in the House made a statement very significant in this analysis. 
According to him, “We felt that over the years, the North-Eastern region has 
been marginalized in all aspects of life in this country, [and] marginalization is 
responsible for insecurity in North-East.”64 Thus, “in the general context of 
Northern angst over the loss of central power, Boko Haram may be conceived of 
as a resurgent Northern ethnic militia or in the specific context of the Kanuri sense 
of marginalization, an emergent militia for that ethnic group.”65
In attempting to establish a causality between the current season of 
violence in Nigeria and intense contestation for federal power that marked 
Jonathan/Ijaw ascendency since 2010, Nigeria’s Nobel Laureate, Wole Soyinka, 
had played down the perspective that links the mayhem to economic factors such 
as unemployment, mismanagement, misplaced priorities, social marginalization, 
and massive corruption. According to him, “to limit oneself to these factors alone, 
is an evasion, intellectual and moral cowardice, and a fear of offending the ruthless 
caucuses that have unleashed terror on society, a refusal to stare the irrational in 
the face and give it its proper name – and response.”66
Former Nigeria’s foreign affairs minister, Bolaji Akinyemi, conceptualizes 
the Nigerian army from July 1966 to May 1999 as an Hausa- Fulani ethnic militia in 
64 Ahmed Mohammed, “Nigeria: North-East Suffers Marginalization,” Sunday Trust, February 12, 
2012.
65 Alozieuwa, “Contending Theories.”
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the unclassical sense of the term (ethnic militia) in that although the Nigerian army 
is composed of representatives of many of the nationalities of Nigeria, it was only 
the Northern Hausa-Fulani military representatives who had a sense of collective 
interests to advance and protect. Hence, the first intervention by a formal ethnic 
militia in Nigeria’s politics was in July 1966 when the counter-coup took place 
and the series of coups since July 1966 were designed by the North to protect 
the North.67 Following the end of the ideological Cold War between the West and 
East, military rule generally became an aberration globally. For Nigeria, perhaps 
the most important effect of that development was that the Nigerian army could 
no longer be appropriated as an ethnic militia by any ethnic group to topple an 
elected government - a tendency that had existed among the Hausa-Fulani ethnic 
group for most the country’s political history until 1999. Indeed very significantly, 
in 1999, retired army captain and former military intelligence operative, Sagir 
Mohammed, had formed a northern militia, the Arewa People’s Congress (APC) 
to “protect and safeguard the interest of the North wherever it is.”68 And outside 
of the North, the APC is perceived by some as founded for “the maintenance 
of [Northern] hegemonic control in national politics.”69 More so, “unlike the 
other ethnic militias who seek change, the Arewa People’s Congress seeks the 
maintenance of the status quo, irrespective of its crises of marginalization.”70
Bingham Powell Jr. conceives of democracy as a strategy of government 
based on the gamble that the potential for participation and responsiveness that it 
offers will make possible a resolution of conflict without violence. Where large-
scale violence or coercion does however appear, he contends, democracy is 
fundamentally threatened. Not only does the influence of coercion on decision-
making weaken the importance of democratic resources, but failure of government 
to maintain order and security leads citizens to look more positively on authoritarian 
alternatives.71
Furthermore, from a strategic point of view, organized political violence has 
three very general objectives: to change the bargaining rules of the democratic 
game, to undermine the support enjoyed by the regime or its major parties, or to 
67 Ajibola B. Akinyemi, “Ethnic Militia and the National Question in Nigeria,” in Urban Violence, 
Ethnic Militia and the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria, ed. Tunde Babatunde 
(Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited, 2003), 21.
68 Kalu N. Obasi, Ethnic Militias, Vigilantes and Separatist Groups in Nigeria (Abuja: Third 
Millennium Ltd, 2002), 43.
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70 Akinyemi.
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intimidate the opposition while mobilizing.72 “And the association between rioting 
and deaths by violence was notably higher in ethnically fractionalized countries.”73
There is a direct correlation among the following variables: the rejection of 
military intervention in politics, the North’s marginal occupation of the Nigerian 
presidency since the commencement of democratic governance in the country in 
1999, the emergence and transformation of the Boko Haram as an ethnic militia 
in the context of an appropriated machinery, and the current virulent violence 
in Nigeria, which has resulted in thousands of deaths. The huge resources 
committed to the counter-insurgency war in Nigeria could have been deployed to 
tackling many of Nigeria’s infrastructure problems. And sustained violence and 
deaths have forced the Nigerian citizenry to begin to question whether the civilian 
(democratic) framework is capable of being secure. The Boko Haram violence in 
Nigeria obviously poses a real threat to the country’s young democracy. In 
the context of an ethnically fractionalized country, the marginal occupation of 
the Nigeria’s presidency by the Northern power elite since 1999 also resonates 
with the logic of “highly placed, highly disgruntled, and thus highly motivated 
individuals who, having lost out in the power stakes are determined to bring society 
to its knees and under a specific fundamentalist strain.”74 Equally, the rise of the 
counter-terrorism outfit, the Civilian “Joint Task Force” (JTF), made up of the 
Borno youths in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital and the hotbed of the Boko 
Harm insurgency, evinces the conclusion that deadly violence is not, systematically 
and crossnationally, a product of patterns of citizen involvement and support, but 
of the strategic efforts of small groups of political elites. The Northern commoner 
who continually grapples with the factors of basic needs such as food, shelter, 
and housing is more concerned with the dilapidating effect of the insurgency on 
his daily life than the elite who worry about political power. This elite responds 
rather directly to the strains and limitations of ethnicity and lower modernization, 
to checks of constitutional structure, and to the policies of political opponents.75 
Are there, therefore, forces sworn to bringing back the military as Soyinka has 
postulated? The crux of the problem, indeed, perhaps, as Africa’s foremost political 
economist, the late Claude Ake, rightly noted, is the over-politicization of social life: 
“[W]e are intoxicated with politics: the premium on political power is so high that 
we are prone to take the most extreme measures to win and to maintain political 
72 Ibid, 158.
73 Ibid, 157
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power.”76 The late former National Security Adviser, General Patrick Oweye Azazi, 
had declared that the Boko Haram violence was all about wrangling over power 
rotation. Azizi died shortly afterwards in a crash in a military helicopter. In his 
response to a private letter made public by former President Olusegun Obasanjo, 
President Goodluck Jonathan was also of the view that,
At the heart of all the current troubles in our party and the larger
polity is the unbridled jostling and positioning for personal or group 
advantage ahead of the 2015 general elections. The “bitterness, anger, 
mistrust, fear and deep suspicion” you wrote
about all flow from this singular factor.77
Reference needs to be made to the attempts to explain the violence within 
the social/human needs theoretical framework, which going by the foregoing 
analysis has already encountered formidable difficulties. Indeed the then ruling 
People’s Democratic Party, PDP, had dismissed Boko Haram as a not a product 
of poverty or misrule, but a local terror group.78 Apart from among other 
prominent northerners like the former Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) governor79 
and the governor of Niger state, Aliyu Babangida,80 who link the Boko Haram 
violence to poverty, strong voices in the North have also faulted the social/human 
needs perspective. Former senate president, David Mark, argues that poverty and 
unemployment no longer offer a cogent explanation for the insurgency as these 
adverse socio-economic conditions are not exclusive to the North.81 The Catholic 
Bishop of Sokoto Dioceses, Mathew Hassan Kukah, also adds quite an illuminating 
angle to the debate. According to the cleric,
the Bureau of Statistics had released a report that Sokoto State
was the poorest state in Nigeria. I wasn’t prepared to join the
debate, but if Sokoto is the poorest state in Nigeria and if Boko
76 Alozieuwa, “Contending Theories.”
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Haram is driven by poverty, shouldn’t we (Sokoto) be the most
violent state in Nigeria? How is it that we are still the most
peaceful? What this does is that it explodes the myth and perhaps
we might have founded our analysis on a wrong premise. I don’t
think you can scientifically correlate violence with poverty.82
Indeed hordes of beggars who line Katsina streets reflect the poverty in that 
North-Western state, yet it has neither bred nor harbored such a violent group.83 
Despite the broadening of its contacts with other Islamist groups such as al-
Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), which warranted the designation with its splinter 
group, Ansaru, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States, the 
perspective which views the political militia strain of the Boko Haram sect as 
espousing a strong local concern intricately woven around the country’s politics 
resonates very strongly. Serious consideration needs also be accorded to the 
impracticability of imposing the Sharia on a heterogeneously complex political 
community such as Nigeria. The core of the Boko Haram committed to Islamizing 
Nigeria remains a fringe group, which not only antagonizes mainstream Northern 
Muslims, but also are yet to evolve a broad coalition that will include mainstream 
Northern Muslims and their elite corps. The author has argued elsewhere that 
whereas the Mujahedeen are focused on Islam’s days of glory or great piety, 
which to them assures the true believer of spiritual salvation and an eternally 
joyful existence in the world beyond, the average Nigerian Muslim political elite 
is most likely uninterested in the core Boko Haram’s version of Islam, and may, 
in the words of M. Mozayyan, be more interested in a future that guarantees 
independent thought, social liberty, modernity, and economic remuneration in a 
world– progressive Islam.84
The transformation of the violence from a Bornu affair to a national affair 
fits into the characterization of the group as “a local terror group” by the PDP. Thus 
between June and August, 2011 when it struck at the police headquarters and the 
United Nations building both in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital and arguably safest city, 
the Boko Haram sect had transformed from a violent group whose campaign was 
initially restricted to the North East part of the country to a more formidable force. 
It had graduated from a hitherto presumably bunch of rag-tag inconsequential 
miscreants that could be summarily dealt with to a virulent violent organization 
capable of issuing and making good its threat.
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The attack on the police headquarters was not only a cynical response to the 
boast by then inspector-general of police, Hafiz Ringim, that he would crush the 
group in the aftermath of its attempted attack of the headquarters in Maiduguri, 
the capital of the North East state of Borno, it was also for “the humiliating 
treatment meted out to our members by security agencies in various parts of the 
country.”85 The United Nations building bombing clearly, therefore, supports the 
PDP position that “some people are out to perpetrate acts of terrorism in Nigeria to 
create a semblance of insecurity.”86
In an interview titled, “Boko Haram Menace Beyond Poverty,” Kukah 
raised a very pertinent question:
Can we explain why this Boko Haram is dominant in Maiduguri, Yobe 
and not in Sokoto or Kebbi? … If this was about religion, and Muslims 
are trying to expand the frontiers of Islam, which kind of a stupid 
man will be fighting inside his own house and hope to conquer other 
people?87
At the immediate domestic level, it is obvious the group is at war with 
those that armed and used them to defeat opponents in the political struggle and 
later abandoned them, and which explains the initial killing of politicians in Borno 
and Bauchi. While that local score might not have been settled, as the violence 
attracted national response from the federal center, some highly placed and highly 
disgruntled persons who lost out in the power stake began to appropriate the 
group for violence in the struggle for central power. This explains why while the 
sect makes attempts to penetrate Abuja, its campaign in the North-East persists. 
The factionalization of the group soon after Yusuf’s death, apart from providing 
explanation for the group’s current level of radicalization, also could prove that 
while the original group represented by the murdered Yusuf’s father in-law, Fugu, 
remained the core commitment to the sect’s initial ideals, the faction which actually 
killed him was the political armed gang determined to protest Jonathan’s vying of 
the 2011 presidential polls and importantly, his contesting the presidency again in 
2015.
The violence however appears to pay off. While central power might have 
moved out of the North, the Nigerian state under the Jonathan presidency continued 
to make huge concessions to that part of Nigeria which perhaps would not have 
been the case but for the insurgency; while the North-East in the meantime may 
85 Ibrahim Mshelizza, “Islamist sect Boko Haram claims Nigerian U.N. bombing,” Reuters, August 
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not have yet occupied central power as the North-West, North-Central, South-
West and now South-South, certain socio-economic and political measures have 
been taken to address its crisis of marginalization than had previously been the 
case. On the socio-economic sphere, the government created a N100 billion Green 
Belt de-desertification project for some frontline states in the North. No such 
special initiative has been designed specifically for the South-East, which is being 
ravaged by gully erosion but has not taken up arms against the state despite its 
obvious marginalization from the country’s topmost political office. There is also 
the Almajiri education program initiated by the federal government for the entire 
northern region. For the North-East region specifically, a N2 billion special 
intervention program was ear-marked in the 2014 annual budget for the states of 
Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, which have been devastated by insurgency and were 
placed under a state of emergency at some points in time.
In the political sphere, as the military crackdown on the insurgents persists, 
unlike the previous state of emergencies in the country, which were in 1964 and 
2003, civil political structures remained in the areas where it had been declared. 
The chairmanship of the ruling PDP appears to have been conceded to persons 
from the area as a way of giving the region a sense of inclusiveness.
Conclusion
This paper focused on the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria beyond the general theme 
of the current global Islamic violence. While acknowledging Islamist violence as a 
factor, it however places much premium on the local contexts of the violence and 
argues that the local political issues, more than any other considerations, offer more 
cogent explanation of the problem. The paper notes the religious origin of the sect, 
which later transformed into a militia group for politicians, a tendency that dates 
back to pre- independent Nigeria. From a local Borno affair, the group became a 
ready tool appropriated by some elements of national politicians struggling for the 
control of central power. These elements were specifically dissatisfied with the 
return of central power to the South following the death of Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, 
which denied the North the opportunity to be in power for many years. Jonathan’s 
initially speculated interest in contesting the 2015 presidential elections rallied 
these forces together and pitted them against his government. Although initially 
the violence was perceived as a general Northern protestation of its loss of central 
power, it however later became clearly a North-East tool for bargaining for political 
ascendency. However, while the concern with the local political issues within the 
North-East area persists, increasing state clamp down on the sect eventually drove 
it into seeking alliance with international terror networks.
The Nigerian state has adopted some counter-terrorist measures to stem 
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the violence. Apart from the military option, some socio-economic measures 
have also been adopted. However, no visible political concessions have been made, 
especially at the national level where the political disagreement actually raised the 
scepter of the violence. There is, therefore, the need for a national consensus for a 
viable power-sharing arrangement among Nigeria’s diverse ethnic groups in order 
to give each component
a sense of belonging in the country’s power equation. The arrangement 
should come in the form of a constitutional legislation that provides for the 
rotation of power among the component parts in a pre-agreed formula.
Indeed, democracy as a government of the people for the people and by 
the people should be adapted within the reality of Nigeria’s multi- ethnicity to 
ensure that no group is made to feel left out of the country’s political power. 
Perspectives which suggest that it matters less where the political leadership 
at the national, state, or local government levels emanate from tend to ignore 
the reality that although no particular ethnic group in Nigeria can claim exclusive 
monopolization of pillaging the commonwealth at any point in time, politics in 
Africa still remains privatized by the continent’s leaders. Indeed, according former 
Senegalese leader, Leopold Senghor, politics in Africa is not the art of governing 
the state for the public welfare in the general framework of laws and regulations, but 
that of the politician’s politics, the struggle of clans, the tendencies to place well 
one’s self, one’s relations and one’s clients in the cursus honorum; that is the race 
for preferments.88 Ensuring, therefore, that every part of the country shall occupy 
the highest political position in the country in a pre- determined and predictable 
arrangement will bring stability and peace to Nigeria. President Jonathan for 
instance hails from a small community in Bayelsa, if not the smallest state in 
Nigeria. He is of Ijaw ethnic group, a minority ethnic group in Nigeria. His 
ascendency, therefore, proves that every part of the country has a “best” candidate 
that can be presented for Nigeria’s leadership.
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BOOK REVIEWS
Adebajo, Adekeye, ed. Africa’s Peacemakers: Nobel 
Laureates of African Descent. Cape Town: Zed Books, 2014, 
iii + 336 pp.
In fifteen chapters, Africa’s Peacemakers: Nobel Laureates of African Descent 
describes the lives, careers, and Nobel significance of the thirteen Africans and 
people of African descent who have won the Nobel Peace Prize. This unique and 
creative volume features essays by luminaries in several fields, such as Adekeye 
Adebajo and Ali Mazrui (introduction), Pearl T. Robinson, James O.C. Noah, and 
Lee A. Daniels, Chris Saunders, Maureen Isaacson, Elleke Boehmer, and Gregory 
F. Houston, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Morad Abou-Sabe , Janice Golding and 
Gwendolyn Mikell, and Adekeye Adebajo and Rosaline Daniel. This author list is 
comprised of researchers, colleagues of laureates, and other leaders in their fields. 
Laureates are grouped into sections based upon nationality. The introductory 
chapters tie Barack Obama to the legacy of other Peace Prize winners.
Adebajo and his authors strive to discuss Africa’s relationship with the 
wider world through the lens of the lives profiled here. They discuss the laureates’ 
formation through historical forces and interpret each person’s role in further 
directing future trends. Additionally, each author pays attention to the Peace 
Prize’s ramifications related to relations between recipients’ countries and the 
larger world, particularly with Western powers. The themes of each article vary, 
with some placing more emphasis on pre-Nobel careers and others on the Peace 
Prize’s effects on future work or giving a more general overview of laureates’ 
lives. This approach makes for a varied and diverse work.
Within their introductory chapters, Adebajo and Mazrui discuss the long 
and strong connections between American civil rights and African liberation 
movements, marking early the connection between anti- apartheid groups in 
particular and Americans who drew inspiration from them. This relationship forms 
the basis for the work’s initial chapters, honoring the three Americans and four 
South Africans who have won the Peace Prize. Early on, Adebajo identifies the 
wide range of life experiences and struggles that each laureate boasts. Importantly, 
he also comments on the prevalent view of the Nobel Peace Prize as an endorsement 
by Western powers, noting that recipients may find differing views amongst their 
own countries’ citizens than they do from the non-African world at large.
Authors of subsequent chapters elaborate on this theme.
In addition to making connections between groups of laureates, Adebajo 
also points out the commonalities between individuals, noting, for instance the 
relationships between Ralph Bunche and Martin Luther King, Jr., who marched 
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together during civil rights protests in the 1950s and 1960s, and Albert Luthuli 
and Nelson Mandela, who worked together during those same decades. These 
help to create a thread between some of the laureates and support another central 
argument, that the Peace Prize committee has been keenly interested in issues 
of racial reconciliation. It also helps to draw out the differences between other 
recipients, such as Mohamed ElBaradei or Kofi Annan, who have worked in 
different spheres.Additionally, the authors point out this study’s limitations in 
assessing each laureate’s accomplishments in depth and espouse a commitment to 
critical views that eschew hagiography.
Mazrui’s chapter discusses the importance of the Gandhian tradition in Peace 
Prize awards and also features an extended discussion on African and diasporic 
identity. Mazrui makes a distinction between laureates who are African by birth 
and those who become African by adoption and notes that individual views of 
and relationships with the continent vary amongst the highlighted Peace Prize 
recipients. This is an important point as well, as the laureates themselves seem to 
view their own relationships to the continent in vastly differing terms. In chapters 
on the three Americans, the authors each spend time discussing tendencies toward 
hawkishness versus peace-mongering in their subjects. Given Obama’s fairly recent 
reception of the Peace Prize, this is a noteworthy conversation. This long historical 
trajectory also, of course, lends itself to a variance in the essays’ examination of 
lives fully lived and the one which continues to unfold. While it may be early to 
accurately and completely assess Obama’s legacy, the authors have attempted to 
add historical context to their discussion. Writing about the four South Africans who 
have become Nobel laureates, the authors emphasized biography and relationships 
to the larger liberation movement when discussing Luthuli, Tutu, and Mandela. De 
Klerk, as the continent’s only white recipient and arguably its most controversial 
receives a treatment that examines both his oft-peaceful rhetoric and relationship 
with his own National Party as well as a discussion of the Third Force and other 
covert operations of violence in his post-Nobel presidency.
Boutros-Ghali provides the most personal reminiscence in the book, with 
his writing on Sadat contrasting greatly with Abou-Sabe’s on ElBaradei. These 
two figures are far less linked than the Americans and South Africans in terms of 
commonalities. Additionally, as the only two laureates who are their countries’ sole 
representatives, Kofi Annan and Wangari Maathai combine into a section, with 
much discussion of their strong Western ties and relationships to wealthy nations. 
Finally, the last section discusses gender and class in the contrasting lives of Ellen 
Johnson Sirleaf and Leymah Gbowee. Adebajo pays careful attention to critiques 
of Sirleaf, including her arguable tendencies toward nepotism and corruption. As 
in the case of Obama, it is more difficult to assess the legacies of these last two 
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laureates given the fact that their careers remain far from incomplete.
This work does not include a concluding section, which is the only thing it 
seems to lack. Overall, each author makes important connections between their 
own laureate, other Peace Prize recipients, and the wider world. The lively and 
engaging essays present a variety of perspectives and a plurality of different lenses 
for examining their subjects. This makes each chapter very unique in both its scope, 
tone, and contribution. Africa’s Peacemakers could likely be read as a whole or as 
a contribution to work on any of the individuals discussed within.
Myra Ann Houser 
Assistant Professor of History 
Ouachita Baptist University 
Arkadelphia, AR
76 | Book Reviews
Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2015
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/
Arsan, Andrew. Interlopers of Empire: The Lebanese 
Diaspora in Colonial French West Africa. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014, xviii + 341 pp. 
This important study of a modern and commercially-oriented diaspora beginning 
in the late nineteenth century consists of eight chapters divided into three parts: 
“Roots and Routes,” “Words and Laws,” and “Days, Thoughts and Things.” 
“Roots and Routes” provides the eastern Mediterranean background to the 
migration of Lebanese, a topic which has not been detailed extensively in previous 
works on this diaspora community in Africa. It also provides the push and pull 
factors that have motivated their migrations. For example, except for scholars and 
other experts in the history of the region, the centrality of the silk industry to 
the homeland areas of the migrants, and the effects of its decline is an important 
factor that has contributed to this migration. Also of note are the events that led 
many to settle in Afrique Occidentale Francaise or AOF, as France’s West African 
possessions came to be known in the early twentieth century. The author looks at 
the French responses to the Lebanese in AOF, also presenting the importance of the 
Lebanese Mandate status following World War I and the quasi-protected status of 
the Maronite Christian population to the free migration of the Lebanese throughout 
the French colonies. Part Three, “Days, Thoughts and Things,” considers the daily 
lives of the migrants (Chapter 6) and attempts to look at their political lives--both 
in AOF and in the Lebanese homeland (Chapter 7).
Andrew Arsan, is a Lecturer in Middle Eastern History at the University of 
Cambridge, and this, it would seem, makes Africa, despite the title of the work, 
peripheral to his study. Arsan’s research concentrates on the first half of the 
twentieth century, though parts of the introduction and the last chapter, termed 
“Coda: The Making of Postcolonial Selves” give significant details about the 
current situation of the Lebanese in the former AOF. Arsan bases his work entirely 
on archival and published primary sources and a rich bibliography of secondary 
sources. A note at the beginning of the study, “Of Names and Words” (xvii-xviii), 
presents the thorny issues of transliteration and nomenclature for these residents in 
French West Africa” on the margins of whiteness” (xvii).
The author presents his goals in the study as “reconstructing the social, 
economic and political lives” of the migrants in order to better understand diasporic 
experience and to “examine the fraught responses this unsettling presence [of the 
Lebanese] prompted in French functionaries”(2). He
succeeds quite well in the second of his goals, with an in-depth examination 
of the conclusions and misunderstandings of this group exemplified in various 
colonial archive reports and contemporary newspaper articles in France, 
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Lebanon, and West Africa. He also introduces much information on the roles 
of the non-functionary French merchants in their frequently successful attempts 
to direct colonial government responses to the Eastern Mediterranean migrant 
community. As to the first goal, he has certainly attempted to flesh out the lives 
of the migrants, dealing more extensively than previous studies on confessional 
separations, specific village origins, and class differentials among the migrants. 
The study concentrates throughout on the role of their places of origin in the 
lives of these migrants, giving telling details in the last chapter on how their 
lives in AOF brought change and wealth through large remittances back to the 
homeland. But the study is curiously lacking in African content, because it is 
curiously lacking in a consideration of the African peoples among whom these 
migrants settled.
The index is quite brief (331-341) for such a richly detailed work. The 
end notes (257-304) are detailed, for the most part, giving source citations only 
and very little parenthetical rumination. The book definitely needs a glossary of 
terms, particularly for the numerous non-English terms that are used frequently. 
The bibliography is full (305-330), giving credit to the depth of research in 
secondary and archival sources pursued by the author.
Throughout the work, however, I saw many instances where author- 
collected oral sources would have added much to the familial details of this 
diaspora. These are details that could have presented more on Afro- Lebanese 
relations in everyday life, for instance, as well as highlighted the roles of 
women. The author recognizes the lack of oral sources by stating this would 
have “required another work, quite different to that I have undertaken” (2). 
However, without considering the African people among whom these Eastern 
Mediterranean migrants settled, how well can one fully discuss and understand 
this diaspora in AOF? Though the author tries mightily to present the important 
roles of Lebano-Syrian women in this diaspora, they still seem to be tropes, 
rather than fully fleshed out actors. This, again, is due to the reliance on archival 
and published sources.
Kathryn Green
Associate Professor of History 
Mississippi Valley State University 
Itta Bena, MS
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Boucher, Claude (Chisale). When Animals Sing and Spirits 
Dance Gule Wamkulu: The Great Dance of the Chewa People 
of Malawi. Mtakataka: Kungoni Centre of Culture and Art, 
2012. xxviii + 276 pp.
Claude Boucher’s When Animals Sing and Spirits Dance Gule Wamkulu: 
The Great Dance of the Chewa People of Malawi, with additional text from 
Gary J. Morgan, Director of Museum Studies at Michigan State University, 
and photographs by Arjen van de Merwe, offers a refreshing, insightful, and 
brilliant interlink between what could be regarded as artistic compendium and 
the fundamental spiritual cultural heritage of an African community, the Chewa 
people of Malawi, in the dynamic context of everyday paradigms of holistic 
life experiences. Through a drama-laced strategy, the book masterfully employs 
symbolic characters depicted in masks and woven structures in an analytical 
syringe of songs and dances to “play out” the realities of cultural philosophical 
values and communal expectations of the Chewa people.
The crux of the book is revealed in two major sections. The first is the 
introduction written by Gary Morgan. Here the reader is exposed to the historical 
background of Malawi in general, the historical origin of gule wamkulu, and the 
religion of the Chewa people. It also introduces the reader to the role, as well as 
the form of gule wamkulu characters. The history of the origin of the symbolic 
and ritual evolution and the eventual transition of the gule wamkulu characters are 
also extensively discussed. With the introduction, the reader is prepared for the 
subsequent intriguing and illuminating details to follow in the main section of the 
book.
The second presents the kernel of the book in seven major themes as 
“dramatized” through the performances of the gule wamkulu dancers. The themes 
vividly capture the Chewa people’s worldview on moral codes. The holistic nature 
of the themes is compelling. They strategically cover the existential instructions for 
the citizens of the community, such as history and politics; community, authority and 
ancestors; sexuality, fertility and marriage; childbirth and parenthood; health, food 
and death; witchcraft and medicines; and personal attributes. The author brilliantly 
portrays the interpretations and dramatic uses of these themes in ways that vividly 
represent the authentic voices of the local people that may be impossible to achieve 
in any other format. Perhaps more importantly, the Chewa people’s heritage of the 
spiritual linkage to the ancestral world, in which the ancestors continue to impact 
their living descendants as agents of societal moral standard, is substantially 
highlighted. This without any doubt constitutes a significant representation of 
the fundamental religious worldview of Africans on the circular nature of human 
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existence and the “never ending” reciprocal obligations and privileges between the 
living and the living dead, i.e. the earthly and the spiritual domains.
I find the intellectual and communicative strengths of this book enormous. It 
is comprehensively researched and the author admirably subsumes his subjective 
considerations of the themes discussed and allows the voices of the Chewa 
people to be heard in their “undiluted” forms. The colorful illustration employed 
throughout the book definitely enhances the reader’s imaginative and empirical 
understanding. The images are compelling and make the reading of the book 
engaging and less cumbersome. Also, both the mask name and the theme indexes 
at the end of the book provide the much-needed information on the locations of 
prominent words and ideas. In addition, the glossary of Chichewa terms and the 
interpretations of the songs in Chichewa and English afford the reader, who may 
not speak the Chichewa language, the basic understanding of the contents.
Surprisingly, with the author having a background as a Catholic priest, I did 
not find an interfaith discourse that I believe would have positively linked the 
moral codes of instructions of the Chewa thematic worldviews with the Christian 
(Catholic) moral expectations in the inculturalization spirit of Vatican II. This I 
believe would have raised the profile of the book as a doctrinal literature in the 
promotion of African Christianity (perhaps I was looking for too much) given 
the focus, objectives, and scope of the book. Notwithstanding this critique, the 
book presents a formidable resource as a “hypothesis” ready for further scholarly 
research for those interested in the rich African spiritual heritage in the context 
of existential humanity. In this regard, the book attests to the 2005 UNESCO 
description of gule wamkulu as “a masterpiece of the oral and intangible heritage 
of humanity.” On the whole, Boucher deserves to be applauded for his scholarly 
endeavor in writing this book.
Ibigbolade Aderibigbe
Associate Professor of Religion and African Studies 
University of Georgia,
Athens, GA
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Carrier, Neil and Gernot Klantschnig. Africa and the War 
on Drugs. London: Zed Books, 2012, i + 176 pp.
Neil Carrier and Gernot Klantschnig appraise Africa’s place in the global drug 
trade. Their book comes at a time when numerous publications call attention to the 
dangers of drug trafficking in Africa and its challenge to democratic and corrupt-
free governance, as well as sustained economic development. These works argue 
that drug cartels have become interwoven with government institutions and engage 
in sustained violence against rivals and law enforcement. They connect growing 
terrorism in Africa to drug trafficking, arguing that the destabilization of the 
continent by drug-related activities affects investment and poses a threat to long-
term economic development in Africa. Africa and the War on Drugs challenges 
these prevalent portrayals of Africa as being in jeopardy due to its new position as 
a transshipment port for Europe-bound drugs. The authors question contemporary 
Western views that treat drug use as a recent phenomenon in Africa and depict the 
drug trade as detrimental to Africa’s economic development. They also criticize 
Western approaches to drug control. Their categorization of drugs go beyond hard 
substances such as heroin, cocaine, and cannabis to stimulants like kola nuts, 
coffee, khat, tobacco, and alcohol.
The book is divided into four chapters. The first chapter traces the history of 
drug cultivation and use in Africa, and focuses on drugs – khat, cannabis - that have 
been historically present in the continent. Chapter two assesses the link between 
drugs and development in Africa, while chapter three examines the continent’s 
emerging role as a drug entrepot, arguing that it had a long history of involvement 
in the international drug trade. The final chapter criticizes current drug policies that 
are propagated by international agencies and offers alternative approaches to the 
fight against illicit drugs in Africa.
Carrier and Klantschnig argue that evidence of drug production in Africa 
dates back to twelfth century Kenya, where El-Ghafeky, a Spanish doctor, recorded 
the use of kola. Archaeological evidence and travelers’ accounts also show that 
cannabis and khat existed in Ethiopia as early as the fifteenth century. However, 
these drugs served social, cultural, and practical purposes, such as improving 
stamina and alertness. In the West, they functioned more recreationally.
Following the rigorous policing of traditional drug-smuggling routes in the 
1970s and 1980s, drug traders turned to Africa as an alternative course. 
In the process, substances like heroin and cocaine became diverted to local 
markets, leading to increased drug problems. As a result, the United Nations 
embarked on a “drug war” in Africa, arguing that drugs posed a challenge to the 
continent’s development. The UN also claimed that African states could descend 
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to the status of narco-states, territories that are overrun completely by drug cartels, 
devoid of any law enforcement. Carrier and Klantschnig, however, argue that 
Africa held a substitutable place in the drug trade, dependent on the policing of 
routes. The continent’s drug trafficking operated in a small-scale, profit-oriented, 
and temporary structure that differed from the cartels and mafias portrayed in 
official discourses. The continent did not count as a major consumer or producer of 
heroin and cocaine, a fact that invalidated any fear of African nations’ degeneration 
into narco-states.
Far from causing underdevelopment, the authors assert that the cultivation 
of substances, such as the illegal cannabis and quasi-legal khat, offered revenue 
to many farmers and states like Malawi, Swaziland, Somalia, and Mozambique. 
Development problems arose instead from the repressive and prohibitive policies 
enforced in Africa by international anti-drug agencies. These strategies concentrated 
on strengthening weak African states in their enforcement of suppressive drug 
laws, to the detriment of research-based, socio-economic, and health approaches 
to drug control. The funds provided by these organizations, according to the 
authors, strengthened corruption, state brutality, and human rights violations by 
African governments. They conclude that Western funders dissociate Africa’s drug 
problems from the global drug market, especially because of the high demand of 
these substances abroad.
Carrier and Klantschnig dedicate a part of their book to the effects of drug 
consumption in Africa – unemployment, HIV/AIDS, low productivity, drug 
abuse by gangs and rebel groups, state destabilization by cartels – and provide 
detailed examples of the impact of drugs on other societies, such as Afghanistan 
and Colombia, where they pose grave challenges. However, they conclude that 
drug consumption in Africa poses no threat to the continent’s development. One 
wonders about their definition of development. Unless they view it as separate 
from economic and social issues, their conclusion that drug use stands apart from 
Africa’s development is contradictory to the very background that they provide on 
the effects of drugs. Their statement that, “it must be emphasized that a detrimental 
effect of drugs and development in Africa has nowhere been demonstrated through 
sound research,” despite their examples of “real dangers and potential dangers” of 
drug consumption in the continent, is even more disconcerting (56-57).
Though the authors make a strong argument regarding Western exaggerations 
about the linkage of drugs to Africa’s growth, they underplay the real and potential 
impact of drugs on the continent as well as the increasing complicity of political 
actors in the drug trade. They gloss over the fact that drug habits in the continent 
have since shifted. They scarcely acknowledge that youths in Africa employ 
drugs recreationally as much as their counterparts in the rest of the world. In an 
82 | Book Reviews
Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2015
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/
effort to support their argument that drug production in Africa offers revenue to 
African states, the authors either ignore or downplay the long-term effects that the 
proliferation of illegal drugs would cause in African economies. Illicit drugs have 
been connected to violence, lawlessness, and terrorism in Africa and elsewhere. Its 
tolerance in Africa, as recommended by Carrier and Klantschnig, can only result 
in further disruption, thereby impeding economic growth and investment. While 
the roots of violence and state corruption in Africa may have minute connections 
to the drug trade, drug consumption exacerbates an already bad situation. It also 
potentially plunges the affected countries into a public health crisis.
The authors raise an important concern about the unreliability of 
international agencies’ statistics on drug trafficking in Africa, which they portray 
as estimates that lack current empirical research. However, it remains unclear 
how their methodology differs in this regard or how they navigated the challenge. 
One wonders to what extent their contemporary source materials – academic 
dissertations, newspaper and media reports, and online statements – diverge from 
the unreliable approximations that assail official documents generated by foreign 
agencies and national governments.
Despite its shortcomings, Africa and the War on Drugs contains thought 
provoking reflections on the campaign against drug trafficking in Africa. Carrier 
and Klantschnig depart from Western interpretations of Africa’s drug issues 
and offer historical and cultural insights into the continent’s drug habits. Their 
recommendations include important alternatives in drug law enforcement, such 
as the need to incorporate views from academic and health sectors in order to 
implement rules that consider the safety and rehabilitation of drug users. They also 
draw attention to current drug-related threats to Africa, namely, the proliferation 
of fake drugs and the largely unregulated use of “legal drugs” like alcohol and 
tobacco. Their work stands not only as an academic piece but also an informational 
kit for international agencies and stakeholders in the anti-drug campaign.
Ogechukwu Ezekwem
Doctoral Candidate, Department of History
University of Texas at Austin
Austin, TX
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Cheru, Fantu and Renu Modi, eds. Agricultural Development 
and Food Security in Africa: The Impact of Chinese, Indian, 
and Brazilian Investments. New York: Zed Books, 2013, xiii 
+ 263 pp.
Due to factors like climate change, population growth, and decreasing availability 
of fertile land and water, there has been a growing competition for land. These 
adversities have led to increasing debates, media attention, and research surrounding 
agricultural development, food security, and land use. The roles and actions of 
emerging powers, like China, India, and Brazil in international development, 
world economy, and influence in global governance are of particular interest. Thus, 
the collection of work provided by editors Fantu Cheru and Renu Modi is a needed 
and welcome addition to the growing research in this field.
Organized into twelve chapters and divided into four parts, Cheru and Modi 
introduce the work pragmatically, committing to a balanced analysis based on 
empirical evidence of the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) from Brazil, China, 
and India in Africa’s development. This is partially an attempt to highlight the 
complexity of FDI, but also to illustrate that the development process is not simply 
a dichotomy split along the lines of Western Europe and the United States versus 
agricultural development focusing on small-scale farming and environmentalism. 
Cheru and Modi also emphasized that the work is an effort to prevent equating 
FDI with neocolonialism and land grabbing. However, while the emphasis is on 
FDI generally, the book does broadly examine investment, trade, and development 
assistance from China, India, and Brazil to Africa. Parts II, III, and IV respectively 
cover the experiences of India, Brazil, and China with African agriculture. Part II 
focuses on India’s private and public sector involvement with African agriculture. 
Brazil’s experience, including the Dialogue Forum with South Africa (IBSA), is 
covered in Part III, and focuses on biofuel production. Finally, Part IV focuses 
on China, highlighting its domestic successes in agricultural development and 
poverty reduction based on strong government incentives and how this translates 
into its foreign investments.
Cheru and Modi state that the goal of the book is to examine whether “private 
and sovereign investments from China, India and Brazil create new opportunities 
for the transfer of appropriate farm technology, build local capacity and know-
how, reverse the persistent productivity decline in agriculture, generate local 
employment, improve local living standards and ensure food security” (xii). The 
overview in Part I begins this examination with a discussion of the potential of 
FDI from India, China, and Brazil and a historical perspective on the role of 
FDI in Africa’s agricultural development. Sam Moyo’s chapter provides critical 
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analysis and historical account of the risks of FDI and its tenuous record in 
Africa. Ultimately, Cheru and Modi argue that FDI can be a successful vehicle for 
development, social transformation, and poverty reduction if paired with a “strong 
and effective development-oriented state” (2).
Cheru and Modi succeed in their commitment to a balanced analysis of 
FDI from Brazil, China, and India, as there are a variety of perspectives given by 
the chapter authors, ranging from the avid supporter of FDI, cautious supporter, 
to the more critical perspective. This is best illustrated in Part II. For the most 
part, the views closely align with the Indian government and private sector – that 
India is committed to helping Africa overcome poverty and underdevelopment. 
To illustrate, Gurjit Singh asserts that “India’s engagement with Africa in the 
agricultural sector has largely met expectations” and that “Indian companies have 
been good about meeting their corporate social responsibilities by creating local 
employment, transferring technology and contributing to domestic and intra-
African trade” (73-74). However, contributions from Dessalegn Rahmato and Rick 
Rowden in Part II critically examine India’s commitment by examining large-
scale land acquisitions by Indian companies using a land rights framework. For 
instance, Rahmato argues that there has been “hardly any technology transfer” to 
the average Ethiopian farmer, and that these projects are often technologically “not 
transferable to or affordable for smallholders” (105).
The editors also succeed in highlighting how each of the emerging countries’ 
own domestic agricultural development experiences relates to their respective 
engagements in Africa. This is especially evident in the section on China, 
particularly the chapter by Xiuli Xu and Xiaoyun Li, but can also be found 
throughout the book in varying degrees. However, this brings to light the paradox 
of the potential success of such emerging countries’ investments when there may 
still be significant domestic struggles. For instance, how can India be considered 
a success in food self- sufficiency when a large part of its own population goes 
hungry? Or how does one reconcile China’s stance on civil liberties with that of a 
“strong, effective development state” (8)? Further, this also raises larger issues of 
transfer of success and whether it’s possible.
Despite Cheru and Modi’s claim to base the book on empirical evidence, 
Rahmato’s work on Indian investments in Ethiopia is the only piece that does so. 
However, this is tempered by their success in gathering diverse perspectives on this 
topic and highlights a broader role and function of narrative, discourse, and social 
construction in how the role of emerging countries’ involvement in international 
development is perceived and defined. Thus, with the evidence based largely in 
narrative form, Cheru and Modi offer the conclusion that “the overall impact of 
Chinese, Indian and Brazilian investments and technical assistance to African 
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agriculture has been positive.” However, given the large reliance on narrative, such 
conclusions fall short of rigorous evaluation.
Ultimately, this book advances the understanding of the subject of FDI 
investments in Africa by emerging countries. It is particularly helpful as it pulls 
together diverse accounts from Brazil, India, and China, and provides consideration 
of each of the emerging countries development trajectories and what it may mean 
for Africa. Finally, it offers a foundation upon which future work and evidence can 
build to help explain and understand the role of emerging countries in FDI.
Jennifer Dye
Adjunct instructor, International Human Rights 
University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati, OH
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Gallagher, Julia. Britain and Africa Under Blair: In Pursuit 
of the Good State. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2011, viii + 166 pp.
While employed at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office during Tony Blair’s 
prime ministership, Julia Gallagher found herself struck by the distinct rhetoric 
about Africa that Blair and his cabinet expressed. In Britain and Africa Under Blair, 
Gallagher seeks to understand this “new” moral, ethical discourse which differed 
from that used to describe the rest of the world. Where Africa was concerned, 
Blair’s government expressed an “ethical foreign policy,” which was “grounded in 
utopian and cosmopolitan ideas and highly idealised… [as well as] offered a grand, 
heroic identity for Britain” (4). The rhetoric, interestingly, was not restricted to the 
New Labour party; politicians from all parties seemed to employ it. Africa was thus 
set above party politics as the government undertook a moral crusade to “help” the 
continent, claiming that it was supporting human rights and creating social justice, 
all the while contributing to global stability and economic improvement.
Gallagher’s approach has a second, crucial façade. She argues that Africa 
was a perfect “Other” where Britain could project its international efforts, which 
contributed to domestic notions about the ideal British state. She derives her 
argument from the realm of psychology by considering how individuals – and by 
extension, the states they comprise, she argues somewhat controversially – can 
solve internal traumas and maintain well being. In the case of the British state, this 
was achieved in part through attempts to “‘repair’ external objects,” that is, trying 
to fix the problems facing African peoples (69). This is an original argument that is 
grounded on Gallagher’s conviction about the “importance to human wellbeing of 
a connection to a sense of the good” (73). She provides the evidence for this thesis 
in the second half of the book through contemporary case studies of recent British 
engagement in Sierra Leone and Nigeria, though one wonders whether Kenya or 
Zimbabwe might have provided more complex, richer examples.
Gallagher begins with a theoretical chapter that weighs the “good” a state 
might wish to accomplish against its “political” considerations, and dips into the 
history of the British Empire to begin explaining the intellectual background to 
New Labour’s approach to Africa. The first half of the book, indeed, is really an 
intellectual history of the idea of the “goodstate” in Britain since the late eighteenth 
century. Gallagher’s approach reminds this author of Alice Conklin’s efforts in 
writing the history of early colonial French West Africa. Like Conklin, Gallagher 
believes in the importance of ideology in British efforts in Africa, and links later 
Labour ideologies to the period of the Scramble for Africa and beyond.
For Gallagher, “doing good” was no simple veil covering economic and 
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geo-political considerations, but an important aspect of British policy and 
consciousness. The various strands of the “good” of British state policy from 
the past through New Labour are clearly explored, though these sections leave a 
sense of uneasiness about the omission of those slightly less “good” aspects. There 
is also a problematic tendency to take statements from politicians like Joseph 
Chamberlain or publications like the Times at face value without subjecting them 
to critical analysis, something Gallagher acknowledges in the conclusion.
It is perhaps in the second half of this book that Gallagher makes her most 
striking contribution. She evaluates interview testimony from a variety of contacts 
she made during her years working in government. They range from Clare Short 
to Malcolm Moss, and serve to justify her claims about the perceptions of Africa 
among Britain’s high-ranking contemporary politicians. Politicians viewed Africa 
idealistically; whereas British domestic politics was a murky maelstrom of chaos 
and argument, Africa’s “massive problems appear[ed] to generate clear-cut 
solutions,” and permitted the justified expression of British power abroad, despite 
the fact that African issues were rarely vote-winners at home. The same ideals, 
Gallagher continues to demonstrate, were mirrored by officials in the field who felt 
genuine satisfaction in their work, and felt a deep responsibility to it. They spoke, 
officials believed, for the common man and woman of Africa, and steered clear 
of politics as much as possible. Here, in “empty” Africa, “British officials [could] 
embody the good state” (122). After the Thatcher years in which Britain had failed 
to sanction apartheid South Africa and its later inaction in the face of the Rwandan 
genocide, the nation state came to hold little moral authority. New Labour “felt 
itself to be inheriting a damaged state,” and international activity and the crusade 
in Africa, undertaken with little ostensible self-interest for the government, served 
as a venue for moral action in the new, globalized world (127).
To my mind, there is one major weakness in this work. Gallagher is convincing 
in tracing the ideology of the “good state” until the beginning of the twentieth 
century. But the remainder of the century yawns like a gaping hole between that 
point and the Blair years: how did the ideology of the “good state” transform due 
to the Second World War, for instance? And what about the golden age of colonial 
development, in the 1940s and
1950s? These would seem like vital subjects for study and analysis of them 
might permit the author to more directly link the periods together. Finally, and 
perhaps this is a historian’s grouchiness, the author has the tendency to assert 
rather than demonstrate; the actual evidence for many statements is sparse. This 
could be, in part, a result of the author’s total familiarity with her topics, but it is 
occasionally unsettling for the non-specialist reader.
This is a highly theoretical and erudite work. Hegel and Rousseau share the 
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pages with Mbembe and Mudimbe, and Gallagher possesses the enviable skill of 
being able to relate philosophy, intellectual history, and psychology directly to her 
topics in a comprehensible manner, although these sections do limit the flow of 
the prose in places. Overall, Gallagher’s argument is largely effective. While she 
may not succeed in wholly convincing readers about her convictions, she certainly 
provides an important perspective that will inspire scholars of the continent to heed 
her insights and think more deeply about their own research.
Myles Osborne 
Assistant Professor of History 
University of Colorado Boulder 
Boulder, CO
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Giles-Vernick, Tamara and James L.A. Webb Jr, eds. Global 
Health in Africa: Historical Perspectives on Disease Control. 
Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013, 1 + 246 pp.
Few will argue against the reality that Africa bears a heavy disease burden, yet little 
scholarship exists that situates Africa’s struggles with disease in a broader global health 
perspective. Tamara Giles-Vernick and James L.A. Webb Jr. formulated a smart collected 
volume that takes an interdisciplinary and multi-lateral approach toward understanding how 
“health initiatives launched within Africa by actors based outside of the continent” have 
addressed disease, chronic health problems, and complex conditions such as malnutrition 
and injection drug use (3). At the heart of the text, Giles-Vernick and Webb are concerned 
with presenting the long history of intervention, from the introduction of biomedicine during 
the colonial era, through the developmentalist frames of early post-colonies, to the late-
twentieth century focus on HIV transmission and drug culture. Weighted toward historical 
accounts, the book is broken into three parts, with nine chapters plus the introduction.
Part one examines the historical picture of Africa’s experience with global health. The 
first chapter, by William Schneider, examines the history of smallpox eradication, noting 
that colonial efforts led to some successes and opened the door for later, comprehensive 
vaccination work under the WHO from the 1960s to the 1970s. Schneider gives the only 
full-scale success story, in a complicated history of intervention and retrenchment. In the 
second chapter, Webb analyzes “large-scale use of insecticide” in Liberia to eradicate 
malaria between 1945 and 1962 by the United States, followed by the WHO and UNICEF 
(42). Webb’s chapter gives a cautionary tale of limited success offset by emergent problems 
as vector resistance to DDT and Dieldrin (DLD) weakened the institutional commitment to 
a program with expansive financial and logistical challenges (61).
 The dual problems of economies of scale and lack of foresight to manage 
shifting disease environments as an outside agent, prevents effective change, 
no matter the scheme. Guillaume Lachenal’s chapter “proposes a genealogy of 
treatment as prevention” in HIV/AIDS interventions by examining colonial efforts 
to manage African health despite “indecision over what constituted (individual) 
treatment and (collective) prevention” (72-73). Lachenal situates HIV/AIDS 
programs at the nexus of smallpox, malaria, and “biomedical messianism” as a 
warning against premature predictions of success (84). In chapter four, Jennifer 
Tappan draws together the colonial and post-colonial to “evaluate the scientific and 
medical rationale underlying the distribution of dried skimmed milk” by medical 
officials in an effort to curb early childhood malnutrition (93). While officials 
claimed the supplement was not meant to replace breast milk, Tappan shows that 
the message received was to “make the powder into milk for their children to drink 
and not one informant could recall being instructed to add the powdered milk to a 
90 | Book Reviews
Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2015
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/
child’s food” (102). Biomedical emphasis on technological treatments, foods, and 
insecticides privileged specialized knowledge and marginalized the beneficiaries.
Part two takes on a more presentist set of health dilemmas through a historical 
lens, with three chapters that incorporate history, anthropology, and biomedicine. 
These chapters have the most to say about current health issues that Africans 
must navigate in their daily lives. Giles- Vernick’s contribution, with Stephanie 
Rupp, explores how “cross-species transmissions” became the most significant 
factor in recent infectious disease outbreaks (117). Rather than privileging western 
scientific explanations, the authors analyze African narratives of contestations and 
interactions with great apes. The significance of socialized distance between humans 
and apes suggests a complicated set of cultural practices to reduce exposure to a 
dangerous disease ecology that holds everything from sleeping sickness to Ebola 
(129). In chapter six, Anne Marie Moulin places Egypt’s recent plague of iatrogenic 
Hepatitis C into a broader framing of Africa’s medical history that reveals how 
treatment for schistosomiasis infected millions of people with the liver disease. 
The violence of iatrogenesis also contributes to the historical memory of forced 
vaccinations coupled with an intense mistrust of medical specialists who appear 
corrupt and ineffective. While some may doubt Moulin’s assertion that iatrogenic 
infection factored into the Arab Spring of 2011, the compounded social malaise 
of political corruption and failed public health does suggest compelling grounds 
for social protest (150). From a newly identified plague of Hepatitis C, Myron 
Echenberg examines how Cholera went from one of the “most feared maladies 
of the nineteenth century, [to]…a severe diarrheal disease,” which since the mid-
1970s threatens Africa on a regular basis (159). Echenberg provides several 
statistical tables to show locations and rates of incidence, revealing that across the 
major geographic regions several states exhibit a high frequency of cholera, which 
suggests important indices for assessing risk. From here, Echenberg examines three 
key risk factors: landscape or ecological changes; political instability or armed 
conflict, which precipitate refugees; and water or sanitation as a consequence 
of public health failures. The failure of appropriate measures to address disease 
outbreaks, transmission, and sanitation points to further problems for disease 
prevention as external pressures drive the agenda.
Part three moves into the complexities of where Africa’s public health 
challenges require innovation before intervention. These last two chapters address 
the dilemmas around HIV/AIDS transmission and control efforts that further alter 
African bodies and material practices, based upon donor models about appropriate 
efforts. Michel Garenne, Alain Giami, and Christophe Perrey examine the 
emergent role of “medical male circumcision” (MMC) as a recommended practice 
to reduce the spread of HIV since March 2007 (186). The authors examine the 
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historical practice of male circumcision in a variety of African communities, from 
the Nuba to Zulu, and its cultural significance for Africa’s monotheistic religions. 
They also point toward the trauma and sanitary challenges of circumcision, 
showing that despite the appearance of reduced HIV infection the statistics are not 
significant enough to be clearly indicative. The last chapter, by Sheryl McCurdy 
and Haruka Maruyama, on heroin use and HIV interventions in Africa shows how 
global flows carried new practices in its currents: “a foreign-led, top-down drug 
control approach, and a public health—and human rights-focused harm-reduction 
approach” (212). Africa became a transit nexus for heroin, connecting production 
sites in Pakistan and Afghanistan with markets in Europe and the United States. 
East Africa became an important hub for heroin after 1999, which also transformed 
heroin use in the region from something smoked or inhaled to an injectable drug. 
The change to injecting heroin also increases the risk of transmitting various blood-
borne diseases, such as HIV and Hepatitis C. As McCurdy and Maruyama note, 
the top-down approach criminalizes users, while the harm reduction exemplifies 
treatment and prevention methods that “enable drug users to make better choices 
that will help them reduce their risk-related practices” to better “manage their drug 
dependence and comorbidities” (224).
Giles-Vernick and Webb have assembled a valuable collection of perspectives 
on the global health challenges African countries face today and their historical 
roots. Each study is localized and rich in details, which will encourage discussions 
and further analysis of the problems presented. The book has excellent utility for a 
variety of course applications, from Global Public Health for medical and nursing 
programs to Medical Anthropology or Histories of Science and Medicine to more 
specific applications in a number of African Studies fields. 
Chau Johnsen Kelly
Assistant Professor of History 
University of North Florida
Jacksonville, FL
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Hammar, Amanda, ed. Displacement Economies in Africa: 
Paradoxes of Crisis and Creativity. London/New York: Zed 
Books, 2014, vii + 260 pp.
Displacement Economies in Africa, an anthology edited by Amanda Hammar, 
breaks new theoretical ground in its introduction as it examines the troubling 
question of displacement economies that result from Africa’s vast and apocalyptic 
range of upheavals, stemming from wars, misrule, ecological devastation, and 
allied challenges that confront its nascent nation-states. Internal displacement, as 
well as the more familiar variety of refugee export, receive close attention, and 
the economic spaces vacated and created by these difficulties come under very 
close analysis for the inevitably novel alternative socio-economic and political 
relational configurations that they spawn. Major changes occur in both formal and 
informal economic arrangements, and some players derive maximal benefits while 
others lose out as inchoate forces at play shape new universes of opportunity and 
disadvantage. The instrumental agency sometimes exercised by the displaced, yet 
often ignored, comes in for close scrutiny, and the resourcefulness of the victim in 
the midst of adversity becomes compelling terrain for heuristic review. This is a 
bold and insightful introduction to the book.
Andrea Behrends discusses the Darfur-Chad borderlands, and, in charting 
differential responses to displacement, she identifies scenarios ranging from 
continuing, even if temporary, attachment to agricultural production, lives free 
of assistance from aid agencies, partial dependence on aid-supports, through 
to total reliance for social reproduction on the charity of the latter. Through 
extensive discussion of the lives of the displaced, she demonstrates the choices 
that individuals are forced to make in fashioning their peculiar survival strategies 
in dire situations of conflict. These decisions were often influenced by conditions 
of intense political volatility as rulers of Chad and Sudan warred with each other, 
significantly constraining the choices of the displaced, heightening the appeal of 
the aid agencies, and dimming for many the prospects of an eventual return to pre-
conflict locations and lifestyles.
The war-torn Casamance region of Senegal is Martin Evans’ terrain of 
analysis. He shows convincingly how the forces of secession in the area introduce 
displacement but also discusses the possibilities of a “return” once some normalcy 
begins to dawn. The returnee faces challenges of physical as well as relational 
fracturing and deterioration, and economic opportunities have to be rebuilt even 
as generational tensions emerge as the youth take on the elders in the much-
contested political stakes. New land tenurial arrangements become necessary, and 
administrative re- alignments breed tensions and roil communal solidarity, with 
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former guerrillas claiming a seat at the table.re-alignments breed tensions and roil 
communal solidarity, with former guerrillas claiming a seat at the table.
Amanda Hammar’s chapter deals with the implosion of a Zimbabwe badly 
governed by Robert Mugabe’s ZANU/PF in the period after 2000. She charts the 
major problems of a failed state, Mugabe’s megalomania, the serial insecurities 
of a majority population heavily dependent on the informal economy, and the re-
shaping of social class as white commercial farmers and their African workers 
suffer exclusion while the working classes experience both internal and external 
displacement. The well connected amass wealth, but their goal is the most primitive 
and grotesque of accumulations, not re-investment to foster economic growth. 
The middle class recomposed, with heavy dependence on the informal economy, 
particularly with the crushing burdens of Structural Adjustment. The poor do 
worse, even as new economic relations emerge in areas like Masvingo, where 
“class, gender and generational differentiation” (90) threw up new initiatives that 
sustained beleaguered households, especially in the area of livestock. Displaced 
white farmers cooperated creatively with new black owners to their mutual benefit, 
and ZANU/PF is too embarrassed to formally note this vital relationship. The 
illicit trade in foreign currency has imbricated the social classes, bringing some 
relief to the internally displaced, while raising fortunes for the apparatchiks. The 
introduction of the American dollar has restored some sanity to the economy, but 
not before much disruption of material conditions occurred across the board.
For Cristina Udelsmann Rodrigues, the diamond-rich north- eastern Lundas 
of Angola, in a season of crisis, is the field of exploration. Independence in 1975 
brought no respite to a war-weary nation, and difficulties were compounded by 
instability in the neighboring Congo. Illegal mining (garimpo) became the refuge 
of many as population groups variously experienced displacement, involuntary 
confinement to both safe and unsafe areas, forced mining labor at the command of 
UNITA, and sundry material dislocations amidst an influx of competing Congolese 
refugees. The end of the war generated yet more insecurity as the government 
showed the flag, garimpo became more hazardous, and legal mining became more 
dominant for the approved few. Non-mining jobs were now the new attraction, and 
the hardy, and generally insecure, garimpeiro now easily fell foul of the law, and 
were greatly harassed.
Nairobi’s Eastleigh Estate, home to many displaced Somali, is Hannah 
Elliott’s purview in this anthology. She is particularly drawn to the trade in camel 
milk, which became the com-mercial, social, and therapeutic refuge of a displaced 
population that was much traumatized by civil war. The milk trade, run on a trust 
system, drew visiting Somali from abroad, gener-ated income for real-estate 
investment, cemented social ties, and elevated the urban “middle-woman,” the 
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widow, and the spinster, who avail themselves of the indeterminacy of their clan 
location to rival the patriarchs.
We continue with the Somali-displaced in Peter Hansen’s contribution, 
but this time with an emphasis on the returnee, post-conflict. Few returned to 
Somaliland permanently, but, from the Somali diaspora, many invested savings 
and time in real estate, businesses, conjugal arrangements, and social networking. 
The returnees found great comfort in belonging to an established network of 
familial and social ties, transcending the anonymity that could never bring social 
distinction to their efforts in the diaspora. Neither the fledgling “government” nor 
family members encouraged their permanent return, for, as a floating population, 
they offered Somaliland a whole lot more materially.
With Sarah Bracking, we return to Zimbabwe, this time to examine the 
dynamics of asset-relocation in a period of economic hardship and displacement. 
The wealthy, both those with ZANU/PF connections, and those without, sought 
creative ways of spiriting their funds out of the besieged economy to safer havens 
abroad. Many escaped state predation as taxes rose, and victimization came to 
those out of favor with the government. Bank officials helped some to get their 
funds out, and others found creative ways of evading detection. A lot of bribes 
were paid in these spoils politics of the redomiciling of capital, and the elite 
joined the poor in many acts of extraversion. The state took to manipulating 
remittances sent to family members from Zimbabweans abroad, and creative 
delays in completing transactions ensured good rents to state officials and the 
well- connected. The business in foreign currency spawned a network of Chinese, 
Angolan and Zimbabwean capitalists, and, at a time of great immiseration for the 
majority, significant fortunes were made by the wealthy.
Morten Boas and Ingunn Bjorkhaug probe northern Uganda in their chapter, 
examining the psychological trauma of confinement, in which displacement is of 
a short distance, and the displaced can see their original homes, and yet cannot 
live there. This circumstance bred poverty and utter hopelessness. The Acholi 
communities, traumatized by Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and 
other bandits, lived in a “prison-like economy” of the internally-displaced, in camps 
that offered little agency, operating under curfew, with only a few opportunities 
for trade, limited cultivation, or military service. In perpetual fear of terror, and 
encompassed in mythical, preternatural beliefs of Kony’s occult powers, these 
populations languished in abject dependence on charity.
Jeremy Jones reviews the Zimbabwean crisis of the 2000s, and highlights 
the misery, but also the resourcefulness, of those who were “stuck” in their 
original locations while being traumatized by a collapsed formal economy. He 
traces Mugabe’s slide into extravagant financial commitment to war veterans, state 
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corruption, urban opposition to ZANU/ PF (and the reprisals this drew), and the 
ultimate collapse of the formal economy. People of all social classes took to illegal 
means for survival, with the poorly educated youth being the biggest victims, their 
lives completely unhinged from the tenuous material moorings they once knew.
The final essay comes from Timothy Raemaekers, and it deals with the 
displacement of the youth in an eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
ravaged by war. Few Congolese ever made it to the aid camps, many pursuing 
solace in neighboring countries. A number found shelter in forest environments, 
with a large majority being hosted by more cohesive families that could offer some 
protection. Aid agencies were rigid in their munificence, and only those directly 
under their wing could expect their sustained charity. Being mostly unarmed, the 
youth had to devise a means to survive. They were at the mercy of the G8, that 
“closed group of transnational traders who dominate[d] almost every aspect of 
urban economic life,” (236) a virtual government in the eastern Congo. The vibrant 
informal economy in the towns supplied some temporary jobs, but one’s ethnic 
roots often determined what was available to these youthful “strangers.” Periods 
of peace improved work chances, but host families exacted a high material price, 
and were generally cold comfort in harsh economic times.
This is a well-packaged, and insightful anthology, and it richly fulfills the 
claims of the introduction in covering displacement, especially the internally-
displaced, from a very rich field of empirical investigations. While noting that 
a map or two would have provided greater context for the unfamiliar reader’s 
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Heaton, Matthew M. Black Skin, White Coats: Nigerian 
Psychiatrists, Decolonization and the Globalization of 
Psychiatry. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013, x + 249 pp.
In recent years, the study of Africa’s transition from colonialism to independence 
has proven to be a particularly fruitful avenue of historical inquiry, as scholars 
have documented both the opportunities and challenges Africans faced as they 
struggled to define the boundaries of nationhood and identity while articulating 
new understandings of modernity. With his recent work on the history of Nigerian 
psychiatry in the decades surrounding national independence, Matthew Heaton has 
contributed an important chapter to this unfolding narrative, inserting the perspective 
of Nigerian psychiatrists into larger debates over the process of decolonization and 
the appropriation of Western knowledge within African landscapes.
The book’s title, a play on the classic 1952 text by Frantz Fanon, signifies a point 
of departure rather than arrival, as Heaton argues that Nigerian psychiatrists of 
the 1950s and 1960s were able to reject the Manichaean logic of Fanon in favor 
of a pluralistic approach to medicine that adapted Western psychiatry to the 
Nigerian landscape while simultaneously redefining their field in light of local 
perspectives. In this way, Heaton argues that Nigerian psychiatrists challenged the 
binary distinctions between colonizer and colonized that have often defined the 
study of modern medicine in the non- Western world. Heaton’s book thus offers an 
important corrective to other studies of African psychiatry that have emphasized the 
dislocations and miscommunications of the colonial encounter, in which Western 
doctors all too often pathologized and dehumanized colonial subjects exposed to 
the Western medical gaze.
By contrast, the heroes of Heaton’s narrative are the first generation of Nigerian 
psychiatrists trained in the West, men like Thomas Adeoye Lambo and Tolani 
Asuni, who challenged the assumptions of the racist ethnopsychiatry that had 
dominated the field of colonial mental health for much of the twentieth century. That 
movement had argued for the existence of an “African mind” that was impulsive, 
emotional and allegedly less prone to mental illness than the supposedly more 
logical Western subject. In the book’s most important chapter, Heaton shows how 
Lambo’s work in the
1950s and 1960s shifted the field towards the new paradigm of transcultural 
psychiatry, defined by the premise that mental illness was a product of what Heaton 
calls “universal similarities of human psychological processes that transcended 
perceived boundaries between races and cultures” (4-5). Thus, a subsequent 
chapter on the mental illnesses of Nigerians living in the United Kingdom shows 
how Lambo and other Nigerian psychiatrists resisted racial and essentialist 
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explanations for the prevalence of mental illness among migrant populations. 
Likewise, Heaton shows how Nigerian doctors worked to reformulate so-called 
“brain fag” syndrome, an illness once thought to be unique to Nigerian culture, by 
placing it within the spectrum of universally acknowledged mental illnesses.
Though the above examples suggest a process whereby Nigerian psychiatrists 
redefined African illnesses according to the accepted terminology of Western 
medicine, Heaton does a fine job of showing how Nigerian medical personnel also 
worked to redefine the field of international psychiatry through an engagement with 
local practices. In this regard the most important effort at integrating international 
and local medicine was made through the establishment of the Aro Mental Hospital, 
founded by Lambo near his home of Abeokuta in the 1950s. Here Lambo and other 
Nigerian doctors offered an approach to healing that combined Western techniques, 
such as psychopharmaceutical treatment and electroconvulsive therapy, with 
traditional African healing practices that were more holistic than those found in 
Western medical institutions. In fact, as Heaton shows, Lambo not only worked 
with traditional medical practitioners at Aro, he also spent much of his career 
insisting on the value of indigenous healers to achieving successful therapeutic 
outcomes. Yet the incorporation of non-Western medicine into the practice of 
Nigerian psychiatrists was also clearly elitist in orientation, as Nigerian doctors 
situated themselves as intermediaries, or as Heaton refers to them, “gatekeepers 
of the mind” who were “the only ones with the appropriate balance of culturally 
specific knowledge and scientifically universal knowledge” (152).
Heaton’s narrative is written in a clear and effective—if at times repetitive—
prose, and his argument about the importance of transcultural psychiatry to the 
decolonization process is well-made. However, Heaton’s analysis would also 
have benefited from a deeper engagement with the theoretical implications of 
his main contentions. Heaton is surely right to position figures like Lambo as 
“gatekeepers,” yet this term also raises important questions about the cultural and 
national agendas of this newly educated elite, as well as their desire for social 
control. Nowhere is this more clearly apparent than in the doctors’ concerns about 
the emergence of recreational drug use by young urban men in post-independence 
Nigeria. As Heaton shows, Asuni believed that widespread cannabis use hurt 
family stability and constituted “disruptive and irresponsible behavior” (170) 
that threatened the health and productivity of the nation. Yet the author never 
weighs in on whether these fears were rational or simply a manifestation of an 
undefined social and cultural agenda. Given the importance Heaton ascribes to 
these seminal psychiatric figures, a deeper exploration of their own perspective on 
the meaning of nationhood and independence would have helped to contextualize 
their interventions in local and international medical debates, while also raising 
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the question of whether, as intermediaries, these doctors’ efforts at social control 
constituted a neo- colonial continuation of colonial-era priorities. Relatedly, the 
book’s focus on elite perspectives seems to preclude a deeper discussion or analysis 
of how other participants in the field of Nigerian mental health, such as traditional 
healers and patients, navigated the post-colonial landscape being constructed by 
men like Lambo and Asuni.
That Heaton’s book raises these questions is surely a credit to the author’s 
exhaustive research into the medical debates of the independence period and his 
clear presentation of his argument. For these reasons alone, Black Skin, White Coats 
will become essential reading for scholars of the history of African psychiatry and 
African medicine, as well as for specialists of modern Nigeria. It will also surely 
open new fields of inquiry into the study of contemporary African encounters with 
Western science and philosophy.
David Crawford Jones
Senior Lecturer of African American and African Studies 
The Ohio State University
Columbus, OH
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Kinyanjui, Mary Njeri. Women and the Informal Economy 
in Urban Africa: from the Margins to the Centre. London: 
Zed Books, 2014, x + 140 pp.
Setting out a critique of Western urban planning models as applied to African cities, 
while recognizing not only the positive contributions of economic informality 
but also articulating its indigenous characteristics, and at the same time asserting 
women’s agency and dynamism as a basis for new models in advancing urban growth 
is ambitious for such a slim volume, yet is precisely what Mary Njeri Kinyanjui’s 
incisive observation and analysis achieves in this concise, groundbreaking work.
The subtitle of the book, “From the Margins to the Centre,” captures the 
essence of Kinyanjui’s enterprise. Through an in depth case study of Nairobi, 
Kinyanjui sets out to reposition the African city as a unique, coherent entity as 
opposed to an inexplicable aberration on the margins of urban planning theories. At 
the same time, she re-conceptualizes economic informality from a site on the edges 
of survival to a site of dynamism and sustainable solidarity built on indigenous 
concepts. She embodies all of this in the movement of women, spatially and 
entrepreneurially, from the edges of the city to its center, in a rejuvenation of the 
central business district through ingenious new uses of retail space by small scale 
women traders.
The book, in Kinyanjui’s own words, “urges the need to investigate the 
diversity and creativity within the African city in terms of the African indigenous 
market concept, solidarity entrepreneurialism, inclusion of women in urban panning 
and collective organization as a method of organizing business, … [and] including 
gender in the construction of urban theory” (5). The author’s emphasis on the 
dynamism and promise of innovations stemming from economic informality and 
particularly from women in this sector, stands in contrast to much urban planning 
theory and development literature.
Although not formally divided, the book may be said to fall into three 
sections. The first and last chapters articulate Kinyanjui’s position in relation to 
other development and urban planning theorists. In chapters two through four, 
Kinyanjui delves into historical and archival records to trace the development of 
the city from its colonial inception, through independence and successive post-
independence administrations. Aspects addressed include spatial segregation, 
men and women’s place in the city over time, as well as the changing relationship 
between government officials and street hawkers. Throughout, Kinyanjui stresses 
the continuity in the development of the informal economic sector, including its 
roots in indigenous market concepts, which are explicitly elucidated. In this way, 
Kinyanjui’s treatise brings the postcolonial school of thought to the field of urban 
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planning, insisting that the social and historical context of a city’s development 
be considered in any evaluation or development of future plans. This also forms a 
basis for Kinyanjui’s unabashed critique of the inadequacy of Western theories of 
urban planning for Africa’s context, and her call for the innovations employed in 
economic informality to be recognized for their contribution to the development of 
the city’s human capital and studied for new urban development paradigms.
Kinyanjui shifts to an analysis of empirical data, gathered from surveys and 
interviews of Nairobi women in economic informality, in chapters five through 
eight. This analysis is thematically organized, including chapters on “women’s 
mobility,” the “characteristics of women in economic informality,” “women’s 
search for spatial justice,” and “women’s collective organizations,” respectively. 
Kinyanjui is conscious about allowing “subaltern” women’s voices to come 
through in her work. In this section she also formulates a critique of the women’s 
movement of the 1980s and 1990s in Kenya, by highlighting the intersection of 
class and culture, and alleging “modernist” formulation of the women’s movement 
failed to engage the majority of Kenyan women coming from less middle class 
or Western-influenced backgrounds. She suggests that women in the informal 
economic sector are forming a new movement, which has not yet been recognized 
in academic discourse; an intriguing position that merits further study.
Kinyanjui’s data on women in economic informality brings to light a 
significantly different picture of the sector than that found in other studies in terms 
of demographics and sustainability. Significantly, she asserts: “The movement 
[toward women’s economic accumulation] is not haphazard, as envisioned in the 
literature on the impact of informality in the city; it is discussed and coordinated” 
(110). Kinyanjui’s analysis of women’s collective organizations gives rise to 
several exciting possibilities: from the potential for solidarity entrepreneurialism 
and existing women’s groups to form a basis for addressing participation and 
spatial justice in the city, to a view of collective entrepreneurial organization as 
a challenge to individualistic, concentrated capitalism. Kinyanjui, suggested that 
rather than being mainly conceptualized in relation to land reform, one must focus 
on recognition of emergent social alliances.
A slight tendency to essentialize women operating in economic informality 
in some sections of the book is overcome when the empirical data and extensive 
quotes from women themselves are shared in later chapters. One might have wished 
for enhanced editing to avoid occasional repetition in the manuscript, but overall, 
Women and the Informal Economy in Africa makes important contributions to 
theories of urban planning, spatial justice, indigenous entrepreneurialism, and 
gender studies; accordingly, it will appeal to scholars and practitioners in a range 
of fields.
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Muehlenbeck, Philip E. Betting on the Africans: John F. 
Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist Leaders. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012, xxi + 333 pp.
In Betting on the Africans, Muehlenbeck focuses on President John F. Kennedy’s 
relationships with a number of prominent African leaders to analyze his efforts to 
improve US-Africa relations during his presidency (January 20, 1961 - November 
22, 1963). From the outset, Muehlenbeck contrasts “Kennedy’s policies of courting 
Third World nationalism” to the subsequent abandonment of these efforts in a larger 
shift towards an agenda focused on “Cold War concerns of anticommunism” that 
dominated other administrations (xiv). This is significant because, as Muehlenberg 
asserts, the shift away from Kennedy’s policies and ideologies relating to Africa 
and the developing world facilitated a considerable growth in anti- Americanism 
in subsequent presidencies (xiv).
Muehlenbeck carefully navigates the historiography of mid-twentieth 
century US-Africa relations by squarely situating this work as an effort to balance 
“modernization theory with personal diplomacy” (xv). As a result, Muehlenbeck 
seeks to consider Kennedy as a deeply strategic, yet highly personable figure in 
the construction of bonds between the US and Africa. Perhaps most importantly, 
Muehlenbeck perceives decolonization as “the most important historical force 
of the twentieth century,” thus, in gaining African leaders as allies, Kennedy had 
the ability to gain great respect from Africans while strengthening foreign policy 
(xvi). Ultimately, it is Muehlenbeck’s approach to Kennedy’s efforts in US-Africa 
relations through personal diplomacy that is very striking because it emphasizes a 
very different kind of diplomatic history that is underrepresented, especially within 
the histories of Africa, the Cold War, and US relations with Africa and Africans.
While the book could have easily devolved into a series of disconnected 
case studies in Cold War history, Muehlenbeck carefully crafts a framework for 
considering the strengths and weaknesses of JFK’s personal diplomacy by first 
beginning with a discussion of foreign policy under Eisenhower. Muehlenbeck 
then shifts to the Kennedy administration and his approach to African nationalism 
and US policy. After this somewhat prolonged introduction, Muehlenbeck delves 
into Kennedy’s relationships with individual African leaders like Sékou Touré 
of Guinea, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria. After 
examining these spaces, Muehlenbeck transitions to a discussion that focuses on 
the impact of Kennedy’s policies towards Africa and African nationalists, and how 
these exchanges bled into other areas of domestic and foreign policy. For example, 
Muehlenbeck gives considerable attention to the precarious nature of Kennedy’s 
stance towards minority rule in South Africa.
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While Muehlenbeck attempts to center his dialogue on personal diplomacy, 
there are critical issues with this approach. For example, Muehlenbeck makes 
great effort to emphasize Kennedy’s early support for African nationalism, 
especially during his years in Congress and the 1960 presidential campaign. Yet, 
he essentially explains away the Congo Crisis, which is simply discussed through 
the lens of how it influenced Kennedy’s relationships with other African leaders. 
This is problematic because Muehlenbeck goes to great lengths to differentiate 
Kennedy’s policies from other Cold War-era leaders, yet actions in the Congo or 
(in)action in South Africa are not simply aberrations as Muehlenbeck asserts on 
page xvi, they are indicative of an approach to diplomacy that was deeply personal 
in some cases, but also very telling in the continuation of pro-Western policies that 
sought to maintain stability and control in the midst of the Cold War.
While the bulk of Muehlenbeck’s limited discussion of the Congo Crisis 
centers on Lumumba and his death in 1961, it seems as if there is a careful forgetting 
of the fact that this conflict did not end after the death of Lumumba. There is no 
sustained or meaningful engagement in an effort to make sense of the extreme 
limitations of “personal diplomacy” in the case of the longer process of the Congo 
Crisis. This is troubling because one cannot simply ignore the immense diplomatic 
implications of the Congo Crisis because it was one of the most important conflicts 
in the continent of Africa in the years immediately following independence. 
Designating Kennedy’s stance in the Congo Crisis as an anomaly is problematic 
because it downplays the significance of this horrific event in African history 
within US policy. While Muehlenbeck provides an engaging and multi- faceted 
approach to the various ways in which Kennedy practiced personal diplomacy, it is 
difficult to label this as his dominant method of approaching African politics when 
some of the most influential and troubling parts of US-Africa diplomacy existed 
outside of this realm during the Kennedy presidency.
Nevertheless, Muehlenbeck’s work is very successful in a number of other 
areas. Muehlenbeck’s chapter on the rivalry between Kennedy and De Gaulle 
in Africa is especially noteworthy, as it carefully outlines the shifting nature of 
US-French relations with the (re)construction of spheres of influence during the 
early 1960s. As Muehlenbeck astutely assesses, De Gaulle “[envisioned] himself 
as a protective shield from superpower hegemony and Kennedy [saw] himself as 
a protective shield from French neocolonialism” (163). Thus, in continuation of 
this theme, Muehlenbeck outlines subtle and not-so-subtle attempts to extend, 
consolidate, or challenge influences in Africa from both the US and France. 
While Muehlenbeck’s brief introduction to Francophone Africa’s affinity with 
De Gaulle was a bit superficial, the chapter was very successful at capturing the 
nuanced rivalry between the two leaders by carefully demarcating strategic spaces 
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in Africa, analyzing motivations, exploring personalities, and assessing policies. 
Additionally, Muehlenbeck’s discussion of US- France tensions that influenced 
Peace Corps volunteers on the ground in Francophone Africa emphasized ways in 
which international politics intersected with daily life in a very tangible manner.
Muehlenbeck’s chapter on Kennedy’s relationship with Sékou Touré was 
intriguing because it emphasized the complex transformation of US-Guinea 
relationships, as evidenced by the fact that Eisenhower previously dismissed the 
Guinean leader as a communist (58). Thus, gaining a relationship with Guinea 
was a bit more complex than using Kennedy’s charm to secure the allegiance of 
a nation that was already friendly with the US. Yet, through the engaging and 
well-researched chapter, Muehlenbeck presents the argument that Kennedy “was 
able to not only influence Guinea back to a position of neutrality but by the end of 
Kennedy’s life the Guinean leader had even become slightly pro-Western” (58). In 
order to demonstrate this argument, Muehlenbeck chronicles debates over US aid 
to Guinea, both from US and Guinean perspectives, Touré’s visit to Washington 
in 1962, and the US Civil Rights related, and fabricated, controversy at the OAU 
conference in Addis Ababa in 1963. By examining these episodes, Muehlenbeck 
argues for the transformation of US-Guinea relations, which would ultimately 
facilitate “Guinea’s support of John F. Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis, 
the Congo crisis, and the outbreak of racial violence in the American south, and 
they could judge Sékou Touré not only by what he did-but also what he said” (72). 
This chapter is important because it is the first of five case studies of Kennedy’s 
personal diplomacy with some African nations. Yet, as the chapter on Kennedy 
and Touré reveals, Kennedy’s relationships with these leaders varied greatly and 
provided a range of political opportunities for all actors.
Overall, Muehlenbeck’s Betting on the Africans is an intriguing and 
important work that emphasizes the significance of personal diplomacy during 
Kennedy’s presidency. While there are obvious issues with Muehlenbeck’s limited 
discussions of the aforementioned aberrations, the book is largely successful in 
its efforts to shift towards a different type of Cold War politics, namely, one that 
focused on Kennedy’s personal diplomacy. While there are many books on Africa 
and the Cold War, I am confident that this monograph will be an important source 
of information for scholars and students interested in international diplomacy, 
Africa, and the Cold War.
Danielle Porter Sanchez
Doctoral Candidate, Department of History
The University of Texas at Austin
Austin, TX
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O’Sullivan, Kevin. Ireland, Africa and the End of Empire: 
Small State Identity in the Cold War, 1955-75. Manchester, 
UK: Manchester University Press, 2012, x + 230 pp.
The diplomatic history of small to medium-size states during the post- World War 
Two era is an emerging historiographical topic that complicates the study of the 
Cold War era and provides an important corrective to the overwhelming focus on 
how great powers interacted with and on Africa. In the process of forging a strong 
international identity, the emergence of newly independent African states created 
the perfect opportunity for a variety of states with limited resources to engage 
with a new group of countries. Africans could be invited to study or train, foreign 
advisors could be sent to the continent, or foreign aid and diplomatic support could 
be provided. Irish diplomats chose mostly the last option. Kevin O’Sullivan’s 
Ireland, Africa and the End of Empire offers a needed, well-researched, and 
engaging intervention into the relationships between smaller European states 
and newly independent African countries. In this diplomatic-focused history, 
O’Sullivan demonstrates the complicated narrative of the Irish relationship with 
Africa through an examination of the Katanga Crisis, Biafran War, and debates 
over minority rule in southern Africa. This engagement provided Ireland the space 
to emerge diplomatically and increase its importance on the international scene. 
O’Sullivan helps change the focus of diplomatic history during the 1960s and 
1970s from one on agendas driven by the Cold War to smaller states with their 
own plans to shape the African continent.
With the experience of being colonized and having to struggle for 
independence, Ireland is able to forge strong connections with the developing 
world. O’Sullivan makes a strong case in highlighting the considerable influence 
Ireland enjoyed in Africa considering its size and lack of experience in the realm of 
diplomacy. However, as O’Sullivan demonstrates throughout his work, this special 
link was a fragile balancing act with the Cold War looming in the background. Irish 
diplomats needed to consider their complicated relationship with Great Britain, 
their desire to obtain membership in the European Community, and ties with the 
Nordic “fire brigade” countries (198).
Additionally, in the process of showing Ireland’s delicate balancing act, 
O’Sullivan highlights a number of additional complicating factors, including 
the Irish need for trade with southern Africa, meager resources to devote to the 
cause, and a public with widely varying interests in Africa. By concentrating 
their diplomatic efforts on Africa, Ireland proves itself to be a “global citizen” 
and responsible member of the European Community (198). Shifting their support 
from political considerations in the immediate post-war era to foreign aid by the 
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1970s, Ireland evolves from being a devotee of United Nations policies to an active 
member of the “fire brigade” involved in the Afro-Asian solidarity movement to an 
important player in African affairs moderated through the European Community.
O’Sullivan is at his strongest when examining specific case studies as 
illustration of Ireland’s unique relationship with particular areas of Africa. He 
demonstrates a mastery of these complicated events and is able to provide a new 
and interesting perspective, especially regarding Ireland’s role in the Katanga 
Crisis. To my knowledge, Ireland’s role in the Katanga Crisis has been largely 
unexamined, even though the country played an important role in dealing with the 
crisis, provided military support, and learned from their engagement, to the extent 
that it shaped Ireland’s response to future African issues. O’Sullivan also provides 
insight into how Ireland dealt with the Biafra crisis and demonstrates the dilemma 
the country faced in balancing its desire to recognize the Biafra government against 
the need to rescue missionaries and protect future relationships with the Nigerian 
state. He shows how Ireland’s involvement in Biafra allowed the country to foster 
an independent foreign policy and increase the public’s concern over Africa. This 
engagement possessed important consequences, as the public began advocating for 
a more transparent approach to foreign policy initiatives.
The source material O’Sullivan engages with is impressive. In addition to 
using traditional newspaper accounts and mining archival sources, he seamlessly 
incorporates his own interviews with and published memoirs of a variety of Irish 
diplomats and leaders involved in the events. Another strength of the book is the 
use of non-governmental organization archival material, as it moves the narrative 
outside of formal diplomatic channels. By successfully using an impressive 
quantity of non-state material, O’Sullivan highlights the evolution of early NGOs, 
complicates our understanding of Ireland’s ties to the continent, and shows the 
degree of the Irish’s public interest in Africa.
While the book provides an excellent overview of Ireland’s long and varied 
relationship with the continent, several small issues need mentioning. O’Sullivan 
makes a strong case about the importance of small states in international diplomacy 
and shows the struggle of developing and maintaining an independent diplomatic 
relationship. Yet, he could have elaborated the importance of this case study with 
regard to the end of the British Empire. Readers remain unsure how Ireland’s 
diplomacy complicates our understanding of the decolonization process, and the 
demise of the British Empire requires a more explicit and developed response. 
A large body of literature exists on this topic, and although O’Sullivan cites this 
literature in the bibliography, he could have engaged with it to a higher degree in 
order to provide a more forceful interjection in the historiography. Additionally, 
African voices would have been beneficial, especially when dealing with the 
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fascinating example of rescuing Irish missionaries on the ground during the Biafra 
conflict. Here, we see an important group caught between two opposing forces, 
which served to complicate the Irish response. The inclusion of such material 
could easily support the idea that Africans were certainly using their emerging 
connection with Ireland for their own agendas, just as Ireland needed Africans, and 
thus were more active participants in this evolving relationship.
The study of Ireland’s engagement with Africa that O’Sullivan provides 
is an important intervention in diplomatic history. While diplomatic historians 
will benefit the most and appreciate the backdoor diplomatic maneuvering and 
intrigues, those interested in the Biafra crisis will also be satisfied. Overall, 
O’Sullivan provides an important contribution to diplomatic, Irish, Cold War, and 
African history as Ireland sought to carve out its own particular place and forge its 
own diplomatic relationships. Now, a sequel is needed that looks at Irish responses 
in a more neoliberal world and how HIV/AIDS responses mobilized the Irish 
population and elicited new diplomatic and aid-driven responses.
Timothy Nicholson
Assistant Professor of History
SUNY Delhi
Delhi, NY
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Resnick, Danielle and Nicholas van de Walle, eds. Democratic 
Trajectories in Africa: Unravelling the Impact of Foreign Aid. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, x+310 pp.
Over the last few years, scholarship on foreign aid in Africa has increasingly 
focused on three related qualitative paths: intentions, forms or types of aid, and 
their variable impacts. Where for too long the focus seemed limited to “how much 
is required?” or testing assumptions via economic regression about aid’s impact 
on macroeconomic growth, increased consideration for the types of and intentions 
behind aid, and its uneven economic and political impact, is a welcome trend. This 
edited volume, completed under the auspices of the United Nations University 
World Institute for Development Economics Research (UN-WIDER), attempts to 
parse out the impact of aid on African democracy, both in terms of transitions and 
consolidations. The collection comprises three broadly comparative chapters, seven 
case study chapters—covering Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Benin, and Ghana— and a final “Conclusions and Policy Recommendations” 
chapter. Those seven case studies were carefully selected as part of a comparative 
research design: they all transitioned to multi-party democracy in the 1990s and 
have held at least four presidential and parliamentary elections since the transition. 
By narrowing these parameters for the selection of African cases, which still 
display considerable variation in terms of development status, aid flows, and 
democracy indicators, the impact of aid on democratic consolidation (compared 
to more authoritarian polities) can be better assessed. A wide range of figures and 
tables provide excellent illustrative support for both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches employed by the contributors. 
The book opens with a straightforward research question that is hardly 
simple to answer: “When, why, and how has foreign aid facilitated, or hindered, 
democratic transitions and consolidation in recipient countries?” (1). Because 
aid directed at easier-to-measure economic and social outcomes may undermine 
democratic processes, and aid focused on supporting nascent democratic trends 
may become implicated in and overly influence local political processes, much 
care has to be taken to gauge aid’s impact. The editors thus rightly adopt a nuanced, 
multi-method approach where comparative quantitative and qualitative methods 
are combined with in-depth country case studies. This study partly builds on 
insights from van de Walle’s earlier seminal work.1 There, van de Walle identified 
how the foreign aid regime evolved from the independence era, institutionalizing 
a range of norms and practices that impacted not only development-related 
1 Nicholas van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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inputs and outputs but also the evolution of the post-colonial African state and 
the neopatrimonial politics operating within it. His initial (2001) assessment 
of the 1990s democratization wave on the seemingly permanent economic and 
governance crisis suggested minimal direct influence on state capacity to deliver 
public goods and to constrain executive power and neopatrimonial politics. While 
this assessment came right before the NEPAD and “China in Africa” era which 
transformed to some degree the international development regime and improved 
terms of trade for a growing number of African commodity exporters, van de Walle 
also hinted that “There are reasons to believe that in the long-term, democratization 
may well improve economic management by increasing the accountability and 
transparency of governments” (276). Thus, if democratization may gradually 
improve economic management but decades of foreign aid may have undermined 
economic development, understanding varying and perhaps competing objectives 
within a complex aid regime becomes exceedingly important. 
This edited collection seeks to “disaggregate” democratization and 
consolidation processes as well as different types of aid over time to better 
understand the “conflicts and complementarities between development and 
democracy aid” (3). All the core definitions—democratic transitions and 
consolidation, development and democracy assistance—are provided early on to 
ground the comparative and case study chapters, and Table 2.1 (30) delineates 
different components of the democratization continuum. While not wholly distinct, 
targeted democracy assistance—only 6-8% of total aid flows (7)—is dwarfed by 
development assistance and generally exhibits less donor agency coordination. 
Qualitative differences are critical, however; there is usually short-term tension 
between promoting democratic change and economic stability. This may include 
trying to build up horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms rather than 
simply working within existing executive structures. What this study does well is 
demarcate the more obvious forms of democratic assistance that support transitions 
to multi-party elections versus the more complex ways aid may be intended to 
sustain consolidation processes.
While every chapter makes a significant contribution to the collection, 
the quantitative comparative chapter three by Dietrich and Wright illustrates 
the complexities of addressing the core research question. The authors create 
new datasets that capture qualitative variables for democratic transitions and 
consolidation over time, not solely relying on measures offered by existing 
databases. They examine how different types of aid influence transitions to multi-
party regimes, multi-party failure, electoral fairness failure, incumbent turnover, 
and term-limit failure. Overall, Dietrich and Wright admit their findings are 
weak or inconclusive: they find “some evidence consistent with the proposition 
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that economic aid increases prospects of multi-party transitions in [Sub-Saharan 
Africa]. . . . However, we find little support for the contention that democracy 
assistance is correlated with other aspects of democratic development” (83). 
Despite their inconclusive results, Dietrich and Wright offer important insights 
into methodological challenges including endogeneity bias intrinsic to foreign aid 
flows, and lay the groundwork for the in-depth country case studies that follow. Each 
country case study is an important contribution—theoretically and empirically—to 
the general foreign aid and democracy literature as well as to understanding the 
political economy of development and democratization in each country. A few 
short policy recommendations designed to improve both democracy assistance and 
direct budgetary support close out the book.
Ultimately, the book supports the contention that development aid can play 
a positive role in the promotion of democratic transitions, specifically to multi-
partyism. However, the real conundrum remains aid’s role in consolidation 
processes. Democracy assistance can improve vertical accountability mechanisms 
especially around elections and to support civil society groups, but could do more 
between election cycles to strengthen electoral and party institutionalization. Two 
issues are not specifically addressed in the volume: first, the possible effects of 
patronage networks and the informal realities undermining consolidation, and 
second, there is no consideration of the influence of the designed formal political 
institutions, that is, the constitution(s) after democratic transitions. Perhaps 
democracy assistance and donor leverage can never overcome badly designed 
constitutional frameworks, from powers invested in the executive branch to 
weak amendment formulas. Thus, if the informal networks are powerful and the 
constitution itself does not enable adequate prospects for constraints (horizontal 
accountability mechanisms or the rule of law), then no amount of democracy 
assistance will help. That notwithstanding, this collection stands as an ambitious 
and highly valuable study that tackles the complexities of aid’s impact on one 
desired outcome for assistance, the promotion and entrenchment of democracy. For 
anyone interested in foreign aid in Africa and the interaction of aid and democracy, 
this collection represents a leading-edge contribution.
Chris W. J. Roberts
Doctoral Candidate and Instructor
 Department of Political Science, University of Alberta
Department of Political Science, University of Calgary
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Spiers, Edward. The Victorian Soldier in Africa: Studies 
in Imperialism. Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2013, v + 212 pp.
The “human experiences” of the Victorian soldiers who fought in Africa to expand 
the British Empire at the turn of the twentieth century have received little scholarly 
attention. Yet, as Edward Spiers presents in The Victorian Soldier in Africa, recently 
released in paperback, letters “from the front” by soldiers to acquaintances and 
weekly newspapers at home reveal  their  combat  experiences and  their  close 
connections with  the army and the civilian community in Britain. Often composed 
by soldiers enduring extremely demanding terrains and climatic conditions, the 
letters convey views of imperial wars rarely expressed in the official dispatches, 
corroborate the testimony of contentious issues, provide fresh insight about the 
men’s experiences in various aspects of the same campaign, and supply a greater 
range of perspectives from soldiers in different regiments (2). Significantly, the 
letters also soften the image of the army in Britain during the period when men 
hardly considered careers in the military and “few families had a positive image of 
the army as a career” (12).
The value and significance of these letters cannot be overstated. But Spiers 
cautions against taking them at face value, because of what he has identified as 
their “shortcomings.” He cautions that some authors “were profoundly shocked by 
the experience and were not always lucid in their recollections; others embellished 
their accounts” (40). Soldiers without a clue about the casualty figures provided 
imagined estimates, made factual errors, and downplayed the enemy’s resilience, 
essentially authoring letters that are “limited in perspective” (28). Creating further 
complications, these communications passed through the hands of military censors 
and local newspapers editors who likely tinkered with their tone and meaning. 
Notwithstanding, the letters convey eyewitness accounts of the Victorian army in 
action and reveal the hardships the soldiers encountered in Africa.
Structurally, the nine chapters of the book follow chronological order, covering 
twenty-eight years of Victorian wars in Africa (1874–1902). Spiers begins by 
discussing the British military success in West Africa against the Asante people of 
modern Ghana, a victory ascribed to the soldiers’ valor and the superior firepower 
of breech-loading Snider. In the second chapter, the author examines similar 
imperial campaigns and victories in the Ninth Cape Frontier War and the Anglo-
Zulu War in South Africa. In  both  campaigns,  however,  the  Victorian  soldiers 
encountered  “a succession of assaults,” especially from the Zulu warriors who sent 
them to “eternity” (49, 50), before reinforcements began to arrive. Spiers’s third 
chapter, also on South Africa, highlights the British campaign in battling the Boers 
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in the First Anglo-Boer War of 1880–1881. Over the next three chapters, which 
consider the war in northeastern Africa, Spiers focuses on British intervention in 
Egypt, the fight against the Mahdists, and the Gordon relief expedition. While the 
seventh chapter brings back the discussion to southern Africa, in Bechuanaland 
(modern Botswana), the penultimate chapter takes the reader back up north—to 
the war in Sudan, whose purpose was to reconquer the region after the essentially 
failed Gordon relief expedition. Spiers concludes by “re-engaging the Boers” in 
the Second Anglo-Boer War in southern Africa (1899–1902).
The book’s strength resides in its significant use of substantial primary 
materials in the form of personal letters and diaries that convey the soldiers’ “human 
experience” in their own voices. To the benefit of scholarship on the subject, Spiers 
allows the men to speak for themselves, adding commentary on their views and 
assessing key actors, such as native auxiliaries in Africa and politicians in London. 
For these reasons, Spiers’s book is a valuable contribution to the scholarship.
But the book is not without fault. One wishes that Spiers would have 
discussed at much greater length the social relationships between the soldiers 
and non-combatants, especially women—a topic he covers very briefly in two 
paragraphs, one in chapter six and the other in the epilogue section. The book’s 
cursory treatment of the soldiers’ social interactions produces the unsettling and, 
indeed, cliché, image of an impassive Victorian man completely lacking human 
connections. As the book has it, the men seem to have cared about more victories, 
the possibilities of earning promotions and medals, and increased self-esteem (93, 
180) than they did about native bearers, laborers, and traders, whom they often 
subjected to physical punishment whenever they felt that they had been cheated 
(185).
Nonetheless, this book fits squarely within the literature of imperial, colonial 
Africa, and military histories, as well as in the capacious field of Victorian studies. 
College instructors in these disciplines who wish to use the book as a classroom 
text will surely find this paperback edition affordable and useful. Although fairly 
short, its chapters convey deep meanings about British wars in pre-colonial Africa. 
Undergraduate students should find the chapters easy to read and comprehend. The 
book carries visual images in general maps—eight in all—simplifying the work of 
readers seeking to identify the major theatres of the wars. Unfortunately, the lack 
of other visual elements (e.g., photographs and charts) may limit the ability of the 
uninitiated to contextualize the conflicts. 
Viewed narrowly, The Victorian Soldier in Africa captures imperial war 
stories in Africa, accentuates the hyper-masculinity of British soldiers, and hints 
at the aggressive nature of the British Army. Speaking broadly, however, the book 
challenges our perception of the meaning of nineteenth and  twentieth  century 
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imperial  expansion  in  Africa,  encouraging  its readers to think critically about a 
transformative period that in many ways determined the fate of the continent for 
many generations to come.
Samson Kaunga Ndanyi
Doctoral Candidate, Department of History 
Indiana University, Bloomington
Bloomington, IN
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Takougang, Joseph. Cameroonian Immigrants in the United 
States: Between the Homeland and the Diaspora. Maryland: 
Lexington Books, 2014, xxi + 143 pp.
Between the census of 2000 and 2010, the African immigrant population in the 
United States nearly doubled in size from 881,300 to almost 1.6 million. As 
recent census numbers continue to show, African immigration to the United States 
remains dynamic and fast changing. While East and West Africa remain dominant 
as points of origin for African immigrants in the United States, other regions of 
Africa, in particular Central Africa, are  gaining  ground,  increasing in  a  very 
short  period  their  presence and precipitating a need to broaden the conversation 
around African immigration in the United States. In Cameroonian Immigrants in 
the United States, Joseph Takougang provides an important guide to understanding 
the unique development of the Cameroonian Diaspora in the United States. He 
analyzes Cameroonian immigration and the circumstances that have shaped it as 
one of the most recent and fastest growing immigration waves from the African 
continent.
Divided into five chapters, the first chapter of this well-timed book addresses 
the post-colonial immigration efforts of Africans to the United States. Here 
Takougang acknowledges the important role of African students during the colonial 
and the immediate post-colonial periods as progenitors of African immigration. He 
also underscores the failure of African leaders in the post-independence period to 
live up to their promises of political and economic prosperity. In one country after 
another, the devastating failure after independence of the neo-colonial experiment 
in governance prompted many in the early 1980s and, most noticeably, in the 
1990s to flee abroad to among other destinations, the United States. Cameroon, 
however, as Takougang shows in Chapter 2, for a short period, would prove the 
exception to the pattern of socio-economic and political strife and conflict that 
wracked the African continent. Contrary to the popular image widely publicized 
in the early 1980s of the failing African state, Cameroon enjoyed both political 
and economic stability well into the late 1980s, a fact attributable, as the author 
notes, to “the economic pragmatism and liberal policies of the government, the 
dynamism of its private class and the nation’s remarkable political stability” (17). 
The boons of this period, however, would be temporary, as they were influenced 
by a decline in export products, increasing corruption, as well as stringent reform 
policies mandated by Structural Adjustment Programs. Cameroonians began to 
look abroad, first to former colonial metropoles in Britain and France, but with the 
passage of restrictive immigration policies in these countries, the United States 
became the destination of choice.
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In the last three chapters of his book, Takougang addresses the adjustment 
of Cameroonian immigrants in the United States, supplementing his analysis with 
first-hand accounts about their experiences. Many will appreciate the inclusion of 
these stories as the stories of Cameroonian students, who arrived in the immediate 
post-colonial period (up to 1990), echo the hardships suffered and sacrifices made 
often described in the narratives of other African students during this period. As 
Takougang undoubtedly intended, the further addition of the stories of Cameroonian 
immigrants of the post-1990 population wave allows for important comparisons 
between these two generations of Cameroonian immigrants. Here Takougang 
shows that whereas the early generation of immigrants was fairly consistently 
students, male, and from the English-speaking region of the country, there is more 
gender, regional, and ethnic diversity among the post-1990 generation. There is 
also less of an adjustment period for this generation due to established networks of 
friends and family already living and settled in the United States.
The last two chapters explore the struggles and challenges Cameroonian 
immigrants face in their efforts to make “home” and “community” in the United 
States while maintaining important ties and bonds with their homeland. Takougang 
documents the evolution of community organizations in helping to build 
community, beginning with the establishment in the 1970s of student organizations 
like the Cameroon Students Association (CAMSA), which would influence the 
establishment of future national as well as ethnic and alumni organizations, 
all focused on helping to preserve social, political, and economic bonds and 
relationships with Cameroon. These bonds are further reinforced, as Takougang 
shows, with the mutually dependent relationships that remittances exemplify for 
Cameroonians. The money sent home helps to alleviate the strain for many of a 
persistent struggle to access even the most basic necessities, while providing those 
abroad with a sense of responsibility as well as prestige and “celebrity status” that 
can be accessed on return visits back home.
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No work is without limitations, and this work is no exception. It certainly 
could have benefited from a more rigorous accounting of sources, particularly the 
interviews utilized, and a more detailed explanation of the push factors that helped 
to spur the post-1990s immigration wave of Cameroonian immigrants. These few 
issues, however, should not at all detract from the significance of this book as 
one of the first comprehensive efforts to analyze Cameroonian immigrants in the 
United States. It will stand, I hope, as a foundational cornerstone of scholarship 
on both the Cameroonian and African immigrant Diasporas in the United States.
Olanipekun Laosebikan 
Lecturer, College of Education 
Chicago State University 
Chicago, IL
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Terretta, Meredith. Nation of Outlaws, State of Violence: 
Nationalism, Grassfields Tradition, and State Building in 
Cameroon. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014. vii + 367 
pp.
Over the past years, many African nations have commemorated forty and fifty 
year independence anniversaries from European colonialism. Recently, scholars 
have devoted attention to the contexts and legacies of African liberation struggles 
that were hallmarks of the era famous for ubiquitous Afro-optimism and pan-
Africanism. In this book, Meredith Terretta offers a critical analysis of “the history 
of the practice and discourse of Cameroonian nationalism, spearheaded by the 
Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC), as it unfolded in intersecting local, 
territorial, and global political arenas in the 1950s and 1960s ” (2). By examining 
the various local and international contexts that informed the UPC’s efforts to oust 
France from Cameroon, Terretta convincingly argues that the UPC demonstrated 
broad organizational pragmatism in pursuit of legitimacy. In this extensive analysis 
of French Cameroonian nationalism, Terretta also cites how the UPC made use of 
“two political concepts indigenous to the Grassfields region – lepue and gung - as 
the terms used to translate ‘independence’ and ‘nation’,” (13) respectively, in order 
to situate the liberation struggle in a culturally-relevant, discursive framework of 
“global” politics (4).
One of the strengths of this book is Terretta’s detailed ethnographic analysis 
of the formation of Bamileke identities over time. Critical to this endeavor, Terretta 
highlights how the meanings of lepue and gung were interpreted and reformulated 
by UPC supporters to gain support from Cameroonians throughout the liberation 
struggle. From the mid to late 1950s, the UPC sought to develop grassroots support 
at the local level. Bamileke identity was not only shaped by existing ethnic and 
kinship affiliations in central Cameroon, it was also influenced by the cosmopolitan 
and burgeoning nationalism of young Cameroonian women and men who, in the 
early 1950s, migrated to the Bamileke and Mungo regions looking for work. 
Critical to understanding the politicization of these youth, Terretta contends that 
the meanings of both lepue and gung were frequently interpreted, appropriated, 
and altered by UPC cadres to legitimize the liberation movement’s existence in the 
eyes of both local Cameroonians and international agencies. In addition to its local 
organizing efforts, the UPC also drew the attention of the international community 
at the United Nations by submitting thousands of Cameroonian signatures on 
petitions in support of liberation.
Although the UPC’s local and international efforts were critical strategies 
meant to augment and legitimate the UPC as a liberation movement, Terretta also 
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explores the divisions that shaped these strategies. She concludes that, although 
the UPC sought to fashion itself as a unified front, the organization was also 
affected by generational divides and gendered expectations. With the enactment of 
the French loi-cadre, colonial officials sought to empower loyalist chiefs and youth 
who would support France’s intention to remain a colonial presence in Cameroon. 
The power struggle between the UPC and French colonial policies often resulted 
in protests and violent clashes among Cameroonians within the Mungo and 
Bamileke regions. With different Cameroonian actors jockeying for either full or 
mediated independence from France, new opportunities emerged for young men 
and women to challenge existing cultural and social norms. Many youth joined 
the UPC against their elders’ wishes and became part of the nationalist cause. Pro-
UPC Cameroonians also pursued nationalist strategies that highlighted customary 
practices of local political succession, especially when they advocated for the 
ascendency of pro-independence “chiefs” like Fo Pierre Kamdem Ninyim. Since 
Fo Ninyem was sympathetic to the UPC cause, he was subsequently detained
by French officials since his status as a “chief” was supported by many in the UPC. 
In this example of Fo Ninyim, Terretta demonstrates how colonial authorities 
actively infringed upon local cultural practices in order to thwart nationalists’ 
ambitious.
Terretta also explores the international strategies of UPC members. 
Similar to other nationalist movements in Africa and elsewhere, the UPC 
“fashioned their independence-era political repertoire out of a combination of 
public discourse, print culture, symbols, political cartoons, clothing, religiosity, 
and the political symbolism of the UN in an international arena” (116). Critical 
to the UPC’s quest for legitimacy, both in French Cameroon and abroad, was 
the liberation movement’s petitioning efforts among a broad spectrum of 
Cameroonians. As Terretta shows, the signatures of Cameroonians were sent to the 
UN to pressure the French to leave the “Trust Territory.” Given the sheer volume 
of petitions sent to the UN Trusteeship Council between 1946 and 1960, however, 
a fundamental weakness is the author’s inability to analyze the rich primary 
sources now available. It would have been interesting to learn about the processes, 
methods, and challenges that must have faced UPC members while collecting, or 
soliciting, signatures. For example, were petition signatures peacefully solicited or 
coercively obtained, were they independently verified in anyway and, if so, what 
evidence did the UPC (or UN) use to validate the authenticity of the petitions? 
Moreover, in the years leading up to independence, the UPC sent roughly “fifty 
thousand petitions to the Trusteeship Council” advocating for independence from 
France, but in what concrete ways did these petitions play a role in generating 
legitimacy for the UPC at the local and international levels (113)? These minor 
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quibbles aside, Terretta highlights how the petitions themselves connected UPC 
organizers to the local Cameroonian population and helped to galvanize support 
for liberation. The UPC’s petitioning efforts brought peoples’ grievances about 
French colonialism in Cameroon to the attention of the international community.
Despite both the UPC’s grassroots and international success in challenging 
lingering French colonialism in Cameroon, Terretta also underscores the fact that 
French officials and their Cameroonian sympathizers infiltrated UPC networks, 
exploited cultural practices, and made use of African loyalists in order to thwart 
the liberation movement. After banning the UPC and propping up the regime 
of Ahmadou Ahidjo, violence engulfed French Cameroon. Terretta contends 
“that Bamileke chiefs, guided by their own political concerns, those of their 
chieftaincies, and those of their emigrant populations, understood what was at 
stake as they chose to side with one trend or another in the territorial political 
arena of 1956” (173). Thus, Terretta reveals the complex intersections between 
Cameroonian nationalism and French colonial machinations as various actors 
sought opportunities for political and economic power in the waning days of 
French colonialism in Cameroon.
Given the variety of rich primary sources and level of analysis in this book, 
Terretta makes a significant contribution to the liberation history of Cameroon 
and, more broadly, to analyses of African liberation history. By emphasizing how 
“global” issues, contexts, and cultural practices overlapped to inform the legitimacy 
and strategies of the UPC, Terretta’s book offers scholars interested in nationalist 
struggles a thorough example of the complexities of African liberation.
Michael G. Panzer
Adjunct Professor 
Mount Saint Mary College
Newburg, NY
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Wendland, Claire L. A Heart for the Work: Journeys through 
an African Medical School. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2010, xiv + 330 pp. 
In A Heart for the Work, obstetrician and anthropologist Claire L. Wendland writes 
about medical student training in Malawi’s first medical school. In contrast to 
Western medical school ethnographies, this work does not find students becoming 
increasingly detached from their patients as they study sick bodies and the science 
of medicine. Instead, empathetic connections to the afflicted are strengthened. 
Wendland’s research demonstrates that although medical curricular are increasingly 
harmonized around the world, the processes and influence of medical education 
are not. As elsewhere on the globe, doctors are held in high regard in Malawi 
and medical school is hard to enter and challenging to complete. But Malawian 
medical students have no assurance of an upper-middle class wage or state-of-
the- art clinics at graduation. Many are “called” to medicine, others choose it for 
the prestige, and some study it because they have shadowed relatives in health 
care or practiced as clinical officers themselves. Chapter Three details students’ 
socioeconomic enablers and motivations for pursuing a medical career. Although 
there are multiple paths to medical school, and Wendland is careful to include the 
many exceptions in her ethnography, the journey to Malawi’s College of Medicine 
is most easily navigated by upper-class, male, Christian students. 
Matriculation is only the first of many challenges to receiving and perfecting 
scientific training in this resource-limited setting. As the author observes (and titles 
the very rich sixth chapter), “resource is a verb” in Malawi and “resourcing” is a 
skill honed in medical school. Resourceful doctors procure tests and medicines 
despite shortages, and improvise creatively, when essential tools are impossible to 
obtain. Exceptional physical diagnosis skills stand in the gap in the absence of high-
tech diagnostics. Students and faculty are unworried by personal and professional 
risks associated with diverting resources, which are overshadowed by avoidable 
adverse outcomes that arise from the dearth of the materials of health care. 
Very early in their education, students at the College of Medicine and its 
associated Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital become nominally supervised 
clinicians. As trainees, they have close and extended work with terminal 
patients and a very small community of classmates with which to share difficult 
experiences. Irrespective of previous preparation (some students have worked 
as clinical officers), all the students struggle emotionally to work through the 
suffering and poverty of their patients to deliver care. Working with too few tools 
and personnel, students and interns recognize that they cannot but draw upon the 
expertise and experience of nurses and clinical officers. As Wendland observes, 
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with the exception of female students, who are often mistaken for nurses, Malawian 
medical students are immediately and continuously accorded the very high respect 
reserved for medical doctors. This might have prevented the authoritarianism and 
power struggles that have been documented for Western medical students.
The possible trajectories for graduates of the new College of Medicine 
could only be projected at the time of writing. The book does this by layering 
student aspirations and newly-graduated intern experiences on to available data 
and interviews with Malawian physicians. In spite of an often-stated desire to 
migrate, and the belief that this is the most popular path of their predecessors, 
Wendland speculates that most of the medical school’s graduates will become 
general practitioners in Malawi. Data from a recent study suggests that this is 
where most recent graduates are and Wendland finds most of those she followed 
through medical school in domestic posts soon after graduation. However, the 
author does not project very far, but perhaps an ethnography should not. As the 
alumni population builds, the least objectionable posts in Malawi are filled and 
the school gains reputation, even as the motivations and means to migrate could 
actually increase. This is certainly the experience of African countries with older 
medical schools;101 but as Wendland mentions, doctors who migrate may still 
contribute to health care in Malawi in some way or form. 
A Heart for the Work does identify important systemic problems that promote 
emigration from Malawi. A two tiered pay structure for faculty members at the 
medical school, which gives expatriates much cushier wages and benefits than 
Malawians, stands in the way of “Malawianizing” the Medical school and is a 
principal factor that could drive brain drain. While financials are enumerated as 
disincentives to stay in Malawi – Malawian government doctors not only earn less 
than their contemporaries abroad, they are more poorly paid than other professionals 
like lawyers and accountants – the students cite the dearth of tools needed for 
optimal clinical care and the risk of contracting life-threatening disease on the job 
as principal inducements to emigrate. Wendland observes that although pay and 
work conditions in the public health system are poor, they can be supplemented 
with social capital, with part-time private practice and with what Valéry Ridde has 
referred to as “perdiemitis,” income supplements obtained by attending externally-
funded training workshops that are replete across Africa. As Ridde has observed, 
the opportunity to make a living from perdiems solves some problems but is its 
own disease. 
A Malawian health practitioner is a doctor or nurse all the time and everywhere. 
Most are compelled to work round the clock from home as well as the hospital, and 
101 C. Ihekweazu., I. Anya, and E. Anosike, “Nigerian Medical Graduates: Where Are They Now?” 
Lancet 365 (2005):1847-8.
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for little pay. A couple of months can, on occasion, be skipped from the payroll 
due to “computer problems” and back pay may be difficult or impossible to secure. 
These disincentives occur alongside an almost complete absence of regulatory, 
professional or public oversight of clinical practice. As a result, Malawian doctors 
are viewed by their students as either exceptional or “saint like” in their practice 
and commitment to their patients, or working, or failing to work, with “clinical 
impunity.” Almost no doctors did “a decently competent job for eight or ten hours 
and then [went] home” (171). The Malawian medical students aspired to practice 
with “Heart”, an unusual “empathetic responsibility” (177), which Wendland’s 
book captures very well. The students hoped not to “become so absorbed in the 
trauma that [they would] miss the gift” (173). Western Medical school ethnographies 
inevitably record that the stresses of medical school result manifests in derision 
and even dislike of patients.102 Wendland observes similar stresses and frustrations 
among Malawian medical students but remarkably finds no ill-will towards 
patients. Instead, the students direct their anger at their government, whose failure 
to properly resource the health system is held accountable for the failures and 
stresses that come with practicing medicine. And in contrast to Western medical 
trainees who become increasingly detached from politics, Malawian students 
become more politically aware activists in the course of their training. Rather than 
becoming disgusted at their patients, they work to mobilize them to demand better 
health care from their government.
Scholars and students of African medical practice need to read this richly 
illustrated picture of medical students, teachers, and other health practitioners 
in Malawi. Many recent studies of post-colonial medicine focus on external aid 
and its impact on the African clinic. By contrast, Wendland’s eye is remarkably 
trained on the African medical establishment and thus provides valuable context 
for other studies. A Heart for the Work will also be valuable to health policy 
makers and medical educators as well s pre-medical and medical students in Africa 
and elsewhere. The author’s personal experience working as an obstetrician as 
she engaged in her ethnographic research could be perceived as a confounding. 
However, the dearth of clinicians means that neither she nor “Queen’s” hospital 
could afford to have her work only as an anthropologist. Her dual practices there, 
as well as her extensive experiences in medical education and clinical practice in 
the United States, come through in many unusual and positive ways. 
102 See for example, S. J. Reiser, Medicine and the Reign of Technology (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978).
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Iruka N. Okeke
Professor, Department of Biology, 
Haverford College, PA and Faculty of Pharmacy,
University of Ibadan 
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Youngstedt, Scott M. Surviving with Dignity: Hausa 
Communities of Niamey, Niger. United Kingdom: Lexington 
Books, 2013, xv + 226 pp.
Hausa   scholarship   has   developed   primarily   around   communities in Northern 
Nigeria and Eastern Niger. In Surviving With Dignity, anthropologist Scott M. 
Youngstedt shifts the focus to long-standing Hausa communities in Niamey. 
This book is the result of over twenty years of research in Niger, and Youngstedt 
effectively draws from his own friendships with Hausa men to inform his larger 
work. Bringing together personal Hausa narratives and proverbs with global 
economic policies, Youngstedt situates Niamey at the center of larger conversations 
on globalization and modernity.
The first half of Youngstedt’s book frames Niamey within a global context. 
In his introduction, Youngstedt establishes the two concepts of suffering and 
dignity as essential to understanding how Hausa communities interact with 
shifting social and economic dynamics in Niamey. He links suffering to poverty 
and global structural violence, whereas dignity is found at the individual level 
and intimately tied to Hausa ideologies. After a brief history of Niamey’s growth 
from an eighteenth century Zarma town to a present day cosmopolis, Youngstedt 
then analyzes how international organizations have had devastating effects on 
the Nigerien economy. In particular he points to the five Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs) imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s. 
The consequent lack of economic opportunity in Niger leads to Youngstedt’s next 
topic, Niamey’s global diaspora. Youngstedt contributes an interesting perspective 
in his analysis of internal migrations in which he places Niamey as a stepping-stone 
for Hausa men moving from rural to international destinations. He also examines 
how technological developments such as money transfers, internet usage, and cell 
phones help maintain global Hausa networks connected to their symbolic home in 
Niamey.
In the second half of his book, Youngstedt delves into his local case studies. 
His fourth chapter looks at how hira, Hausa men’s conversation groups, serve as a 
grassroots institution in which Hausa communities negotiate local meaning amidst 
global societal changes. In his fifth chapter he considers three overlapping spheres 
through which Hausa experience modernity; Africanist-traditionalist, Muslim-
Islamist, and Francophonist- globalist. Here he focuses primarily on modernity 
from an economic perspective, and the tension between local understandings of 
globalization and growing economic inequality. His sixth chapter, briefer than 
earlier ones, focuses on the economic struggles of male youth in Niamey with 
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examples highlighting the financial difficulties of marriage and the role of hip hop 
as a means of expression.
One of Youngstedt’s strongest contributions in this book is his use of hira 
in the fourth chapter. His analysis focuses on both the structure of these groups 
and the role they serve in Hausa communities in Niamey. He looks at structural 
variances between unofficial hira and the more recently developed formal groups, 
fada. Ultimately it is the function of hira that fits very well into Youngstedt’s 
framework. It is here that the encounter of suffering and dignity meet within a 
local cultural context; these conversation groups allow for an active negotiation 
of what modernity and globalization mean within the Hausa community. This is 
also where Youngstedt’s own language skills and long-term friendships align most 
strongly with his methodological approach.
The limitations of this book are self-addressed by the author. Youngstedt notes 
that within Niamey there is ethnic flexibility, yet his work relies on Hausa as an 
exclusive category. His personal experiences add dimension throughout the book, 
but lead to one major limitation, the lack of Hausa women’s voices. Youngstedt 
addresses this by highlighting the existing scholarship on Hausa women, but leaves 
room for the role of women and foyande, women’s conversation groups, to be 
further explored. In addition, throughout the book Youngstedt’s local case studies 
play a supporting role to an analysis that is often shaped around quantitative data 
from international organizations and surveys. The exception to this is his strongest 
chapter on hira, which highlights a point in the book where the author is able to 
use local understandings of modernity to shape his own analysis. The result is 
a glimpse of a more complex understanding of these concepts within a Hausa 
epistemological framework and an approach that Youngstedt could have developed 
further.
The  strengths  of  Youngstedt’s  work  outweigh  these  limitations. He 
successfully places Niamey at the forefront of the conversation on globalization, 
and  highlights  the  growing  work  of  Hausa scholarship in Niger. He does so 
in both an informative and compassionate way by offering the reader a history of 
Niamey, the global policies that have impacted its growth, and a glimpse into the 
lives of the Hausa men who are negotiating on a daily basis with living in a modern 
world that has created severe economic inequalities. Most importantly, Youngstedt 
points scholars to many promising directions, such as the roles of gender and ethnic 
flexibility, to continue the worthy scholarly hira he has initiated.
Lori De Lucia
Doctoral Candidate, Department of History
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA
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